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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the dissertation was to analyze the development of
the Spanish American societies and rural Spanish America in historical
and comparative perspective.

Locating the dissertation in the context

of the debate over whether the Latin American societies should be
defined as "pre-capitalist or capitalist?," the author reviews the
dualist and development of underdevelopment theses as presented b y
Jacques Lan&ert and Andre Gunder Frank, respectively.

And noting the

critiques offered by Eugene Genovese, Ernesto Laclau and F. Stirton
Weaver,

the author proposes that the historical development of the

Spanish American societies and rural Spanish America be analyzed
in terms of the social relations of production and the class structures
to which they give rise.

Several chapters are then devoted to

analyzing the development of rural Spanish America: historically, in
the context of the respective national societies of Spanish America
and the developing world economy, and comparatively, as suggested by
Cristobal Kay, with Eastern Europe.
The thesis of the dissertation is:

That the Spanish American

societies have - until recently - been characterized by the domination
of pre-capitalist ruling classes and that rural Spanish America has
been characterized by the persistence of pre-capitalist, predominantly
seigneurial social relations of production and domination.

And, that

the underdevelopment characteristic of the Spanish American societies,
and, in particular, rural Spanish America, has been the historical

v

p r o d u c t of that persistent seigneurial domination.
is argued,

Furthermore, it

the p a r t icipation o f the Spanish A m e r i c a n societies in the

c h a n g i n g and expanding world economy o f the late nineteenth and e a r l y
t wentieth centuries had the combined effect o f strengthening that
s e i g n eurialism at the same time that it furthered the development of
c a p i t a l i s m in those societies.

Thus,

the Spanish A m e r i c a n societies

e x perienced the contradiction of combined, o r heterogeneous,
d e velopment

(i.e.

the coexistent expansion of seigneurialism and

capitalism) which, during the twentieth c e n t u r y - u n der the impact of
the w o r l d crises - generated the populist

(multi-class) alliances

w h i c h have seriously challenged the pre-capitalist domination of the
S p a n i s h A m erican societies and the persistence of seigneurialism in
rural Spanish America.

INTRODUCTION
Life must be lived forward, but
can only be understood backward.
- Kierkegaard

In 1957, the International Labor Organization published a study
on the agrarian structure of Latin America.*-

This study indicated

that there were three main types of land tenure patterns in contemporary
rural Latin America.

The first type was the coranunal landholding,

apparently a survival from pre-conquest society.

The second type was

the latifundia, a product of the conquest and colonization of America
by Spain and Portugal.

A n d the third type was the family-farm land-

holding, characteristic of Europe:

the result of the migrations to

Latin A merica from Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.

3

The communal and latifundia land tenure types had,
persisted for centuries.

Often,

it appeared,

the communal lands and the latifundia

lands did not exist in isolation from each other, but had, in fact,
been involved in a continuing struggle over land and labor within a
latifundia-minifundia tenure pattern.
sixteenth century (and earlier)

Rural Spanish America from the

to the twentieth century might be

Vrhis dissertation is restricted to an interpretation of Spanish
America, focusing primarily on Mexico, Peru, and Chile, w ith more than
occasional reference to Bolivia and Venezuela.
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Labor Office, The Landless Farmer in Latin
A m e r i c a , New Series no. 47 (Geneva, 1957).
ibid.,

pp.

1-2 .

1

described in terms of persistence and continuity.

But, as C. Wright

Mills once wrote:
Rather than 'explain' something as a persis
tence from the past,1 we ought to ask 'why has
it persisted?'
Usually we will find that the
answer varies according to the phases through
which whatever we are studying has gone; for
each of these phases we may then attempt to
find out what role it has played, and how and
why it has passed on to the next phase.^
And yet, since the 1930's, there have been major changes in the
Spanish American countryside: Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile and
Peru have all experienced (or are experiencing) major reforms of
their agrarian structures.-*

A common element in these reforms has

been the diminution of the latifundia as a land tenure type in favor
of greater peasant landholding.
However, that major changes have finally occurred in rural
Spanish America does not negate the question 'why did the agrarian
structure persist?'
significance.

Rather, the whole issue is provided with new

By rephrasing the question of persistence as 'why was

there no change?' and posing it opposite the question 'why have there
recently been major changes in rural Spanish America?,'

it becomes

very apparent that persistence and change must be studied in relation
to each other, rather than in isolation.

^C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1959), p. 154.
5"...generally understood to mean a set of institutions, norms
(both written and unwritten) and social, political, and economic
relationships governing the access to and use of land as a productive
resource." Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Introduction" in Stavenhagen, ed.,
Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1970), p. 3.

3

The study of continuity and change Is essential In the study of
development.

And if "historians should stress continuity over change"®

while "sociology is an attempt to understand the direction of change,
then the

integration of history and sociology - whose relationship

Peter Berger has called

"symbiotic,"® must be achieved

appreciation of development.

for an

At the same time, it must be remembered

that we are not referring "to the dull little padding known as
'sketching in the historical background,"'^ but rather that:
...the use of such a perspective goes beyond
the notion of 'historical background' to the
theoretical comprehension of development and
underdevelopment as historical processes.*-®
Nevertheless, history has been excluded from the field of
development studies; probably because of sociology's eagerness to both
break with the "evolutionism" of its theoretical origins

(which has

been seen as an historical approach) and also to "establish its own
academic credentials."*•*■

The contradiction has been that the rebel

lion from history has not only been at the expense of understanding

^Stanley Stein and Barbra Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 189.
^Philip Abrams, "The Sense of the Past and the Origins of
Sociology," Past and Present, no. 55 (May 1972), p. 18.
Q

Books,

Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City: Anchor
1963), p. 169.
9Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 154.

lOHenry Bernstein, ed., "Introduction." Underdevelopment and
Development: The Third World Today (London: Penguin Books, 1973),
p . 15.
^Abrams,

"The Sense of the Past," p. 25.

4

persistence,

12

but also - b y necessity - it has been at the expense of

understanding change.
jeopardized,

Thus, an understanding of development has been

if not sacrificed:

As a reaction to the concept of an inevitable
succession of stages, social scientists have
turned anti-historical - erecting a barrier
between social change and social development.
The historical development of rural Spanish America has been
characterized by persistence, continuity and, since the 1930's, major
change.

The challenge of this dissertation is to explain

thatp e r 

sistence and change, and, thus, to seek to further understanding
the development process in Spanish America.

of

As the historian,

E.H. Carr, once wrote:
A historically-minded generation is one which
looks back, not indeed for solutions vrtiich
cannot be found in the past, but for those
critical insights which are necessary both to
the understanding of its existing situation
and to the realization of the values which it
h o l d s .14

A n Outline of the Study
This dissertation is an attempt to interpret persistence and
change in rural Spanish America in historical and comparative perspec
tive, and to relate the issue of persistence and change to the subject
of development and underdevelopment.

^ W h i c h , in fact, many critics in the discipline claim has been
just the opposite, i.e. sociology has been stuck on equilibrium studies.
l^Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory
and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1972), p. 37.
^ E d w a r d Hallett Carr, The New Society (Boston: Beacon Press,
1957), p. 18.

Basically,

the thesis presented herein is, that the Spanish

American societies have - until recently - been characterized b y the
persistence of precapitalist ruling classes15 and that rural Spanish
A m erica has been characterized by the predominance of precapitalist,
seigneurial relations of production and domination.1^
is argued,

Furthermore,

it

the underdevelopment characteristic of the Spanish American

societies,1^ and in particular rural Spanish America, has b een the
product of that persistent precapitalist, seigneurial domination.
Chapter One,

"A Debate and A Thesis," locates the issue of p e r 

sistence and change in rural Spanish America within the debate
"feudalism and/or capitalism in Latin America?," as represented b y the
"dualist" and the "development of underdevelopment" theses.
a critique of these two theses,

Following

seigneurialism and capitalism are

defined for the purpose of historical analysis and the thesis of this
study is presented in more complete form.
Chapter Two, "Spanish Seigneurialism," examines the changes in,
and yet persistence of, seigneurialism in Iberian Spain in order to
locate the origins of Spanish American seigneurialism as an
historico-social formation.
Chapter Three,

"Colonial Development in Comparative Perspective,"

examines the persistence of, and changes in, Spanish seigneurialism
produced b y the conquest and colonization of America, and places the

15

The term, precapitalist ruling classes, does not include all
n o n -capitalist ruling "classes," e.g. the ruling bureaucracies of the
communist states.
16See pages 26-27.
^ G e n e r a l l y understood to be the lack of economic growth via
industrialization.

6

development of Spanish American seigneurialism in historico-coraparative
perspective with Eastern Europe, which also experienced the persistence
of seigneurialism in this period of the sixteenth and seventeenth
c e n t u r i es.
Chapter Four,

"Spanish A merican Seigneurialism," follows the

persistence and expansion of seigneurialism as a mode of production
and domination during the first half of the nineteenth century and the
establishment of Spanish American independence;

and examines Spanish

A merican seigneurialism as a mode of production characterized by the
social relations between a dominant landowning class and a dependent
peasantry.
In Chapter Five,

"National Development in Comparative

Perspective," Spanish America is again placed in comparative perspec
tive with Eastern Europe in order to examine the decline of seigneur
ialism as a result of the development of capitalism, and to understand
the divergent paths that their respective agrarian structures followed
as a result of the specific class alliances which emerged during the
period of transition.
Finally, in the "Conclusion," the dissertation is summarized
with reference to the theses presented, and an attempt is made to
indicate the limitations of this study and to propose further areas
of research to be pursued.

Note on Methodology
It would be easy to fall upon the quote of Paul Sweezy and say
"aLl sociology worthy of the name is historical sociology."

18

18Mills quoting Sweezy, The Sociological I m a g i nation, p. 146.
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However,

in order to present the methodology of this dissertation, a

few more words on "historical sociology" seem essential.
It has already been stated that the objective of this disserta
tion is to confront the questions

(or dual question)

"why did the

agrarian structure persist and w h y has there recently been change?"
In order to accomplish this task,

the Spanish American societies and

their rural sectors must be placed in historical, comparative perspec
tive,

i.e.

they must be examined through the phases of their

historical development.
Analyzing the historical development of a society (or institu
tion, community, etc.) is the task of historical s o c i o l o g y . ^

The

met h o d of historical sociology is the application of social science
theory to the research and evidence of the historian.

To quote Mills,

"The production of historians may be thought of as a great file in dis
pensable to all social science,"^®

Directly relevant to the use of

historical works in sociology is Seymour Martin Lipset's citing of
T.H. Marshall's statement:
Another criticism which has been levelled at the
sociologist's attempt to generalize by comparing
the histories of several nations is that he must
inevitably rely extensively on secondary authori
ties without going back to the original resources.
T.H. Marshall, one of the deans of British sociology, has justified this practice: Nothing is more
unreliable than the first-hand account of an

^ S e y m o u r Martin Lipset, "History and Sociology: Some Methodolo
gical Considerations," in Lipset, Revolution and Counter-revolution:
Change and Persistence in Social Structure (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1970), pp. 3-36.
In this article, Lipset states: "A significant source
of the renewed interest in historical and comparative sociology has
b e e n the emergence of the body of inquiry which has been called the
sociology of development."
(p. 5)
^^Mills, The Sociological I magination, p. 145.

8

eye-witness, nor more liable to deceive than
diaries and correspondence whose authors
thoroughly enjoyed writing them. And even the
accounts of treasurers cannot always be accepted
as representing the final and absolute truth.
It is the business of historians to sift this
miscellaneous collection of dubious authorities
and to give to others the results of their
careful professional assessment. And surely
they will not rebuke the sociologist for putting
faith in what historians write.21
If there is a tradition which the methodology and interest of
this dissertation would pretend to fit, it is the traditional concern
of the classical sociologists for historical social change,

22

and the

renewed interest among historians and social scientists in unifying
the study of the past and the present.

23

In particular, this dissertation subscribes to the proposal of
the French historian, Fernand Braudel.

Braudel, directing himself to

the issue of unifying the social sciences and history, proposed that
the unification begin through the study of the "long term" and
"duration.In

this way, he hopes that historians will be able to

move away from merely focusing on the short-term, the individual and

^^-Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Ration: The United States
in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1967), p. 10. T.H. Marshall quoted from Sociology at the Crossroads
and Other Essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 36-37.
^ T h e classical sociologists, Karl Marx and Max Weber, studied
history to understand the meaning of change in their respective
presents.
^ I n more recent times, there has been a renewed interest in
historical social change, exemplified by the work found in the
journals, Annales (French), Past and Present (British), and Comparative
Studies in Society and History (North American).
2 % e r n a n d Braudel, "History and Social Sciences," in Peter Burke,
e d , , Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe: Essays from Annales
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 11-42.

9

the event, and social scientists, who often make pretensions to
trans-historical analysis, will return to the study of historical
society:

25
The past can only be told as it truly ijj not
was.
For recounting the past is a social act
of the present done by men of the present and
affecting the social system of the present.

25Ibid., p. 13,
2 fi

Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York:
Academic Press, 1974), p. 9. Wallerstein explains that this should
not be at the cost of objectivity.

CHAPTER I

A DEBATE A N D A THESIS

A major debate among students of Latin America has been the
issue of whether Latin American society, and in particular rural Latin
America, should be termed pre-capitalist or capitalist.

The

persistence of the debate has been due to several reasons.
The first reason is that the many participants in the debate
have not all defined the term capitalism in the same manner.

Thus,

although they may be analyzing the same society (or societies) they
are not using the same criteria.

This problem of definition has been

compounded by the fact that the participants in the debate have rarely
made explicit the definitions they are using in their analyses.
A second reason, closely related to the first, is that the many
analyses carried out and the propositions which have been stated are
often focusing on different levels, i.e. some arguments in the debate
focus on the region,
national system.

1

others on the nation,

2

and others on the inter-

It is possible that contradictory conclusions which

were reached about Latin America would not have been reached had the

^■Josue de Castro, Death in the Northeast (New York: Vintage
Books, 1966).
o

Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970).
3
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Rise and Future Demise of the World Capi
talist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies
in Society and History, vol. 16, no. 4 (September 1974), pp. 387-415.
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same level of analysis been used in each case.

At the same time, the

case of similar definitions, at different levels of analysis, resulting
in opposing conclusions, can guide analysis in search of the cause of
this contradiction.
Still a third reason for the persistence of the debate over pre
capitalism vs. capitalism in Latin America is that this issue is not
merely an academic one.

Political and social change strategies, for

mulated by both revolutionaries and reformers, have been constructed
according to the particular framework of social organization believed
to exist in the respective Latin American societies.

It has been

written that:
Modes of definition embody particular assumptions
and concerns and give rise to particular methods
and uses.
It is one of the peculiarities of social
science that its concepts and the activities of its
practitioners themselves enter the field of study.
Thus, political and governmental coalitions, peasant mobiliza
tions and agrarian reforms, development programs and projects have
often depended on the definitions used and the conclusions reached in
the debate over capitalism in Latin America.

Definitions of Capitalism
Before examining the major arguments in the debate, it is impor
tant to review the particular definitions of capitalism which exist in
historical and sociological research.

Maurice Dobb, the late British

economist and economic historian, wrote that there have been "three

^Henry Bernstein, ed., Underdevelopment and Development, p. 14.
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separate meanings assigned to the notion of capitalism."'*
The first definition of capitalism, according to Dobb, is the
one proposed in the writings of Werner Sombart and Max Weber.

Sombart

sought the meaning of capitalism in a particular unity of the "spirit
of enterprise" or adventure, and the "bourgeois spirit" of calculation
and rationality:^
...we must trace the origin and growth of the
capitalist spirit...we dissect the whole into
its component parts, and we shall turn our
attention chiefly to two, the spirit of enter
prise and the bourgeois spirit which when united
generated the capitalist spirit... The spirit of
enterprise is a synthesis of the greed of gold,
the desire for adventure, the love of exploration
... The bourgeois spirit is composed of calcula
tion, careful policy, reasonableness, and economy.
Max Weber also referred to a particular world view which he
called the "spirit of capitalism," and in his work he sought to
differentiate modern capitalism from capitalisms of the past and other
geographic regions, i.e. the spirit of capitalism was not merely the
quest for wealth, but rather the quest for wealth according to
rational conduct and a rationalistic economic ethic:
The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain,
of money, of the greatest possible amount of
money has in itself nothing to do with capi
talism. This impulse exists and has existed
among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists,
prostitutes...gamblers and beggars.
One may
say it has been common to all sorts and
conditions of men at all times and all countries

% a u r i c e Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New
York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 4.
^Ibid., pp. 4-5.
^Werner Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the
History and Psychology of the Modern Business M a n , trans. M. Epstein
(London: T. Fisher and Unwin, 1915), p. 22.

of the earth... Cthisd Unlimited greed for gain
is not in the least identical with capitalism,
and is still less its spirit.
Capitalism may
even be identical with the restraint, or at
least a rational tempering, of this irrational
impulse. But capitalism is identical with the
pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit,
by means of continuous rational, capitalistic
enterprise.®
The second definition is the one which identifies capitalism
with production for the market, particularly distant markets.

Thus,

Henri Pirenne located the origins of capitalism in the twelfth
century, amongst a developing class of merchants:
In actual fact, the capitalistic spirit made
its appearance simultaneously with conmerce
...it began in conformity with the stimulus
which it received from the outer world - with
long range trading and the spirit of big
business... it was dominated by the capitalist
spirit... Those who initiated and directed
and expanded the commerce of Europe were a
class of merchant-adventurers.
Thus, for Pirenne, capitalism is commerce.

In fact, he wrote:

Of one thing we may be absolutely sure, that
these men were inspired by a greedy spirit of
profit-seeking. We must not think of them
simply as respectable folk doing their best
to make both ends meet. Their one object was
the accumulation of wealth.
In this sense,
they were animated by the capitalist spirit,
which the rudimentary psychology of our modern
economists would have us regard as something
highly mysterious, born in penury or Calvinism.
With these words, Pirenne attempts to sweep aside the work of

®Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p.
17. It will be argued later that equating Weber's work with Sombart's
may be to misread it.
% e n r i Pirenne, A History of Europe, 2 vols.
Anchor Books, 1958), vol. I, p. 196.
10Ibid., p. 195.

(Garden City:

Sombart and Weber and their notion of a particular synthesis of profit
seeking and rationalism, and argues that capitalism originated in a
"greedy merchant-class - not among god-fearing calvinists."
Related to the definition of capitalism offered by Pirenne is
that of Karl Polanyi, which equated capitalism with the market economy
reaching its height in the nineteenth century.

Polanyi wrote:

Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile
conditions was there, as we have shown, a
separate economic system in society. Nineteenth
century society, in which economic activity was
isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic
incentive, was indeed a singular departure. ^
This definition of capitalism is today found in similar form
amongst a particular school of economic anthropologists who focus on
market and exchange relationships.

Thus, capitalism is defined as

increasing complexity in the market, whereby the range of transactions
is enlarged through the monetization of the e c o n o m y . ^
The third definition of capitalism, according to Dobb, is the
one traditionally identified with the work of Karl Marx.

In this case

capitalism, and other historical forms of society, are identified by
the "social relations between men which result from their connections
with the process of production."

13

Thus, to quote Dobb:

Capitalism was not simply a system of production
for the market, but a system under which labourpower had itself become a commodity and was bought
and sold on the market like any other object of
exchange.
Its historical prerequisite was the

^ K a r l Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press,
1957), p. 71.
12cyril j. Belshaw, Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).
l^Dobb, Studies, p. 7.

15

concentration of ownership of the means of
production in the hands of a class, consisting
of only a minor section of society and the
consequential emergence of a propertyless class
for whom the sale of their labour-power was their
only source of livelihood. Productive activity
was furnished, accordingly, by the latter, not
by virtue of legal compulsion, but on the basis
of a wage contract.
Or, as Marx himself wrote:
...two very different kinds of commodity
possessors must come face to face and into
contact: on the one hand, the owners of money,
means of production, means of subsistence, who
are eager to increase the sum of values they
possess, by buying other people's labor; on the
other hand, free laborers, the sellers of their
own labor power, and therefore the sellers of
labor. Free laborers, in the double sense that
neither they themselves form part and parcel of
the means of production, as in the case of slaves,
bondsmen, etc., nor do the means of production
belong to them, as in the case of peasant
proprietors... ■*
This definition of capitalism, based on the analysis of the
social relations of production, has been termed the "materialist con
ception of history," while the "spirit of capitalism" approach has
often been posed in opposition to it as the "idealist" argument.

Thus,

Marxian theory has often been countered with what has been called
"Weberianism."

However, not all social scientists have viewed the

Marxian-Weberian dialogue as necessarily a conflict.

In their work in

social psychology, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills recognized this and
wrote that:

^Ibid,
^Karl Marx, "Excerpts from Capital: A Critique of Political
Economy." Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy,
ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 161.
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For both Karl Marx and Max Weber, in contrast
to both Simmel and Sombart, "modern capitalism"
is anchored in the sphere of production.
Accordingly, the historical emergence of modern
capitalism is not seen as a quantitative expan
sion of markets, but as the emergence of the
factory as a productive unit or, in Weber's
terms, of a rational organization of formally
free labor for the continuous acquisition of
profits... Marx focused on the labor supply...
Weber was more interested in the origins and
psychology of...Cthe3 middle class
entrepreneur.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, his
classic work on the origins of capitalism, Weber wrote that:

"The

Occident has developed...a very different form of capitalism which has
appeared nowhere else:
mally free labor."17

the rational capitalistic organization of for
Therefore, the significance of Weber's work in

relation to that of Marx was, perhaps, not to argue against it, but
rather to understand the psychological and socio-cultural dimensions
of the development of capitalist society.
There are, then, three definitions of capitalism which have
predominated in historical and sociological theory:
1)

capitalism as a specific "spirit of livelihood;"

2)

capitalism as production for a market, i.e. commercial enterprise
for profit; and

3)

capitalism as a particular historical formation in which the owners
of the means of production hire labor from a propertyless class

^ H a n s Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure:
The Psychology of Social Institutions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World - Harbinger Books, 1964), p. 214.
^ W e b e r , The Protestant Ethic, p. 21, As indicated above, Weber
sought to differentiate "modern capitalism" from other capitalisms.
See Gerth and Mills, Character, pp. 215-223.

which has nothing to offer for sale but that labor.
The methodological and theoretical significance in the choice of a
particular definition of capitalism will become apparent in the
following discussion of the debate over the characterization of the
Spanish American societies as pre-capitalist or capitalist.

The Debate
In the debate over whether Latin American society and its rural
sector should be characterized as pre-capitalist or capitalist, there
have arisen two dominant theses, which can be termed the "dualist
thesis" and the "development of underdevelopment thesis."
The dualist thesis originated in the work of the Dutch
economist, J.H. B o e k e . ^

Cyril Belshaw, in Traditional Exchange and

Modern Markets, explains that:
The notion of dual economy implies that within
one political framework, there is one sector
which operates according to the principles of
modern capitalism.
This sector is commercially
sophisticated, linked with international trade,
dominated by motives of maximization... Opposed
to this sector and separated from it is the
traditional peasant economy, which, according
to the purist form of the theory, is conserva
tively oriented, interested in security and
continuity rather than change, not concerned
with maximization of profit or resource use,
oriented towards the satisfaction of social
needs rather than reacting to international
forces, and incapable of engaging dynamically
in trade and commerce.^0

l^The definition of capitalism used in this dissertation is that
favored by Marx, see p. 26.
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J.H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953).
^^Belshaw, Traditional Exchange, p. 96.

18

According to this thesis, the dual society is, in fact, two
separate societies with their own laws of dynamics and change.
Supposedly, the interaction between the two societies (of the dual
society) is minimal.
The dualist thesis applied to Latin America is best represented
by the work of Jacques Lambert.
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According to Lambert, the majority

of the Latin American countries is characterized by social dualism,
which exists when "the population is divided between archaic and
developed forms of social organization."

He indicates three forms of

social dualism: regional dualism, rural-urban dualism, and rural
dualism.22

Regional dualism is characterized by Brazil, where the

southern region is modern and developed and the northeast is archaic
and underdeveloped; and by Peru in the contrast between the coast and
the sierra.23

Rural-urban dualism exists throughout Latin America and

is supposedly increasing "to the point where there may be a 'break'
between the rural and urban s o c i e t y . T h e
rural dualism

third form of dualism is

which, in Latin America, refers to the difference

between the plantation and the h a c i e n d a . ^

The plantation, according

to Lambert, is typified by the coffee fazendas of Sao Paulo, sugar
plantations of the Caribbean and the coast of Peru, and fruit farms of
Central America - as well as many cattle estancias of Argentina and

Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structures and Political
Institutions. trans. Helen Katel (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967).

^ J a c q u e s Lambert, Os Dois Brasis (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editors
Nacional, 1967).
24i,ambert, Latin America, p. 85.

25IjJi(j., p< 7]^
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Uruguay.

He contrasts these "capitalist" agricultural investments to

the "feudal" haciendas of pre-revolutionary Mexico and Bolivia,
highland Peru, northeast Brazil and other regions of Latin A m e r i c a . ^
Lambert differentiates between the two types of latifundia, plantation
and hacienda, by whether they are market-oriented or not.

He finds

that the plantations often concentrate on a single-crop for export,
while the haciendas are not so commercially-oriented, but rather tend
towards self-sufficiency.
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He further states that the plantation's

commercial orientation leads it to establish modern, capitalist labor
relations, i.e. hired labor on wage contracts, while the hacienda's
relations of production are feudal in nature because of its basically
non-commercial orientation.
Thus, Lambert argues that rural dualism (and dualism in general
in Latin America) results from the fact that some landholdings, the
plantations, are commercially-oriented and involved in the market
economy, while other landholdings, the haciendas, are not commercially
oriented, nor involved in the market economy, and that these respec
tive orientations are the product of their owners' motivations.
In contrast to the dualist thesis,

there is the development of

underdevelopment thesis which was formulated by Andre Gunder Frank.
Actually, Frank proposed the development of underdevelopment thesis to
counter the dualist thesis, which he felt was ahistorical.

According

to Frank, one cannot talk of "feudalism" in Latin America because Latin

^ I b i d . , pp. 72-73.

2ft

^ I b i d . , pp. 6 8 , 72.

Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin
America (London: Penguin Books, 1971) and Latin America: Underdevelop
ment or Revolution? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
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America has been capitalist since the Conquest.

It is Frank's argument

that, in fact, Spain and Portugal were capitalist in 1500 and, thus,
any analysis of rural Latin America must be seen in the framework of
capitalism.^9

in his research and writings, Frank has sought to show

that, historically,

those regions which are today most "backward" and

characterized by isolation from the market were, at one time, most
involved in commercial relations, e.g. northeast Brazil, highland
Peru, and Bolivia, and other regions.**0

Thus, according to Frank, the

backward regions of contemporary Latin America are the product of the
development of underdevelopment, which is the result of the contradic
tions of capitalist development,

i.e. the development of Western

Europe and the United States has been at the expense of Latin America
and the rest of the Third World.

Frank's thesis is based, in part, on

the work of Paul Baran, the economist, who argued that the Third
World's underdevelopment must be viewed in relation to the development
of the advanced capitalist c o u n t r i e s . ^

Frank writes:

Economic development and underdevelopment are
the opposite faces of the same coin. Both are
the necessary result and contemporary manifes
tation of internal contradictions in the world
capitalist system... One and the same historical

29
Luis Vitale, the Argentine historian, in his research has
also argued that Spain and Portugal were capitalist societies and,
thus, the idea that Spain or Portugal transplanted feudal societies to
the Americas is out of the question. His thesis is based on a defini
tion which equates "natural economy with feudalism" and "money economy
with capitalism." Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist?" in
James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or
Revolution? (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 32-43.
30Ibid.
■^Paui Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (London: Penguin
Books, 1972). In particular, chapters 5, 6 and 7 on the "Roots of
Backwardness."

process of the expansion and development of
capitalism throughout the world has simultan
eously generated - and continues to generate
- both development and underdevelopment.^^
Frank, like Lambert, defines capitalism on the basis of Whether
or not the society, region or community, is involved in - or has been
involved in, market and commercial activity.

According to this

definition, Frank finds that all of Latin America has been actively
participating in capitalist economy and, therefore, the Latin American
societies can only be termed capitalist.
The debate over feudalism vs. capitalism in Latin America deals,
in effect, with the issue of persistence and change.

According to

Lambert's dualist thesis, the persistence of "feudalism" in rural
Latin America is due to the non-coranercial orientation and lack of
integration of those regions and/or enterprises in the national/inter
national economy.

Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis

takes the opposite view.

According to Frank, the persistent "back

wardness" of those regions which Lambert termed "feudal" is actually
due to their historical commercial activity and integration in the
world economy.
Of course, one must ask how it is possible that the two theore
tical frameworks arrive at different, even contradictory, conclusions,
especially when Lambert and Frank have defined capitalism in the same
way.

That is, both the dualist thesis and the development of under

development thesis define capitalism in the manner proposed by
Pirenne, i.e. "is production being carried out for the market?"
To a certain extent, the issue can be termed the "problem of

■^Frank,

Capitalism and Underdevelopment, p. 33.
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sociology without history and history without sociology."

Lambert's

analysis was based on contemporary Latin America and projected into
the past, leading to ahistorical conclusions.

Thus, Lambert's weak

historical analysis placed his thesis in jeopardy, or as Rodolfo
Stavenhagen has written:
There is no doubt that in all the Latin American
societies great social and economic differences
exist - between rural and urban areas, between
Indian and non-Indian populations, between the
mass of peasants and the urban and rural elites,
and between the very backward and the relatively
developed regions.
Nevertheless, these differences do not
justify the use of the concept of dual society
for two principal reasons.
First, the relations
between the "archaic" or "feudal" regions and
groups and the "modern" or "capitalistic" ones
represent the functioning of a single unified
society of which the two poles are integral
parts; and second these two poles originate in
the course of a single historical process. ^
At the same time, Frank's historico-economic analysis, and its
emphasis on Latin America's integration in the world economy fails to
provide us with an explanation for Latin America's structural heterogeneity on the level of national social organization.

Frank's argu

ment that the Latin American societies cannot be termed dual societies
because of Latin America's Integration in the world economy, although
admittedly with historical and regional variation, does appear more
tenable than Lambert's, considering the evidence.

However, by focus

ing his analysis on the level of the world economy, he does not
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Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies about Latin America," in
Petras and Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, pp. 16-17.
Alberto Martinelli, "Dualism in the Analysis of Underdevelop
ment," International Journal of Sociology, vol. 4, no. 2-3 (Fall 1974),
pp. 23-26,
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provide us with a framework within which we can understand the histo
rical development of particular Latin American societal structures and
regional variations in social organization.
As well as the problem of "sociology without history and history
without sociology," there is the problem of "definitional weakness" in
the debate over capitalism in Latin America.

Maurice Dobb has

commented that:
The justification of any definition must
ultimately rest on its successful employment
in illuminating the actual process of histo
rical development; on the extent to which it
gives a shape to our picture of the process
corresponding to the contours which the
historical landscape proves to have.
With this in mind, the problem of definitional weakness in the
debate over capitalism in Latin America can be recognized in Dobb's
critique of the definition of capitalism proposed by Sombart and
Plrenne:
Both Sombart's conception of the capitalist
spirit and a conception of Capitalism as pri
marily a comnercial system share the defect,
in common with conceptions which focus atten
tion on the fact of acquisitive investment of
money, that they are insufficiently restrictive
to confine the term to any one epoch of history,
and that they seem to lead inexorably to the
conclusion that nearly all periods of history
have been capitalist, at least in some d e g r e e . ^
Thus, in a similar fashion, we can see that by using the defini
tion of capitalism which Lambert and Frank seem to utilize, we could
be led to conclude that both contemporary Europe and pre-Columbian
Mesoamerica have been capitalist societies."^

■*"*Dobb, S tudies. p, 8 .

"^Ibid.

^ S o m e t h i n g which neither scholar would wish to suggest.
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A related criticism of Frank's thesis, that the Latin American
societies are necessarily capitalist by virtue of their integration in
the world economy, has been made by a number of historians and social
scientists.

Ernesto Laclau has written that in "the debate over

1feudalism vs. capitalism'... its protagonists have constantly confused
the two concepts of the capitalist mode of production and participation
38
in a world capitalist economic system." °
necessarily directed at Frank,

Similarly, although not

the following statement by Eric J.

Hobsbawm is relevant:
...while in many ways Detroit and Cuzco are today
part of a single system of functional inter
relationships (for example, part of one economic
system) few would regard them as part of the same
society, sociologically speaking . ^
In the same vein, but in this case directed specifically at
Frank's work, Eugene Genovese has written:
What Frank cannot understand - and this failure
steins from his singular concern with economics...
is that it is one thing to argue that European
capitalism has intruded itself into every part of
the world and has exploited and subjugated the
most diverse peoples, societies, and social systems;
but it is quite another thing to argue that there
fore every such people, society, or social system
has become one more variant of bourgeois culture.
And, with greater reference to the issue of development, F.
Stirton Weaver has directed the following criticism at both traditional

^®Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America,"
New Left Review, no. 67 (May-June 1971), pp. 36-37.
•^Eric j, Hobsbawm, "From Social History to the History of
Society," Daedalus, vol. 100, no. 1 (Winter 1971), p. 30.
^ E u g e n e Genovese, "The Comparative Focus in Latin American
History" in Genovese, In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in
Southern and Afro-American History (New York: Vintage Books, 1972),
pp. 385-386.
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international economic development theory and the development of under
development thesis which located itself in supposed opposition to the
former:
The real problem is the narrowness of the
economic terms in which the argument is con
ducted; it simply does not include a sufficient
view of social process to make historically
valid generalizations about the impact of
foreign trade and investment on economic
development. 1
Later, he added (which, to a certain extent, introduces the
method of historical analysis to be used in this dissertation):
Although inter-nation transfers of economic
surplus is useful for understanding the
benefits accruing to the developed capitalist
trading and investing nations, it is too fra
gile to bear so much of the burden of explana
tion for the more complex "development of
underdevelopment." The extreme wealth of
Latin American appropriating classes through
history is potent prima facie evidence against
"capital scarcity" and "too poor to save"
explanations of economic stagnation.
The use
of economic surplus, not merely its quantity,
must be the center of attention, and this
necessitates class analysis.
Actually, what these criticisms appear to be moving towards is,
as Genovese proposes, "a redefining of capitalism.

From being under

stood as merely a system of economic relations, it must be understood
as a social process."4 ^

And, following Marx,

(Weber), and Dobb,

Genovese argues that such a "redefinition of capitalism" should begin
by focusing analysis on the mode of production of the society and the

4 *T. Stirton Weaver, "Positive Economics, Comparative Advantage,
and Underdevelopment," Science and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer
1971), p. 171.
42Ibid., p. 176.
4 ^Genovese, "The Comparative Focus," p. 387.

26

social relations which compose it.

To operationalize his proposition,

Genovese suggests that the following definitions of "seigneurialism"
and "capitalism" be used:44
Seigneurialism is here defined, following Marx
and Dobb, as the mode of production characterized
by a dependent labor force that holds some claim
to the means of production.
This definition makes
seigneurialism roughly equivalent to serfdom, but
not exactly so, for it includes regimes in which
the lords' claims on the economic surplus are met
by payments in money or kind, as well as in labor
services. Capitalism is here defined as the mode
of production characterized by wage labor and the
separation of the labor force from the means of
production, that is, as the mode of production in
which labor power itself has become a commodity.
He explains that:
The great value of this viewpoint lies in its
focus on the human relationships inherent in
labor systems. As such, it should be understood
to transcend mere economic categories and to
define each mode of production as a social rather
than as a narrowly economic system.4^
These are the definitions upon which the historical and

44Genovese's work has been devoted to analyzing (U.S.) Southern
plantation society and the master-slave relationship, placing it in
comparative perspective with the slave regimes of the Caribbean and
South America, particularly Brazil.
4 ^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders Made (New York: Vintage
Books, 1971), p. 16. Genovese's use of the term seigneurialism
instead of feudalism is explained:
"The substitution represents a grudging, long-resisted
capitulation to those medieval historians who bitterly
complain about the expropriation of one of their favorite
terms.
Since feudalism continues to define a particular,
fairly well delineated political system...the dual meaning
causes unnecessary trouble. As Marx and Dobb themselves
show, the mode of production they call feudal does not
require the political system of the same name, although
some kind of rough historical correlation may be made.
The term "selgneurial" expresses the essentials of that
mode of production and avoids the difficulty." (p. 16)
46Ibid., p. 17.

sociological analysis of this dissertation will be based.

From a

study of the social relations of production, analysis can proceed to
the class relations and structure of the society, which are based on
those social relations of production.
Frank appears to have recognized that his emphasis on economic
relations required further grounding in social class analysis.

Thus,

his argument that Spain and Portugal were capitalist societies in 1500
was refined and he proceeded to describe Iberian society as "merchant
capitalism," in which the merchant class becomes the dominant class in
/

the society.

*7

Therefore, his argument that Spain and Portugal were

capitalist societies remained intact.
However, if we are going to define capitalism as a specific
historical form of social relations, is there a "merchant capitalism?"
Maurice Dobb responded to this issue with the following:
If we are speaking of Capitalism as a specific
mode of production, then it follows that we
cannot date the dawn of this system from the
first signs of the appearance of large-scale
trading and a merchant class, and we cannot
speak of a special period of "Merchant
Capitalism" as many have done. We must look
for the opening of the capitalist period only
when changes in the mode of production occur,
in the sense of direct subordination of the
producer to the capitalist.
This is not just
a point of terminology, but of substance;
since it means that if we are right, the appear
ance of a purely trading class will have of
itself no revolutionary significance; that its
rise will exert a much less fundamental influence
on the pattern of society than will the appear
ance of a class of capitalists whose fortunes are
intimately linked with industry; and that while a
ruling class, whether of slave owners or feudal

^ S e e James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson,
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972).

lords, may take to trading or enter Into a class
alliance with traders, a merchant class, whose
activities are essentially those of an inter
mediary between producer and consumer, it is
unlikely to strive to become a dominant class
in quite that radical and exclusive sense of
which we were speaking a moment ago. Since its
fortunes wilL tend to be bound up with the
existing mode of production, it is more likely
to be under an inducement to preserve that mode
of production than to transform it. It is likely
to struggle to "muscle in" upon an existing form
of appropriating surplus labour; but it is unlikely
to try to change this form.^-®
Max Weber,

in his research, stated:

...we shall see that at the beginning of modern
times it was by no means the capitalistic entre
preneurs of the comnercial aristocracy, who were
either the sole or the predominant bearers of the
attitude we have here called the spirit of capi
talism. It was much more the rising strata of
the lower industrial middle classes.
And Gunnar Myrdal has noted that: "Trade by itself...rather
tends to have backwash effects and to strengthen the forces
maintaining stagnation or regression.
Thus, the appearance of an active and aggressive merchant class
is - according to our definition and analytical method - insufficient
to characterize a society as capitalist, because it will not
necessarily entail the development of capitalist social relations.
In fact, neither does the appearance of a bourgeoisie itself,
whose further progress would seem dependent on the expansion of

^®Dobb, Studies, pp. 17-18. Also, see the work by Dobb, ed.,
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (New York: Science and
Society, 1954).
^^Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 65.
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Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions
(New York: Harper and Row - Torchbooks, 1971), p. 53.
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capitalist social relations - both as an enlarged market and an
enlarged labor supply, necessarily guarantee the transformation of a
society from seigneurialism to capitalism.

Eric Hobsbawm, in discus

sing the European crisis of the seventeenth century, has shown that
large-scale production of a capitalist nature developed early in some
regions, but at the same time the rising bourgeoisie of those regions
was immobilized by a still-strong seigneurial structure of society.
And Genovese has similarly Illustrated, in his work on the slave
South, that the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was immobilized
to the point of becoming strong supports of the slaveholders' regime.
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Thus, it can, perhaps, be argued that it is not merely the appearance
of a "capitalist class" which forwards the development of capitalism
to the extent that it becomes the dominant mode of production, but
rather, as one historian has written:

"Capitalism, as a mode of pro

duction, does not attain great strength until the disintegration of
feudalism reaches an advanced s t a g e . T h e r e f o r e ,

rather than resort

to the "promiscuous application of class l a b e l s , t h e

uniqueness of

social classes in their specific historical and national context must
be recognized.

■^Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in
Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe. 1560-1660 (Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1967), pp. 15-19.
-^Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New York:
Vintage Books, 1967).
“^Jo s e p h T. Fuhrmann, The Origins of Capitalism in Russia:
Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 257.
^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders M a d e , p. 19.
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A Proposition and A Thesis
This work, in approaching the issue of persistence and change in
rural Spanish America, will follow the method of analysis which focuses
on the social relations of production and the class relations and
social structure which develop from them; recognizing that such an
analysis must be carried out in the context of the national societies
of which the rural sectors are a part.

At the same time, those

national societies were originally the product of a common source, the
expansion of Spain, and they have developed, and are developing,
within the developing world economy, which together provide a frame
work for a comparative analysis and perspective.
Stated formally, the thesis of this dissertation is:

That the

Spanish American societies have - until recently - been characterized
by the domination of pre-capitalist ruling classes and rural Spanish
America has been characterized by the persistence of pre-capitalist,
predominantly seigneurial social relations of production and
domination.

And that the underdevelopment characteristic of the

Spanish American societies, and in particular rural Spanish America,
has been the historical product of that persistent seigneurial
domination.

Furthermore,

it is argued, the participation of the

Spanish American societies in the changing and expanding world economy
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had the combined
effect of strengthening that seigneurialism at the same time that it
furthered the development of capitalism in those societies.

Thus, the

Spanish American societies experienced the contradiction of combined,
or heterogeneous, development (i.e. the coexistent expansion of
seigneurial and capitalist social relations of production), which
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during the twentieth century - under the Impact of the world crises
- generated the populist (multi-class) alliances which have seriously
challenged the pre-capitalist domination of the Spanish American
societies and the persistence of seigneurialism in rural Spanish
America.
Although we have been highly critical of both Lambert's dualist
thesis and Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis, they have
made valuable contributions to Spanish and Latin American development
studies.

Lambert's dualist thesis recognized the coexistence of

seigneurial and capitalist social relations in Spanish America.

On

the other hand, Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis has
recognized that Spanish (and Latin) America have participated in the
world economy with historical and regional variation.

Nevertheless,

we will argue - on the basis of class analysis - that the underdevelop
ment characteristic of Spanish America, and in particular rural
Spanish America, has been due neither to a supposedly non-commercial
orientation of the Spanish American landowning classes, nor caused by
the Spanish American societies' participation in the world economy.
In view of our criticism of the dominant theses of Spanish
America's historical development, i.e. the dualist thesis and the
development of underdevelopment thesis, there are a number of ques
tions which remain unanswered or require re-evaluation in terms of the
method of analysis to be used herein.

The following questions can,

therefore, serve as a guide to this dissertation and the argument of
the thesis presented:
1)

What was the nature of Iberian-Spanish society at the time of
the Conquest, and what role did it play in the creation of
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conquest societies in. America?
2)

What was the nature

of the societies which developed during

the colonial period and established their independence in the
nineteenth century, and what were the dominant social relations
in the rural sector?
3)

What was the impact

of the changing and expanding world

economy of the nineteenth century, followed by the world
crises of the twentieth century, on the Spanish American
societies and their rural sectors?
4)

And, considering the changes of this century in Spanish America,
and particularly in rural Spanish America, what role did the
social relations of production play in generating those changes?

CHAPTER IX

SPANISH SEIGNEURIALISM

The discovery of America, the rounding of the
cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising
bourgeoisie.
The East Indian and Chinese
markets, the colonization of America, trade
with the colonies, the increase in the means
of exchange and in commodities generally, gave
to commerce, to navigation, to industry an
impulse never before known, and thereby, to
the revolutionary element in the tottering
feudal society, a rapid development.*
Although it was Spain which discovered and conquered America,
thus enlarging the European world economy and providing further
stimulus to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it was not
Spain which was to undergo this revolutionary change.

The new markets

available and the wealth which was generated did not instigate the
social changes necessary to develop capitalism in Spain, rather they
merely served to support the persistence of the seigneurial regime
which had developed.
In turn, it was not capitalism which conquered and colonized
America,^ for if it had been capitalism, the development of America
would have proceeded differently.

Spanish America inherited from

Iberia the social relations of seigneurialism, although admittedly

^Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International
Publishers, 1948), pp. 9-10.
^i.e. Spanish America.
For Portuguese America, see Genovese,
The World The Slaveholders Made.
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cast with a mercantilist orientation.^

Thus, to understand seigneuria

lism in rural Spanish America, analysis must begin in Spain, set in
the Mediterranean world^1- and the product of the Reconquista.’*
The Reconquista's impact on the historical development of Spain
is a debate unto itself.

But within that debate there seems to be

agreement that the nature and the longevity of the struggle impeded
the development of classical medieval feudalism.®
At the same time, the error should not be made of assuming that
the weakness of feudalism made the victory of capitalism easier.

In

fact, one might argue the contrary, i.e. that the strength of the
monarchy would not depend as much on an alliance with the nascent
bourgeoisie to subjugate the nobility to its authority.

Thus, although

feudalism (political) would not have developed, seigneurialism (socio
economic) and its inhibition of capitalism would not be seriously
challenged by such an alliance.

Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz wrote:

It has been stated that Spain never knew
feudalism, and some have affirmed that it
didn't know the Renaissance either.
For
two decades I have insisted many times
about an absence no less transcendent:

Ji.e. commercial orientation.
^On the significance of Spain's geographical, economic and sociohistorical position in the Mediterranean, see Fernand Braudel, The
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip I I . 2
vols. trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). One
reviewer has written: "His vision of Latin America as part of the
sphere of Mediterranean interest is pregnant with new insights and
directions for research."
(Thomas Glick, Hispanic American Historical
Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (February 1974), p. 160.)
^The period of the Reconquista can be seen as having stretched
from 711-1492.
®See Marc Bloch, Feudal Society. 2 vols.
University Press, 1961).

(Chicago: Chicago

35

Spain lacked a bourgeoisie.^
The Reconquista produced an Iberia of disunited kingdoms:
Portugal, along the Atlantic coast, which had finished its reconquest
earlier than the other Iberian kingdoms, and the Spanish kingdoms,
which by -the late fifteenth century were to come under the domination
of Aragon and Castile.
Aragon commanded Mediterranean Spain, and in the latter period
of the reconquest had developed a commercial empire, along with
Catalonia.

This Catalan-Aragonese conmercial empire supported a ruling

class of merchants and a small nobility.

J.H. Elliott has written:

The success of the Catalan-Aragonese commercial
system brought prosperity to the towns of the
Crown of Aragon and helped to consolidate power
ful urban patriciates.
These, in practice, were
the real masters of the land, for, apart from a
handful of great magnates, the nobility of the
Crown of Aragon was a small-scale nobility, unable
to compare in territorial wealth with its
counterpart in Castile.®
Merchant classes, as Maurice Dobb has argued, are not the revo
lutionary bourgeoisie which has been attributed with the transformation
of societies from feudalism to capitalism.

The Catalan-Aragonese

merchants are further proof of the statement:
One feature of this new merchant bourgeoisie
that is at first as surprising as it is
universal, is the readiness with which this
class compromised with feudal society once its
privileges had been won.®

^Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, Espana: un enigma historico. 2 vols.
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1962).
®J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain: 1469-1716 (New York: Mentor Books,
1963). Also, for a description of the Catalan-Aragonese economy, see
Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, trans. F.M. LopezMorillos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
^Dobb, Studies. p. 120,
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Thus, the "new nobility" of merchants in the Crown of Aragon
invested their profits in land, in order to collect the seigneurial
rents of the peasantry, as did the "old nobility."
In Aragon (and Catalonia) the major institution of the seigneu
rial

structure was remenca.

The remenca-peasantry constituted up to

a third of the p o p u l a t i o n , ^ and:
...they were for the most part bound to the soil,
unable to leave or dispose of the farms they held
without the lord's consent; their rights over their
personal property, and their privileges of marriage
and inheritance were seriously limited by seig
niorial interference; and they staggered under a
heavy burden of dues of various sorts, which were
payable in money, labor, and kind, and were imposed
in most vexatious ways.
The lot of the Catalan peasantry was exceptionally hard under
the seigneurial regime, due to the particular regional variation of
remenca which included the seis malos usos - six evil customs.

12

Thus, Aragon and Catalonia, although highly mercantile and inte
grated into the Mediterranean world economy, remained seigneurial on
the essential level of the social relations between the ruling nobility
(old and new) and the working peasantry.

While the Crown of Aragon was

commercially oriented and involved in the Mediterranean, the Crown of
Castile continued with the reconquest of Iberia and pushed its domain

^Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 37.
H-Roger Bigelow Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the
Old World and the N e w . 3 vols., vol. 1, The Middle Age (New York:
Macmillan, 1918), p. 477. Also, for the legal history of seigneuria
lism, see Alfonso Marfa Guilarte, El Regimen senorial en el siglo XVI
(Madrid: Institute de Estudios Politicos, 1962).
^Ib i d . , p. 478.
The six evil customs gave the lord greater
control over the peasant's property and, in some local areas, included
the traditional (and infamous) seigneurial privilege of first night
with the peasant's bride 1

southward.

The Reconquista for Castile "was at once a crusade against

the infidel, a succession of military expeditions in search of plunder
and a popular m i g r a t i o n . T h e

'tradition of conquest1 which Castile

maintained through the continuing battles in southern Spain was to
lend itself to the later conquest and colonization of America.
J.H. Parry, in his classic, The Spanish Seaborne Empire, wrote:
In Andalusia the Castilians developed their
own domestic imperialism and formed the habits
of conquest and settlement which they would
inevitably, sooner or later, seek to exercise
beyond the boundaries of Spain. ^
Southern Spain, conquered by Castile, was carved into vast
landed estates and distributed to the nobility as their reward for
participating in the s t r u g g l e . A l o n g with their estates and juris
dictions, the Castilian nobility secured a "numerous and extremely
docile peasant population.
In Aragon, the merchants and nobles secured an agrarian labor

^Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 31.
Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (London: Penguin Books,
1973), p. 8 . Parry also notes the significance of the Castilian con
quest of southern Spain and the capture of Seville, "The richest, most
productive and most civilized territory in all Spain, the greatest and
most industrious city, a thriving port which was to become the gateway
to Atlantic trade and discovery, became incorporated in Castile, the
most warlike, the most powerful, economically, and socially the most
backward kingdom in Spain. A whole armoury of new weapons had been
placed in the hands of the successors of the Cid."
l^Edward Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in
Spain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Malefakis discusses
land tenure and labor relationships and emphasizes the impact of the
Reconquista on the modern agrarian pattern,
■^Parry, The Spanish, p. 4. Also, "A docile peasantry is a
source of strength and weakness to a strong ruler who can organize its
capacity for labor and taxes, but under a weak and disintegrating
government such a peasantry will, without much spontaneous resistance,
render passive obedience to an invader from outside."
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force and taxes from the remenca-peasantry.

In Castile, there was

also a seigneurial system of lordship over the peasantry known as
senorio de solarlego (which persisted into the seventeenth century),
Varying, according to the amount of land owned by the lord, "its
principal feature was that the vassals EpeasantsU obtained inheritance
rights from their lords in exchange for dues or services."17
Seigneurialism in Aragon and Castile took different juridical
forms; however, the essential features were similar in both kingdoms.
The peasants were subject to feudal-seigneurial labor services and
dues, owed to the nobility (or merchant aristocracy) which dominated
landholding as well.
In the century prior to the Spanish conquest of America, Spain
itself was taking shape.

During the fourteenth century, the

Mediterranean world economy had suffered a severe crisis, which has
been termed a "crisis of feudalism" by many economic and social
historians.18

^ result of the crisis was a decline in the economic

strength of the seigneurial nobility involved in the Mediterranean
world e c o n o m y . ^
However, the economic crisis and the weakening of the seigneurial
nobility did not lead to the collapse of the feudal-seigneurial
regimes.

Rather, as a result of the economic crisis, many merchant

^ T h e r e was a second type of senorio called senorio libre or
behetrfa, however, it eventually became indistinguishable from senorio
de solariego. See Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 67.
*-®Ruggiero Romano and Alberto Tenenti, Los Fundamentos del mundo
moderno: edad media tardea, renacimiento. reforma (Mexico: Siglo XXI,
1972).
In particular, chapter 1, "Crisis of the 14th Century,"
pp. 3-39.
l^Ibid,, pp. 20-23.
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families purchased landed estates with their wealth and bought their
Of)

way into the nobility, u and:
tended inevitably to transform themselves into
aristocracy, a new part of the aristocracy that
sought to inherit and almost always succeeded
in doing so, the privileges - all the privileges
- of the old aristocracy.^^The Spanish seigneurial structure maintained itself by being
99

open and available to the mercantile class which sought entry into it.
Social mobility, i.e. movement from the merchant class to the aristo
cracy (and the seigneurial power and privilege it provided) was
possible and appears to be a characteristic of Spanish society at this
time.

Luis Suarez Fernandez, in his research, has commented:
From time to time a new man appeared and
immediately poured all his energies into
founding a mayorazgo, into creating a noble
house; it cannot be said,
therefore, that
the oligarchy was a closed one. The great
lords served as a model for a large number
of nobles of an intermediate type... They
were highly conservative, and their conser
vatism was directed above all toward the
economic structure which allowed them to
develop their power.
They can be called
capitalists only in the sense they they had
been able to accumulate enormous sums of
money.23

20There have even been hypotheses that the crisis in the
Mediterranean economy was due, in part, to the merchants' preference
to 'seigneurialize' themselves rather than expand their commercial
activities or involve themselves in manufacturing.
^ R o m a n o and Tenenti, Los Fundamentos. p. 69.
if it should be termed neo-feudalism.

The authors ask

22

See Stanley Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal. 2 vols.
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 270, on the
possibilities for "ennoblement."
^ L u i s Suarez Fernandez, "The Kingdom of Castile in the Fifteenth
Century" (1964) in Roger Highfield, ed., Spain in the Fifteenth
Century: 1369-1519 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 97.
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Following the crisis of the fourteenth century, the fifteenth
century was a period of decline in the Catalan-Aragonese economy and
commercial empire in the Mediterranean.

The economic and comnercial

decline of the Crown of Aragon generated conflict between the classes,
and a civil war broke out.

Meanwhile, Castile was laying the founda

tion for its eventual dominance in Iberia and the future Spanish
empire overseas.
The economic crisis of the fourteenth century had led many of
the Catalan merchants to place their wealth in agrarian estates and to
seigneurialize themselves.

When the crisis of the fourteenth century

was followed by the comnercial decline of the Catalan-Aragonese economy
in the fifteenth century, the merchant-nobility (as well as the older
nobility) made increased demands on the remenca-peasants, generating
n/

peasant uprisings.

Urban socio-political conflict was also breaking

out between the merchant elite and the class of ’’artisans, craftsmen,
producers, and exporters who were seeking greater political equality
and more protective tariffs against foreign competition."^
In the third quarter of the century, full-scale civil war
erupted in the towns and in the countryside:
The landlords in the countryside who wished to
preserve their social privileges over their
backward serfs,... tended to link hands with the
merchant oligarchs and form a combination.^
These struggles were, in great part, limited to the principality

24payne, A History, vol. 1, p. 165. Also, see the work of Pierre
Vilar on Spanish economic development, particularly La Catalogue dans
l'Espagne moderne (Paris: 1962).
25pierre Vilar, Spain (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967), p. 9.
^^Roger Highfield, "introduction," in Highfield, Spain, p. 18.

of Catalonia, the roost commercially-oriented region of the Aragonese
Crown.

(It was the Catalanese peasantry and townspeople who most

immediately felt the commercial decline and the increased exactions
made by the merchant nobility.)
The Crown's Involvement in the struggle tended to support the
popular-urban classes and the peasantry.

The Aragonese monarchy was

hoping to further tame the nobility by reducing its seigneurial power
and privileges.
free.

Thus, attempts were made to set the remenca-peasantry

The nobility (old and new) attempted coups against the monarchy

at the same time that it sought to crush the rural and urban
rebellions.

In the 1470's, the monarchy gained the victory and the

nobility swore allegiance to the Aragonese Crown.
The civil war had further weakened Aragon's economy at the time
when Spain was finally moving towards unification under a CastilianAragonese partnership.

Thus, Castile was to dominate the partnership.

Also significant was the fact that the weakened Catalan merchant class
was unable to effectively compete with their Genoese comnercial
rivals, which meant that the Spanish economy, on the eve of its empirebuilding, was to be heavily infiltrated by foreign commercial interests.
Later, in 1492, with the expulsion of the Jews, the Italian merchants
were further able to extend their activities.

As Elliott has written:

This Genoese predominance decisively influenced
the course of sixteenth century Spanish development.
If the Catalans rather than the Genoese had won the
struggle for entry into the Castilian commercial
system, the history of a unified Spain would have
taken a profoundly different turn. '

^Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 38. With regard to Italian
influence and involvement in Spain's economy and overseas expansion,
see Charles Verlinden, The Beginnings of Modern Colonization (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1970), especially chapters 6 and 7,
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Ferdinand of Aragon, who had married Isabella of Castile (thus,
at least uniting the Crowns in one family) issued the Sentencia de
Guadalupe in 1486, which finally set the Catalanese peasantry free
from remenca and the six evil customs.

The nobility maintained owner

ship of the land, but the peasants were guaranteed usufructuary rights
on the payment of a fixed rent,'*® i.e. "...it very cleverly gave the
OQ

peasant effective possession of his land."
Some historians, eager to locate capitalism in
have emphasized these political events in Catalonia,

theSpanish

past,

and theCrown's

on

support of the popular classes;

however, a more accurate reading of

the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella reveals the uniqueness of the
Catalonian case (even within the Crown of Aragon).

In fact, "...if

anything, the reign of the Catholic Kings was characterized by an
O

1

increase in the social and economic power of the great nobles.
It is true that Ferdinand and Isabella sought to tame the
political power of the nobility:
...feudal castles were destroyed, private wars
were declared illegal... The audiencia, or high
court of justice, frequently presided over by
the monarchs themselves, became the supreme
judicial body, and with the establishment of
minor audiencias in local districts royal justice

2®Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 79; Payne, A History, vol.
p. 177; and Vilar, Spain, p. 19.

1,

^ V i c e n s Vives, An Economic History, p. 294. He adds, "Ferdinand
the Catholic's accomplishment was truly democratic, for it gave some
50,000 individuals access to a fair-sized property.
This is why there
have not been, up to the contemporary period, any attempts at agrarian
revolt in Catalonia."
®®Luis Vitale, "Latin America," pp. 32-43.
®*-Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 109.

made deeper inroads on the private law of the
feudal lords.^2
However, the united monarchy followed a 'dual policy'

toward the

nobility:
While reducing it to political obedience on the
one hand, the crown fully ratified its social
and economic predominance on the other. J
During the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, 95% of the population
"lived in the country and were peasants"

and yet, "the nobles owned

97% of the territory of the Peninsula, either directly or by jurisdic
tion.

xhe monarchy 'ratified'

the socio-economic strength of the

seigneurial nobility through a variety of politico-legal decisions and
actions.

Following the conquest of the kingdom of Granada, the

Catholic Kings carved up the new territories into vast landed estates
for the nobility.

Later, under the Laws of Toro (1504), the monarchs

"confirmed and extended the right of establishing mavorazgos;" the
right of hereditary transmission which entailed property to the
first-born of a family.
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A major political economy decision of the united monarchy was
37

its support of the M e s t a ,

'

the guild of sheepowners.

Through several

32john Lynch, Spain Under The Hapsburgs. vol. 1, Empire and
Absolutism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 5.
^ P a y n e , A History, vol. 1, p. 270.
3^Lynch, Spain Under, vol.

1, p. 12.

35yicens Vives, An Economic History, p. 295.
■^Ibid., p. 296. The monarchs also approved a policy of
matrimonial ties which produced further land concentration.
Lynch,
Spain Under, vol. 1, pp. 13-14.
37ju lius Klein, The Mesta: A Study in Spanish Economic History.
1273-1836 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920).
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cedulas

(edicts) the monarchy gave the Mesta 'right of

countryside, in preference to

agriculture, e.g. edicts

way'toSpain's
expelling

fanners from certain lands, communal and private, and banning
enclosures in certain regions, like the kingdom of Granada.-*®
The policy of supporting the Mesta at the expense of agriculture
is further proof that it is not merely the 'search for profit' which
provides the impetus for capitalist development, because, in fact, it
was the monarchy's eagerness to collect the revenues from the pastoral
interests and wooltrade rather than promote agriculture and await its
return which led it to make those decisions.

Furthermore, it was the

nobility which had the biggest stake of all, because many nobles had
been converting their lands to pasture to take advantage of the market
in a way which needed little investment of money and manpower.
For these reasons, Richard Herr has written:
After Ferdinand and Isabel brought order to
Castile, the clergy and aristocracy no longer
posed a direct threat to the crown, but the
kings did little to reduce the wealth of these
groups or the income they obtained from the
commoners over whom the crown had given them
seigneurial jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the nobility was no longer classically feudal, in a
political sense; however, its socio-economic strength unchallenged - if

'JO

~>°The importance of enclosures appears even more significant if
we recall the role of enclosures in the development of capitalist
agriculture in Britain.
On capitalist agricultural development in
Britain, see R.H. Tawney, The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century
(London: Longmans, 1912).
39see Vicens Vives, An Economic History, pp. 303-304, and Lynch,
Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 17.
^ R i c h a r d Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974), p. 41.
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not increased - the harnessing of the nobility might better be called
an association than a subjection.

Perhaps the transition can be

termed one of feudal-seigneurialism to aristocratic-seigneurialism,
i.e. reducing the nobility's political prerogatives, but assuring the
perpetuation of its socio-economic power and privilege.
The peasantry of Spain could no longer be referred to as serfs
in a legal sense because they were no longer bound to the land by
feudal laws, i.e. they were permitted to change their residences.
However, remembering that the nobility possessed 97% of the land
through ownership and seigneurial jurisdiction, the words of one
historian that "this freedom meant only the freedom to die of
h u n g e r , c a n be properly understood.

The peasantry could move about,

but it was merely able to move from one seigneurial estate (or
jurisdiction) to another, and as Elliott points out:
The land was worked by peasants who had probably
been compelled to borrow in the first instance
to secure a plot, and then found their meagre
earnings drastically reduced by tithes, dues
Cseigneurial3 and taxes. After this, it only
needed one or two bad harvests to make them
fall hopelessly into debt.
Thus, by the sixteenth century, the seigneurial regime had come
to be based on two foundations:
ownership.

seigneurial jurisdictions and land-

At times, the two were so closely intertwined that they

t
became indistinguishable.

The peasantry owed dues to the nobility

41vicens Vives, An Economic History, p. 299.
^Elliott,
imperial Spain, p. 115. Those two bad harvests came
early in the sixteenth century - 1502 and 1509!

^ A n t o n i o Dominguez Ortiz, The Golden Age of Spain: 1516-1659.
trans. James Casey (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 155-161.
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for the right to cultivate lands of the estates and as subjects of the
seigneurial jurisdictions.
Sixteenth century seigneurialism in Spain had acquired new
features, and like Spanish seigneurialism historically, it persisted
because it was flexible.

It remained available to successful merchants

and, like a chameleon, responded to the rise of the united monarchy in
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
has admitted:

Of course, one historian

"To break this power Cthe seigneurial lords

*3

would have

been a formidable task and it could hardly be done in a single
ge n e ration."^
Where was the Spanish bourgeoisie during these crucial years of
the rise of the united monarchy and the development of a united Spain?
Richard Herr has written:

"Most lacking of all was a middle class

engaged in commerce and manufacture."^

And another historian wrote:

It was undoubtedly because of this pervasive
seigneurial economy that Castile did not succeed
in creating industry... This inability to create
an industry was reflected in the social order.
There was no bourgeoisie conscious of itself as
a class which might oppose the nobility.
There have been recent attempts to counter this view of the
absence of a bourgeoisie lacking in class consciousness,^ however,
debate continues over whether the Comunero movements of 1520-21 were
urban attempts to maintain their medieval privileges, or social

^Lynch,

Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 13.

^ H e r r , An Historical Essay, p. 47.
^ S u a r e z Fernandez, "The Kingdom," p. 85.
^7juan Ignacio Gutierrez Nieto, Las Comunidades como movimiento
antisenorial (Barcelona: Editorial Flaneta, 1973).

movements of a revolutionary nature against the persistent seigneuria
lism which inhibited the development of capitalism.

In any case, the

movements failed, and as Marx recognized:
While the aristocracy drowned in decadence
without losing its most noxious privileges,
the cities lost their medieval privileges
without gaining modern power.
The Crown's policy towards the nascent bourgeoisie and the
merchant class had already manifested itself prior to the Comunero
uprisings.

During the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the monarchy's

policy was to favor, if not instigate, the establishment of guilds
amongst

the producing groups, and consulates for the merchants.

for the

purpose of regulation than protection, its effect on the

More

development of capitalism and the rise and spread of industry in Spain
was negative.

In the words of the economic historian, Vicens Vives:

At the end of the 15th and beginning of the
16th centuries, just at the moment when all
Europe was starting to break loose from the
guild, Ferdinand the Catholic put the
corporative strait-jacket on the Castilians. "
The definitional level of the social formation has been posited
as the social relations of production.

However, of major significance

are the ideology, culture and social psychology of the respective
classes comprising the Spanish social structure and economy for the
way in which they help to shape the relations between the social
classes

and to support or reject the rule of the dominant class.

As

Irving Zeitlin has written:

^®Karl Marx, "La Espana revolucionaria," in Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, La Revolucion en Espafla (Moscow: Editorial Progreso,
1974), p. 12.
^ V i c e n s Vives, An Economic History, pp. 308-309.
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Weber's work must not be read as a repudiation
of Marx's methodological principles, but rather
as a 'rounding out' and supplementing of his
method.50
Spanish nobles based their wealth, privilege, power and prestige
on mayorazgos and senorios.

Did the bourgeoisie, which in sixteenth

century Spain was the merchant class and a number of petty industria
lists, reject these symbols?

On the contrary, wha' Fernand Braudel

calls the "treason of the bourgeoisie"-^ and Ruth Pike "this passion
for hidalgu£a"52 wag the bourgeoisie's eagerness to enter the aris
tocracy by purchasing estates, creating mayorazgos, and securing
seigneurial jurisdictions, both for economic reasons and for the
social prestige they provided.
John Lynch explains that the absence of a middle class in Spain
could be attributed to the social prejudice against trade and the odium
attached to business and manual work - "el^ deshonor de trabalo. " ^
These prejudices were probably associated with the prejudices against
Moors and Jews who were associated with crafts, manual labor and
trade.

Lynch adds that:
The mania for aristocratic status need not have
been damaging to Spanish society and economy if
the newly ennobled, like those of the English

50irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological
Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 112.
^ B r audel, The Mediterranean, vol. 2, pp. 725-733.
52RU th P ike, Aristocrats and Traders: Sevillian Society in the
Sixteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 99.
->3'The dishonor of work.'
Lynch, Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 107.
Also, see William J. Callahan, Honor. Commerce and Industry in
Eighteenth Century Spain (Boston: Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, 1972), and Payne, A History, on "Social Psychology,"
pp. 285-286.
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gentry who came from merchant backgrounds had
remained faithful to business. But it produced
a contempt for trade and restless anxiety to
join the aristocracy which were ruinous for
Spain and her people.^
The supremacy of the nobility, based on the seigneurial regime
it had succeeded in maintaining, was not rejected by the merchant
class and nascent bourgeoisie.

The flexibility of seigneurialism

meant, in part, the failure of the bourgeoisie to overcome it.

Eric

Hobsbawm, comparing Spanish historical development to that of the
rest of Europe, stated:
Spain is different.
Capitalism has persis
tently failed in that country and so has social
revolution, in spite of its constant imminence
and occasional eruption.
The problems of Spain
rise out of its failures, not the successes, of
the past.
The failure of the Spanish bourgeoisie meant failure for the
Spanish peasantry, which remained subject to seigneurial jurisdictions
and dependent on the nobles' mayorazgos for land and laboring.

The

seigneurial regime, with the subjection of the peasantry to the
burdensome

'tithes, due and taxes' and the entailment of landed

estates in mayorazgos, prevented the development of capitalism and the
rise of industry in Spain.

One historian, in his study of rural

sixteenth century Spain, has recognized the problem:
It isn't strange. The 16th century has on its
stage two contradictory ages: that of feudal

54-lbid. In Lazarillo de Tormes. the famous sixteenth century
picaresque novel, there appears an extremely descriptive quote: "any
no-good wretch would die of hunger before he would take up a trade."
Anon., Lazarillo de Tormes. trans. Michael Alpert (London: Penguin
Classics, 1969).
55Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Spanish Background," chapter 8 in Revo
lutionaries (New York: New American Library, Meridian Books, 1973), p. 71.

economy, and that of capitalist economy. But the
passage to the second a ge...was not to be effected
completely until the radical destruction of the
feudal landholding and the liberation of the
peasantry from seigneurial laws and dues and
ecclesiastical tithes, transforming them into
independent producers and c o n s u m e r s . 56
The discovery, conquest and exploitation of American wealth did
not instigate and generate the further development of capitalism in
Spain, even though it appears to have stimulated its further growth in
other parts of Europe.

The gold, silver, dyes and other resources

provided by America could not change the Spanish social structure and
economy; it could merely act upon the structure which was in the
process of taking shape.

And that structure was seigneurial.

Spanish society persisted in its seigneurial mold into the
eighteenth century.

The movement from basing one's power, wealth and

prestige on seigneurial jurisdictions to basing it on mayorazgos and a
dependent peasant labor force had

c o n t i n u e d , 57

however, the seigneurial

jurisdictions were still significant.-*®
There was an attempt at modernization in the eighteenth century
when the Bourbons replaced the Hapsburgs on the throne of Spain;

5 % o e l Salomon, La Vida rural castellana en tiempos de Felipe II
(Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1964), pp. 181-182.
57a .R.M. Carr, "Spain" in A. Goodwin, ed., The European Nobility
in the Eighteenth Century: Studies of the Nobilities of the Major
European States in the Pre-Reform Era (London: Adam and Charles Black,
1953), pp. 43-60, particularly pp. 48-52.
58Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 89-102.
In fact,
Herr points out that in many cases senorio and mayorazgo, because they
became intertwined on a local basis, almost became indistinguishable
(p. 95). He also points out that the Church was a major landholder
and holder of senorios.
The ecclesiastical version of mayorazgo was
mortmain, which meant the land could never be alienated.
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however:
Hie changes In the classical agricultural structure
of Spain between 1750 and 1850 were achieved by a
rearrangement of the traditional economy, by its
expansion in space, but not by any fundamental c h a n g e . ^
The transition to capitalism and the elimination of seigneurialism
in Spain finally came in the mid-nineteenth century, following the inde
pendence of Spanish
legacies,

America,®^

And yet, social structures seem to leave

depending on how they are transformed.

The legacy of Spanish

seigneurialism was the latifundia.^l
The Spanish seigneurial legacy also made its impact on America,
and has persisted there longer - molded to the conquest, colonization
and particular development of the Spanish American societies.
Pierre Vilar, the French historian, playing on the words of
Lenin,^2 has termed the expansion of Spain into America and imperialism
in Europe as the supreme stage of feudalism, and he has written:
In so far as it instituted the world market and
in so far as it permitted the primitive accumu
lation of capital, by pouring cheap silver into
Europe, the Spanish Conquest founded a new
society.
Such a society, however, could only
develop with increased productive forces and
with new social relationships.
This is what
was to come about in northern Europe.
In

^ R a y m o n d Carr, Spain. 1808-1939 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1966), p. 29. Quoted in Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries. p. 73.
GOsome historians link the rising of the bourgeoisie in Spain
with the crisis of the loss of the colonies.
On this, and on the
transition from seigneurialism to capitalism in Spain, see Josep
Fontana, Cambio econ6mico y actitudes politicos en la Espana del sjglo
XIX (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1973). Also interesting is Marx and
Engels, La Revoluclon en Espana.
6 ^-Carr, Spain, and Malefakis, Agrarian Reform.
62y.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New
York: International Publishers, 1939).

Spain, on the other hand or rather in Castile,
the ruling classes managed the Conquest as they
had the Reconquista. namely in the feudal manner.
To occupy land, subjugate the inhabitants, and
carry off their riches was in no way to prepare
for investment in the capitalist sense. ^

^ P i e r r e Vilar, "The Age of Don Quijote" in Peter Earle, ed.,
Essays in European Economic History, 1500-1800 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1974), p. 105.

CHAPTER III

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Andre Gunder Frank, eager to prove that the conquest of America
by the Spanish was a capitalist enterprise, has quoted Christopher
Columbus:

"The best thing in the world is gold...it can even send souls

to heaven," and Hernan Cortes: "The Spaniards are troubled with a
disease of the heart for which gold is the specific remedy," as
evidence for his thesis.^There is no denying the role of economic motivations in the con
quest of the New World; however, even Weber recognized that greed
alone is not the source of the

'capitalist spirit' when he wrote:

Traditional obstructions are not overcome by the
economic impulse alone.
The notion that our
rationalistic and capitalistic age is charac
terized by a stronger economic interest than
other periods is childish; the moving spirits of
modern capitalism are not possessed of a stronger
economic motive than, for example, an oriental
trader.
The unchaining of the economic interest
merely as such has produced only irrational results;
such men as Cortez and Pizarro, who were perhaps its
strongest embodiment, were far from having an idea
of a rationalistic economic life.
If the economic
impulse itself is universal, it is an interesting
question as to the relations under which it becomes
rationalized and rationally tempered in such
fashion as to produce rational Institutions of the
character of a capitalist enterprise.^
If Iberian-Spanish society at the time of the conquest of America

^■Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, p. 310.
2
Max Weber, General Economic History (New York: Collier Books,
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was seigneurial, although shaped by a developed commerce and an
increasingly absolute monarchy, then the regime which the Spanish
colonizers would seek to establish might also be expected to be
3
seigneurial.

One historian, in his study of the early colonial

period in Spanish America, commented:
Anthropologists have made us familiar with the
stubbornness with which people cling to their
cultural patterns.
The Spaniards who carried
out the conquest brought with them the accumu
lated social habits of centuries and never
relaxed in their long effort to impose them
upon the indigenous population of America.
At the same time, the Spanish conquest and colonization of
America, even if possessed with the seigneurial idea and the intention
of recreating seigneurial relations of production in the new lands and
amongst the colonized peoples, would be subject to the limitations
generated in the encounter with the conquered societies.

Eugene

Genovese pointed out that:
A ruling class does not grow up simply according
to the tendencies inherent in its relationship
to the means of production; it grows up in
relationship to the specific class or classes it
rules.5
Because the Spanish conquistadors and colonizers recognized
themselves as subject to the Crown and Church of Spain they would also

1961), p. 261.
Elsewhere, he wrote that capitalism rested on the
expectation of profit from peaceful exchange, which Spain's entry into
America was never accused of being.
^Unless, of course, the Spaniards who conquered and colonized
Spanish America were refugees or utopianists eager to create a new
society but, except for rare instances, this was not the case.
^Lesley Byrd Simpson, The Encomienda in New Spain: The Beginning
of Spanish Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. vii.
^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders M a d e , p. 5.
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encounter obstacles to their seigneurial ambition from those paramount
institutions.

Eastern Europe’s Second Serfdom
It has been noted by historians and sociologists that the "long
sixteenth century,"** from 1450 to 1650, was characterized by the
decline of feudalism in Western Europe, the intensification of serfdom
in Eastern Europe, and the creation of Iberian overseas empires.^

Of

historico-comparative significance is the simultaneous weakening of
seigneurialism in Western Europe and its intensification in Eastern
Europe;® and, as it will be argued, its rise in colonial Spanish
America.®

^Fernand Braudel, "European Expansion and Capitalism: 1450-1650,"
in Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College, ed., Chapters
in Western Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961),
chapter 8 , pp. 245-288.
^See Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,"
in Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe: 1560-1660. pp. 5-62. Also
significant is Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System.
®It is only recently that attention has focused on this possi
bility for historico-comparative analysis, i.e. comparative analysis
made within an historically unified framework. A Polish historian has
commented, with reference to the potential for comparison of Eastern
and Western Europe: "It seems astonishing that both of these processes,
which took place at the same time are usually analyzed separately."
Jerzy Topolski, "Manorial Serf Economy in Central and Eastern Europe in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Agricultural History, vol.
47, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 341-352.
^Magnus Morner noted in a recent article that attention has also
finally begun to focus on the possibilities for comparing Latin America
and Eastern Europe as frontiers of the Atlantic World. M o m e r ,
"Spanish American Hacienda: A Survey of Recent Research and Debate,"
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 53, no. 2 (May 1973), pp.
183-216. He cites the work of Mario Gongora, Encomenderos v estancieros: estudios acerca de la constitucion social aristocrats de Chile
despues de la Conquista. 1580-1640 (Santiago: Universidad de Chile,
1970), and Cristobal Kay, Comparative Development of the European
Manorial System and the Latin American Hacienda System: A n Approach to
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Freidrich Engels initiated an historical debate when, in a letter
to Karl Marx, he wrote:
I consider the view expounded here Creferring to
an article by someone else which he was enclosing]
regarding the conditions of the peasantry in the
Middle Ages and the rise of a second serfdom after
the middle of the fifteenth century as on the whole
incontrovertible.10
The criticism of Engels, and the debate which was generated,
arose over his denotation of the developments in Eastern Europe during
the period under discussion as "serfdom."

It was argued that serfdom

could only refer to the Middle Ages in Europe.

However, Engels'

response - which seems highly descriptive of Latin America - was:
It is certain that serfdom and bondage are not
a peculiarly medieval-feudal form, we find them
everywhere, or nearly everywhere, where con
querors have the landcultivated for them by
the old inhabitants. 1
Engels termed the resurgence of Eastern European serfdom the
"second serfdom" because the resurgence followed upon a period of
declining seigneurialism, in which capitalist farming had begun to
develop:
...in the midst of the feudal system, e.g. paid
employment of the poorer villagers and of daylaborers, especially on lands rented by wealthy

a Theory of Agrarian Change for Chile (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Sussex, 1971).
*-®Engels to Marx, December 15, 1822, Karl Marx, with an Intro
duction by Eric J. Hobsbawm, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans.
Jack Cohen (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 145.
1*-Engels to Marx, December 22, 1822, Ibid., p. 148. Perhaps the
disagreement over terminology is due to Marx and Engels' being histo
rical sociologists concerned with comparative analysis, rather than
strictly historians.
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peasants.

12

The original theory proposed to explain the return of serfdom
and the manorial structure has been termed the "military theory."

It

stated that the nobility began to take a more active interest in the
rural economy in the late Middle Ages because the changing nature of
warfare displaced them from the army; thus, they increased their
demands on the p easantry.^
Comparatively, it might be argued that the same process took
place in the New World, i.e. the conquest completed, and rapid plunder
ing no longer possible,

the Spanish

'nobles' settled into seigneurial

relations with the Indians to take advantage of less immediate wealth.
However, the military theory has been proven inadequate for Eastern
Europe, and although extremely descriptive for the immediate aftermath
of the conquest in America, it is incomplete for later colonial
development.
There were other theories proposed, but recently two theories
have been favored for their explanatory powers, the "market theory"
and the "political theory.
The market theory emphasizes the expanding export opportunities
in Western Europe resulting from the economic development and popula
tion growth taking place in those countries.

Thus, it is argued, the

nobility began to take advantage of the market opportunities by

12g.p. Pach, "Sixteenth Century Hungary: Commercial Activity and
Market Production by the Nobles" in Burke, ed., Economy and Society in
Early Modern Europe, pp. 113-133.
+
13see Jerzy Topolski, "Manorial Serf Economy," for references to
works in East European languages.
l^Ibid., pp. 342-343.

demanding increased labor services and eventually proceeding to expand
the size of the demesne.
The political theory, on the other hand, emphasizes the signifi
cance of the strong political position of the East European nobility
and argues that, by virtue of this power, it was able to further sub
ject the peasantry to seigneurialism, having the state legitimate its
actions.

Jerome Blum wrote:
Among the factors which were present in all of
the Eastern European lands was the acquisition
by the nobles of political power in the state,
which enabled them to reduce the peasants on
their manors to a position of dependence on
them.

Blum's emphasis on the factor of political power may be due to
the inclusion of Russia in his analysis.

Russia also experienced a

renewal of serfdom during this period, some have even claimed it was a
"first"

serfdom; however, Russian agriculture was not involved in the

export market supplying Western Europe.
In any case, the two theories, the market and the political, are
not contradictory.
gating factor,

The market theory provides the stimulus, or insti

for the nobility to demand increased dues and labor

service from the peasantry and its heightened interest in demesne pro
duction.

At the same time, the nobility's ability to intensify its

demands on the peasantry was based on its political domination of the
state and the relative weakness of a bourgeoisie to effectively
oppose it.
The intensification of serfdom characteristic of Eastern

15j0rome Blum, "The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe," American
Historical Review, vol. 62 no. 4 (July 1957), p. 836.
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European lands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not a
sudden and total reversal of the trend towards capitalist agriculture.
During the fifteenth century, a period of gradual revival following
the crisis of the fourteenth, the nobles of Eastern Europe closest to
the trade routes - particularly the Baltic - recognized the commercial
opportunity of exporting grains to the west.*-**

Thus, in great part due

to its geographic location, Poland began to expand its export of wheat
to Holland, England and northern France early in the fifteenth century,
and as the population continued to expand in the west, Poland's nobles
found an ever larger m a r k e t . ^
Following Poland's lead in the export market, and responding to
the rising demand for grain in the west, the nobilities of other East
European countries took a more active interest in the rural economy
and their seigneurial holdings and domains.

In Hungary,

the nobility's

commercialization occurred in three phases.

First, the lords increas

ingly demanded payment from their peasantry in kind, rather than in
money.

In this way, the lords secured a stronger hold on the market

early in the sixteenth century.

In the second phase, the nobility

moved into the livestock trade, still leaving the production aspects
intact.

This commercial activity also began early in the century, but

did not become significant until the middle of the century.
the lords began to increase production on their demesnes.

Finally,
The further

growth of the export market and the coranercial opportunity of supplying

*-6j.H. Elliott, Europe Divided:
Row, 1968), pp. 44-45.

1559-1598 (New York: Harper and

Wallerstein, "Three Paths of National Development in
Sixteenth Century Europe," Studies in Comparative International
Development. vol. 7, no. 2 (1972), pp. 96-97.
^Immanuel
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the King's military forces on the frontiers Instigated production
expansion onto fallow land and into pasture and forests.

Much of this

expansion took place at the expense of the peasantry's common land.^-®
"But the exploitation of land demanded the exploitation of labor
thus, it was necessary to intensify labor inputs - which meant
increasing the amount of time that the peasants would have to work on
the demesne:
Whereas in the years 1510-20, one day of compul
sory labor was the rule, according to the laws of
1514, and this in fact was not enforced, by the
middle of the century the situation was very
different.
Similar patterns took place throughout Eastern Europe; on Bohemia
one historian has written:
During the sixteenth century the lords began to
acquire and add land to the demesne and to cul
tivate grain crops for income. By the second
half of the sixteenth century they began to
demand more robota from the peasants in order
to get the increased demesne acreage tilled . ^
Even on the frontier of Europe with the Ottoman-Turk Empire, the
economic growth of Western Europe made its impact via Eastern Europe
ry *\

and supported the rise of a second serfdom.
The export market stimulated the interest of the nobility in

l^Pach, "Sixteenth Century Hungary," pp. 113-121.
l^Elliott,

Europe Divided, p. 45.

20pach, "Sixteenth Century Hungary," p. 122.
21

^William E. Wright, Serf, Seigneur and Sovereign: Agrarian Reform
in Eighteenth Century Bohemia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1966), p. 9. Robota is similar to corvee. i.e. compulsory labor
by the peasantry.
^ T r o i a n Stoianovich, A Study in Balkan Civilization (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1967), pp. 78-79, 159-162.

rural economy, but it was the weakness of the opposition which enabled
the lords to proceed with the second serfdom.
There is little disagreement with the following comment of
J.H. Elliott:
The nobles of the West, while still immensely
powerful, had seen their seigneurial jurisdic
tion eroded by the advance of royal justice;
and although they had managed to infuse urban
society with many of their own values, they
nonetheless found themselves competing with
their social inferiors, whether gentry or
townsmen, for the effective control of power
in a monarchical state.
The magnates of the
East, on the other hand, had little competi
tion to fear. With kings and towns alike too
weak to contest their authority, they dominated
an overwhelming agrarian society, in which
their economic predominance as great landowners
was backed up by the exclusive rights over the
serfs on their e s t a t e s . ^
Thus, Eastern Europe was similar to Spain in that the strength
of the seigneurs persisted; however, in Eastern Europe there was even
less question that it had increased.

The sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries experienced the rise of absolutism ,

^

however,

this did not

always signify the decline of the nobility:
In Eastern Europe, where there was no powerful
middle class to set against the nobles, the
rulers secured the nobles' loyalty by granting
to them greater powers over their serfs, a
concession which in no way weakened the crown.
With an association between the monarchy and the nobility, which
has been referred to as a "feudal state," the weak bourgeoisie lost

^Elliott,

Europe Divided, p. 46.

^ E x c e p t for England and Poland.
25oavid Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (New York:
Macmillan-St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 20.
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further ground in Eastern Europe.

The more active the nobility became

in the export market, the more it discovered that it was possible to
deal directly with long-distance merchants from Western Europe, rather
than through local, domestic m e r c h a n t s . And through this trade the
nobility found it could acquire the luxury and manufactured goods which
it desired at advantageous prices.

27

Finally, the Intensification of serfdom limited the peasantry's
participation in the market as consumers and/or potential laborers for
capitalist industry, while in Western Europe the peasantry was becoming
free for capitalist-industrial development.

The significance of the

peasantry's bondage was recognized by Engels when he wrote:
The general reintroduction of serfdom was one
of the reasons why no industry could develop
in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.28
and more recently by Alexander Gerschenkron:

"Emancipation of the

peasants, despite its manifold deficiencies, was an absolute
prerequisite for industrialization."2^
By the end of the sixteenth century, the second serfdom charac
terized Eastern European rural life (or society, as they were agrarian
societies).

Attracted by the profitable opportunities of the export

market, the lords injected themselves into commercial activities,

2^Wallerstein, "Three Paths," p. 97, and Pach, "Sixteenth
Century Hungary," p. 125.
22Elliott, Europe Divided, p. 48.
^®Engels to Marx, December 15, 1822, Marx, Pre-Capitalist
Economic Formation, p. 146.
2 ^Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1962), p. 19.
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demanded increased dues and labor services, and began expanding the
size of the demesne at the expense of the pastures, forests, and,
eventually, peasant holdings.^0
During the seventeenth century, the European world economy
experienced a severe crisis, and in the midst of the crisis religious
warfare and peasant uprisings occurred.

31

As a result of the crisis

in the European economy, the market for East European grains declined
in the west, although it did not experience a total collapse.

The

response to the crisis in the market by the East European nobility was
to demand still further increases in the dues and services owed by the
peasant-serfs; in order to maintain the income level they had achieved
pr e viously.^

One study of the crisis argues that the East European

nobility was in a position of international debt bondage to West
European merchants; therefore, to meet their obligations they had to
33

increase pressure on the peasantry. J
The trend towards the renewal of serfdom thus continued in the
midst of the crisis.

The nobility was also able to increase its labor

supply through manorial expansion at the expense of increasingly
impoverished free peasantry.

When crises forced the peasant to borrow,

by necessity the lending agent was the local lord - further crises and

■^i.e. the lords altered the rural economy from Grundherrschaft
to Gutsherrschaft.
"^Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," pp. 9-13.
32

Henry Kamen, The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe. 15501660 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), pp. 223-228.
Kamen
terms the East European nobility "feudal-capitalists" because they were
profit-oriented, but their profit seeking was based on the "feudal mode
of production," i.e. serfdom.
^'Hjallerstein, "Three Paths," p. 97.
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indebtedness forced the free peasant to sell his land to the lord and
become a peasant of the estate, which meant that the peasant had become
enserfed:

"Indebtedness of an impoverished peasantry became one of the

essential factors in the evolution of serfdom.
At the same time, it must be recognized that seigneurial social
relations and the serf's relation to the lord did provide the peasant
with some security:
For all this subjection to his lord the serf did
enjoy, according to the customs of the land, at
least assurance of aid in times of emergency and
great need.
In time of famine the lord was
required to distribute food from the community
stores and procure seed for the next sowing.
If
the serf should have his house, tools or animals
destroyed by fire or natural disaster, the lord
was to stand ready to lend materials, tools or
animals to replace losses.
Eastern European serfdom persisted in the eighteenth century,
if it was not actually intensified, and was not finally eliminated
until well into the nineteenth century.

In contrasting the status of

the peasantry in Eastern Europe with that of the peasantry in the
west, which was experiencing further declines of serfdom in the
eighteenth century, George Rude wrote:
East of the Elbe, however, the issue was not so
much one of occasional services and obligations
as one of a continuous and almost total lack of
freedom, varying from personal bondage in the form
of serfdom to the status of a domain or household
chattel.
One or other of these conditions was
general in Brandenburg, Prussia, in Poland, Russia
and in large parts of the Austrian Empire... there
were of course exceptions...Cand yetJ in most of

-^Kamen, The Iron Century, p. 216.
^^Wrights, Serf. Seigneur, p. 18, He adds: "However, this was
small compensation...for the many indignities and aggravations that
the serf suffered at the hands of his seigneur."
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these countries serfdom was extending and not
contracting and the remaining pockets of
freedom were being gradually mopped up.36

Hie Development of Spanish American Seigneurialism
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all
instruments of production, by the immensely faci
litated means of communication, draws all, even
the most barbarian, nations into civilization.
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy
artillery with which it batters down all Chinese
walls, with which it forces the barbarians'
intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to
capitulate.
It compels all nations, on pain of
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of pro
duction; it compels them to introduce what it
calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to
become bourgeois themselves.
In one word, it
creates a world after its own image.
The analogy stated by Pierre Vilar (using Lenin's "imperialism
- the highest stage of capitalism") that "Spanish imperialism was the
highest stage of feudalism," can be extended to enhance the analysis
of the Spanish conquest and colonization of America.

Marx's proposi

tion that the bourgeoisie "creates a world after its own image," might
be restated for the conquest of America as: "the seigneurs created a
world after their own image."

In similar fashion, it has been written:

Spaniards going to the New World left a society of
landholding aristocrats, a small bureaucracy, a few
townsmen and a mass of peasants and estate laborers.
It was logical that they refuse to create family
farms in the colonial world where there existed huge
expanses of land and a large population of skilled,
subservient Amerindian agriculturists.38

36George Rude, Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and
the Bourgeois Challenge (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972), p. 33.
37Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 12-13. Also, see Marx,
Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, ed. Shlomo Avineri (Garden
City: Doubleday and Co., 1968). Marx's use of the word "barbarian" is
merely evidence of his own historically situated life.
38stein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage, pp. 36-37.
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What was the nature of the societies which the Spanish, and
Iberian seigneurialism, encountered and subjected to their domination,
eventually leading to the formation and development of Spanish
American societies?
The most significant peoples whom the Spanish encountered in the
New World were the Aztec, the Maya, and the Inca.

The Aztec and the

Maya shared the culture area referred to as Mesoamerica and the Inca
dominated the Andean culture area.^^
Although not exactly alike, there were strong similarities in
the social organization of these peoples.

At the time of the Spanish

arrival in America, each of these peoples had developed into class
societies.

By the sixteenth century, the Maya were reduced to a state

of civil wars between

feuding city-states, while theAztecs

and the

Inca had succeeded in creating extensive empires.
These three societies were agrarian, with the overwhelming per
centage of their populations being peasant.

The ruling nobilities of

each consisted of warriors and priests; there also existed state and
religious bureaucracies, and merchant and artisan classes.
The ruling classes, and the state and religious apparati, were
supported by the peasantry, who secured access to the land through
their membership in the clans:

the Aztec calpulli. the Mayan patri

lineal protection societies, and the Incan ayllu.^Q

There were land

^^The basic sources for this brief comparative description of
the Aztec, Mayan and Incan societies are taken from: George C. Vaillant,
revised by Suzannah B. Vaillant, Aztecs of Mexico: Origin. Rise and Fall
of the Aztec Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1966); Michael D. Coe, The
Maya (London: Penguin Books, 1971); J. Alden Mason, TheAncient
Civilizations of Peru (London: Penguin Books, 1968).
^Vaillant, pp. 122-134; Coe, pp. 168-172; Mason, pp. 174-179.
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tenure customs unique to each clan-system; however, the general form
was that of communal landownership with individual family u s u f r u c t . ^
The peasants' support of their respective ruling classes had,
historically, been in the form of tribute, either a share of the
communal harvest, as in Mesoamerica; or communal labor on special lands
of the community, the harvest of which supported the rulers, as in the
Andes
All three societies appear to have developed several forms of
slavery: selling oneself or one's child, criminals bound to their
victim or the victim's family, war captives, etc.

However, slavery

remained of secondary importance to their economies and in their social
structure (in comparison with the predominating tribute systems).

/1

Besides the tribute in kind, which the peasantry supplied to
support the ruling classes, there were also compulsory labor systems
to construct and maintain imperial and communal projects.

Referred to

as coatequil amongst the Aztecs and mita amongst the Inca, the compul
sory labor systems were also based on the community.

Thus, histori

cally, the most advanced civilizations of pre-Columbian America were
founded on tributary relations, based on a peasant community.
And yet, a significant change was occurring in the imperial
societies of pre-conquest America.

In the period prior to the arrival

^ F o r a comparison of Aztec and Mayan land tenure systems, see
Jose Miranda, "La Propiedad pre-hispsinica en Mexico," in J. Miranda
Vida colonial v albores de la independencia. Sep Setentas no. 56
(Mexico: Secretarxa de Education Publica, 1972), pp. 23-31.
^2()n the Inca tax system, see Sally Falk Moore, Power and
Property in Inca Peru (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
^Vaillant, Aztecs, pp. 130-131; Coe, The M a y a , p. 170; Mason,
Ancient Civilizations, pp. 192-193.
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of the Spanish, there emerged relations of serfdom alongside the
tributary systems which prevailed.
In the fifteenth century, the Aztecs had increased in strength
and through military conquest extended their domain from the valley of
Mexico throughout the central highlands and b e y o n d . ^

The rise and

expansion of the Aztecs meant greater power and prestige for the
warrior-nobility, which demanded greater rewards in the form of land
and labor.

Thus, they acquired private landholdings amongst the

conquered peoples and the Aztecs themselves.

Through two methods the

nobility acquired a labor force to cultivate its estates.
was to use the labor tribute of the vanquished.
to enserf landless peasants.

One method

The other method was

Increasingly, the lands of the calpulli

had become inadequate for the members of the clan.

In order to secure

land to cultivate, a peasant would leave the community and request
land from a noble.

Having left the community, the peasant lost

membership in the calpulli, and the protection it provided.

And by

moving onto the land of the noble, the peasant became enserfed.

The

growing numbers of enserfed peasantry were called mayeque
The Inca experienced a similar development early in the sixteenth
century, also related to imperial expansion.

The Inca nobility, as a

reward for their service in the conquests and Imperialist expansion,

^ S e e the historico-anthropological work of Eric Wolf, Sons of
the Shaking Earth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix
Books, 1959), pp. 102-152.
^-*0n the emergence of pre-Columbian seigneurialism in Mexico,
see Friedrich Katz, "The Evolution of Aztec Society," Past and Present,
no. 13 (April 1958), pp. 14-25. Also, R.C. Padden, The Hummingbird and
the Hawk: Conquest and Sovereignty in the Valley of Mexico. 1503-1541
(New York: Harper and Row - Colophon Books, 1970), pp. 15-18, 43-45.

were granted landholdings in the core of the empire.

These land

holdings came to be worked by a group of peasants called yanacona.
The origin of these peasant-serfs were the tribes which had rebelled
against the empire.

Their punishment was the alienation of their

lands, which were distributed amongst the Inca nobility; with the
formerly rebellious peasants attached as serfs, or y a n a c o n a . ^
Another source of yanacona was the Inca ayllu.

Member families

would send individual family members to the nobles as "bondsmen."
They would either work the land, or they might serve the noble in a
more responsible capacity.
another family member .

The yanacona could be exchanged later for

^

Thus, the Spanish conquerors and colonizers were not only to
encounter primitive societies, as in some regions of the New World,
but also class structured societies, based on tributary systems and
developing seigneurial relations.
The competition, and developing conflict, between the tribute
relations based on the community-clan systems and the emerging seigneurialism based on landholding and the noble-serf relationship were
not dissimilar to the social conflict which was taking place in Iberia
In Spain, the crown was seeking to reduce the nobility's seigneurial
control over the peasantry and to limit the seigneurial relations to
tribute.

At the same time, the nobility was transforming the base of

its seigneurial power from merely feudal jurisdictions to power based
on both mayorazgos (entailed land systems) and feudal-seigneurial

^ F r i e d r i c h Katz, The Ancient American Civilizations (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972), pp. 294-295.
^ I b i d . , p. 295.

Also, see Mason, Ancient Civilizations, p. 184
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domains.
In America, the Spanish crown was to attempt to prevent the
formation and development of seigneurial regimes by favoring the
creation of tribute systems, or the adaptation of pre-existing tribute
relations, based on the Indian community; while the nascent aristocracy
of conquerors and colonizers sought to develop seigneurial societies
which stood in opposition to the Indian Comnunity.

Thus, the pre

conquest competition between communal tributary and seigneurial
systems, which had been developing in unique, but not dissimilar forms,
in both America and Iberia, was recast in colonial Spanish America as
a struggle between the tribute paying Indian peasant community,
supported by the crown and the Church, and the new nobility of con
querors and colonizers.

The major struggle in colonial Spanish America

was not between a developing capitalism and a persistent seigneurialism
but between a developing seigneurialism and a persistent Indian
community.

In fact, the historical development of rural Spanish

America up to the twentieth century can be viewed, in great part, in
terms of this struggle.
The political conflict between the crown and the colonizers
emerged rapidly in the immediate expansion and colonization of the
Caribbean.

The Spanish, having developed imperialist practices in the

later Reconquista and the original overseas expansion in the Atlantic/*®
had already established the institutional precedents to be applied in
the conquest of the New W o r l d . ^

Thus, the Spanish conquerors expected

48parry, The Spanish. Also, see J.H. Parry, The Age of
Reconnaissance (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), pp. 162-177.
49Robert S. Chamberlain, "Castilian Backgrounds of the Repartimiento-Encomienda," Contributions to American Anthropology and History.
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and received from their leaders grants of Indian labor and tribute with
which to mine for precious metals and support themselves."*®
These grants of Indian labor and tribute, or encomiendas.

were

accepted by the crown as a temporary arrangement, and in any case
preferable to the enslavement of the Indians.

However, the struggle

between the colonizers and the crown was inherent in the encomienda as
it was structured.

And yet, the issue of whether the encomienda was

to be a permanent, hereditary grant or merely temporary, was not to be
resolved in the Caribbean, because the major impact of the Spanish
conquest was the rapid decline of the Indian population .

^

The

decreasing Indian numbers and the colonizers' critical labor shortage
led to the enslavement of the Indians on islands still being conquered
(the crown accepted the enslavement of Indians who refused to accept
domination and Christianization) and eventually, due to the continued
decline, the colonizers resorted to the African slave trade which the
Portuguese had established to supply southern Iberian and Mediterranean
estates.Thus,

the struggle between the colonizers and the crown

vol. 5, no. 25 (1939), pp. 23-71.
SOpor a description of the discovery, conquest and exploitation
of the Caribbean, see Carl 0. Sauer, The Early Spanish Main (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966).
5l0n the encomienda in the Antilles, see Silvio Zavala, La
Encomienda indiana (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Historicos, 1935),
pp. 1-40.
-^For example, on the island of Hispaniola, the indigenous popu
lation suffered the following decline: 1490 - 1,000,000; 1508 - 60,000;
1554 - 30,000; 1570 - 500. From Roland Mellafe, Breve historia de la
esclavitud en America Latina. Sep Setentas no. 115 (Mexico: Secretarfa
de Educaci6n Publics, 1973), p. 22.
53Mellafe, Breve historia. p. 23. Also, see C.R. Boxer, The
Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 21-22,
24-25, and 85-107.
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was unresolved, while the Caribbean became a region of African slaves
and European masters.

The crown did not intend to permit the exten

sion of the encomienda to the mainland of the New World,

It insisted

that the Indians were free vassals and could neither be enslaved nor
enserfed (which was not to state that they did not owe tribute to the
c r o w n ) . L e s l e y Byrd Simpson has rightly argued that the crown did
not intend to permit the rise of a New World nobility when it was just
beginning to tame the Old World n o b i l i t y . ^

However, the ambitions of

the conquerors and colonizers demanded the labor of Indians for the
mines, and their tribute to supply produce to maintain and support
them.

In the process of the conquest and colonization of Mexico,

Central and South America, the Spanish conquistadors continued to
establish and grant encomiendas to themselves and their followers.
The crown's response to events in America was to insist that the
encomienda was a temporary arrangement, emphasizing that it merely
represented the crown's temporarily granting its own privilege to
receive tribute from the Indian community to the conqueror, as a
reward for his services in the conquest.

The encomienda, as originally

structured, granted the holder the right to receive tribute from
designated Indian communities, in kind or in labor service.-***

The

encomendero. on his part, was expected to protect the Indians in his

5^See Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the
Conquest of the Americas (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965).
^^Simpson, The Encomienda.
56charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper and Row
- Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 48-66, especially pp. 49-50. Also, see
Zavala, La Encomienda. and Simpson, The Encomienda.
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charge and to provide for their Christianization.-^
Originally, it was believed that the encomienda also entitled
its holder to the lands of the Indians; however, legal historians have
adequately proven that no juridical link existed between the encomienda
and the later development of the landed estate.

Nevertheless, their

evidence that no juridical link existed does not mean that no
functional relationship existed.
The struggle between the crown and the Spanish colonizers was
inherent in the encomienda system.

Was the encomienda to serve as a

temporary arrangement giving way to a tributary relationship between
the Indian community and the crown, or was it to serve as the basis for
the development of a new seigneurial society dominated by the Spanish
colonizers?

In part, the crown was right, the encomienda was to be

temporary, not only because of the crown's opposition to it, but more
so as a result of the changes involved in the formation of the Spanish
American societies.
In the early stages of conquest and colonization, the encomienda
CQ

was able to serve the needs of the colonizers,

but, due to the repe

tition of the Caribbean tragedy on the mainland, i.e. the Indian popu
lation's decline, while the Spanish population and demands were
increasing, the encomienda was to be an inadequate method of supporting

-^Ibid.
-*®Silvio Zavala, De encomiendas v propiedad territorial en
algunas regiones de la America espanola (Mexico: Antigua Librerla
Robredo-Porrua, 1940).
S^On the early period of colonization, see Charles Gibson, The
Aztecs Under Spanish Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964),
pp. 58-81, pp. 220-256; and James Lockhart, Spanish Peru. 1532-1560
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
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the nascent colonial nobility.
The process whereby the conflict inherent in the encomienda
emerged as the struggle between the developing seigneurial hacienda
and the tribute paying Indian community held in corregimiento (encomiendas which were held directly by the crown) is comparable to the
rise of the second serfdom in Eastern Europe.

As in Eastern Europe,

the intensification of the latent seigneurial structure was to be
instigated by the expanding market opportunities available to the
dominant class, or nascent nobility in the case of Spanish America.
Although it appears that the first wave of conquerors was not
necessarily from the noble class (which is not to say that they did
not carry the seigneurial idea with them in the conquest), nevertheless,
the Spanish nobility's second sons, excluded from seigneurial inheri
tance in Spain as a result of the mayorazgo system, did play a signi
ficant role in the later conquests and colonizations.
It appeared in the mid-sixteenth century as if the crown had
been able to exert its authority over the seigneurial ambitions of the
Spanish colonizers.

In Mexico, the crown had succeeded in removing

the labor service as part of the Indians' obligations to the encomendero, and the encomienda was limited to two generations, after which
it reverted to the c r o w n . ^

In South America, the encomienda continued

^ S e e James Lockhart, The Men of Caiamarca: A Social and B i o 
graphical Study of the First Conquerors of Peru (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1972), pp. 63-64. Also, Romano and Tennenti, Los
Fundamentos. p. 185; Enrique Semo, Historia del capitalismo en M ex ico:
los origenes, 1521-1763 (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1973), p. 114, and
James Lockhart, Spanish P eru, pp. 39-41.
^ I n the New Laws of 1542, labor service was abolished, but it
was not possible to fully enforce this until 1549. See Simpson, The
Encomienda. chapter 11, "The New Laws," pp. 123-145.
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to include labor services until later in the century, and in a few
regions into the seventeenth century; however, the crown was able to
set certain limitations on the use of Indian labor by the colonizers.^
At the same time, although the encomienda was to be continually
reduced in importance, it did persist as a tribute system into the
eighteenth century in several parts of the e m p i r e . ^
However, the declining significance of the encomienda as a labor
system was not due merely to a royal victory over the colonizers.

The

encomienda1s decline should be seen in relation to the use of other,
parallel, tributary and seigneurial systems.

For, as the Indian popu

lation declined, absolutely and relatively to the colonizers' and
mestizos' n u m b e r s , ^ alternative methods of exploiting the Indian
peasant population developed to meet the needs of the colonizers and
£C
their seigneurial ambitions.

6^John j. Rowe, "The Incas Under Spanish Colonial Institutions,"
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 37, no. 2 (May 1957), p. 160,
and Eduardo Arcila Farias, El Regimen de la encomienda en Venezuela
(Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1966), pp. 193-221.
^ S e e Maria Isabel Gonzalez Porres, "La Encomienda de indigena
en Chile durante el siglo XVIII," Historia. vol. 5 (1966), pp. 7-103.
^^Nicolas Sanchez Albornoz, La Poblacion de America Latina:
desde los tiempos pre-colombinos al ano 2000 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial,
1973), pp. 58-107.
It has been estimated that the pre-conquest popu
lations of Mexico and Peru were approximately 25 million and 10 million
respectively, and that by 1560 they had declined to approximately 2.5
million and 1 million, respectively.
^^The internal conflict in the encomienda was recognized by
Robert Keith in "Encomienda, Hacienda and C o r r e g i m i e n t o Hispanic
American Historical Review, vol. 51, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 431-446.
Keith argues that the conflict was between an antifeudal crown and a
capitalist colonizing class; however, it will be argued herein that
the conflict was not feudalism vs. capitalism, rather that it was
between the crown's intention to create a tributary system based on
the Indian peasant community vs. the seigneurial ambitions of the
colonizers who were not above making a profit.
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Developing parallel to the encomienda and increasing in
importance with the decline of the encomienda, were the corregimlento
and the hacienda.

The corregimlento, or royal encomienda, was

intended to protect the Indian community's cohesiveness against the
ambitions of the colonizers and the development of the seigneurial
hacienda.00

Thus, the struggle inherent in the encomienda system

emerged in these two ways.
The corregimiento was in the charge of a royal official, rather
than held privately by an encomendero.

The communities of the corre

gimiento were still obligated to provide tribute for the crown and
they were also subject to temporary corvee labor, or repartimiento.^7
when requests for it by the colonizers were approved by the royal
official.

The requests for repartimiento came from mine operators,

owners of obrajes (textile sweat-shops), and landowners.

The Indians

involved in repartimiento were to be paid salaries for their labor.
The hacienda, on the other hand, was in the early phases of its
development.

The crown had provided means for the establishment of

towns and the distribution of lands, based on the Iberian experience,
to be followed in America.

Hoping to protect the Indian communities,

the crown intended that the lands distributed should be worked by the
Spanish t h e m s e l v e s h o w e v e r ,

^Gibson,

S p a i n , pp.

regardless of their social origins, the

143-144.

^Repartimiento was called coatequil in Mexico and mita in Peru,
showing its structural-functional continuity with pre-conquest times.
^ G i b s o n , Spain, p. 144.
^F r a n g o i s Chevalier, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico, trans.
Alvin Eustis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 5282.
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conquerors and colonizers were imbued with the seigneurial idea,
enhanced by their domination as conquerors.^®

Thus, the holding of

land also required the acquisition of a labor force.
At first, when the Spanish population was small and the
encomenderos were still politically dominant, it was not uncommon for
the encoraendero and the landholder to be the same individual.

Although

the encomienda grant itself did not include landholding, neither did it
forbid the encomendero to own land.

Thus, the encomenderos often

sought landownership near the site of the encomienda.

In fact, based

on evidence from various regions of the empire, one historian has
concluded that:
One can say with some assurance that during the
conquest period encomenderos in all the major
regions of the Spanish Indies regularly owned
land as private individuals and that many of
their holdings were inside the limits of their
own encomiendas.^
And so long as the encomienda permitted labor service, the
landholder, as encomendero, used his Indians to work his land.
However, as the non-encomendero Spanish population grew, it
became evident that the encomienda would not be able to meet the
colonizers' needs, nor their seigneurial ambitions.

The decline of

the encomienda, although greeted with hostility by the encomenderos,
was welcomed by the non-encomendero population because it was replaced

7®See George M. Foster, Culture and Conquest: America's Spanish
Heritage (New York: Werner Green Foundation, 1960), p. 11.
71jaraes Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of
the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies," Hispanic American Historical
Review, vol. 49, no. 3 (August 1969), p. 416. Arcila Farias has
referred to the "coexistence of encomenderos' and Indians* land" in
Venezuela. Arcila Farias, El Regimen de la encomienda. p. 288.
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b y the corregimlento, and the repartimiento labor that it provided.
Increasingly, Spanish landowners utilized repartimiento labor.
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With the continued growth in the non-Indian population and the
expansion of markets in the Spanish mining and administrative centers,
the demand for labor in agriculture continued to increase.
peasant population was declining rapidly.

The Indian-

Thus, while the Indian labor

force was declining, the demands upon it were increasing:

for the

mines, for public works projects, and for the agricultural lands which
supplied them.
The several sectors calling upon the repartimiento as a labor
supply (mining, obrajes, the colonial administration, and agriculture)
were, in effect, competing with each other for the Indians.

In a

system based on compulsory labor, this situation does not necessarily
benefit the laborer.

Instead, the colonizers were able to have the

amount of repartimiento which was required of each community
7^

increased, J

The competition for labor became so intense, according

to one historian, that:
Spaniards sequestered laborers, beat them, refused
to pay them, seized their food and clothing to
prevent escape, and undertook to acquire private
native workers outside the draft... The reparti
miento system of the late sixteenth century was
everywhere one of compulsion and abuse. ^
The landowners, eager to take advantage of the commercial oppor
tunities available by supplying the population centers with

^ G i b s o n , The Aztecs, pp. 224-226, and David L. Weidner, "Forced
Labor in Peru," Americas, vol. 16, no. 4 (April 1966), pp. 361-362.

^^Ibid.,
pp. 170-175.
^Ibid.,

(Gibson), p. 230, and Rowe, "The Incas Under Spanish,"

(Gibson), p. 233.
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agricultural produce, sought a more readily available labor force than
that of the repartimiento.

The precedent for debt peonage already

existed to a certain extent in Spain and had appeared in the New World
as a means to secure a labor force for the obrajes.

The obrajes had

been in competition for repartimiento labor with the mines and agri
culture, but they had also acquired labor by "buying" criminals from
the courts, who would then work for a stipulated period in the o b r a j e . ^
Eventually, the obraje operators turned to debt peonage, in which they
would forward a cash payment to an Indian which was to be worked off
in the shop.

The Indian would never be able to pay back the debt and

would, thus, remain tied to the obraje.

To prevent escape, the obraje

operator would be sure to keep the workers chained and the doors to
the obraje l o c k e d . ^
The spread of debt peonage in agriculture is part of a process
of circular causation which leads to the rise of the hacienda, com
parable to the rise of the second serfdom in Eastern Europe.

The

increasing competition for the decreasing Indian labor force instigated
the Spanish landowners to seek to acquire a private labor force, apart
from the repartimiento.

The Indians, suffering the increasing burden

of repartimiento, were easily attracted by salary advances made by the
landowners.

The landowners demanded that their peons be excluded from

the labor requirements of the community and the repartimiento draft,
and were often successful in having their requests g r a n t e d . ^

The

75pernando Silva Santisteban, Los Obrajes en el vlrreinato del
Peru (Lima: Museo Nacional de Historia, 1964), p. 37. Also, see Gibson,
The Aztecs, pp. 243-244.
76ibid.,

(Gibson), p. 245.

^ I b i d . , p. 247, and Weidner, "Forced Labor," p. 363.

landowners were willing to pay the Indians' tribute in order to main
tain their presence on their lands.7®
The attraction of Indians to the Spanish lands became a cumula
tive process.

The decrease in the communities' population was

advanced by the continuing departure of additional Indians to the
Spanish lands (peonage was preferable to working in the mines or the
obrajes), which meant that even less Indians were available in the
communities to meet the required, increasing demands of repartimiento.
Thus, even more Indians abandoned the communities to enter into
peonage arrangements with the Spanish landowners.

Furthermore, the

latter were eager to expand their landholdings; so the less populated
Indian lands were sought and acquired through purchase, rental,
70

encroachment, and usurpation.

It has been noted that:

Peonage moreover was not limited to individual
Indians.
Entire families and successive genera
tions of families were drawn within the system.
And through advance payments on rentals of com
munal lands, hacendados were able to subject
whole towns to a condition of subservience and
economic thralldom.®®
The elements in the growth of the hacienda, debt peonage and

78Ibid.
78For examples of estate expansion in one region, see William B.
Taylor, Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1972), pp. 132-133. Also, Chevalier, Land and
Society, pp. 212-220.
^ C h a r l e s Gibson, "The Transformation of the Indian Community in
New Spain, 1500-1810," Journal of World History, vol. 2, no. 3 (1955),
p. 597. The process of seigneurialization sounds similar to that des
cribed by Marc Bloch in Feudal Society, vol. 1, p. 242: "The majority
of peasants belonged, therefore, at one and the same time to two groups
constantly out of step with each other; one of them composed of
subjects with the same master, the other of members of the same village
community."

land acquisition, did not go unheeded by the crown; however, royal
policies were inconsistent.

The crown's response to debt bondage was

one of acceptance, because formally it appeared as a voluntary wage
relationship which the crown favored.

And yet, because it was recog

nized as a potentially compulsory labor relationship, the crown sought
to regulate it.81

The same inconsistency prevailed in the crown's

response to the hacienda's land acquisition.

At the same time that

decrees were issued seeking to protect the communities' lands, the
crown carried out policies jeopardizing the Indians' landholdings,
82
e.g. congregaciones and composiciones.
There were two major impediments to a consistent crown policy.
The first was the political power of the landholders: "The wealthiest
and most powerful persons in the colony - viceroys, high ranking
officials, prosperous merchants, ecclesiastics...”

83

and:

For the accumulation of such large estates,
political power as well as money was required.
Diego de Ibarra was Governor of New Biscay.
Holders of that office generally managed to do
well for themselves in land.
Perhaps the pro
cess was cumulative - they first became eligible
for office because they were landowners, and then
authority enabled them to build up their domains

81(3.H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World - Harbinger Books, 1963), pp. 62-63, and Gibson, The
Aztecs. p. 253.
B^Congregacion was the reduction or transplantation of Indian
communities in order to facilitate administration, tribute collection,
and Christianization.
Composici6n was the paying of a fee to consoli
date and legitimate the lands one held - which meant that "encroached
upon and/or usurped lands" would be titled as belonging to the Spanish
occupant. On the social-legal impact of the crown's policies, see
Jose Miranda, "La Propiedad comunal de la tierra y la cohesion social
de los pueblos indfgcnas mexicanos," Vida Colonial, pp. 56-66.
83cib son, Spain, p. 155.

82
still further.84
And the second was the crown's need for additional revenues.

At

various times, starting in 1591, the holding of composiciones took
place.8^
Thus, as in Eastern Europe, the 'estate1 was encroaching upon
the peasants' lands to supply an expanding market.

The absorption of

Indian-peasant labor and Indian-peasant land in the sixteenth century
in colonial Spanish America was not a competition between seigneuria
lism and capitalism, giving rise to a bourgeoisie and a rural prolet
ariat, but a struggle between the tribute paying Indian-peasant
community and the seigneurial hacienda, giving rise to a regime of
aristocratic landowners, often resident in the urban centers, and
serfs, resident on the hacienda and managed by overseers.

The struggle

was a transformation of the conquest-colonial relationship between
Spaniards and Indians to a class relationship between dominant
landowners and dominated peasant-serfs.
The nobility of Eastern Europe had encroached upon the labor and
land of the peasantry, and had expanded demesne production, in order
to exploit the commercial opportunities of the Western European grain
markets.

Although not so directly involved in Western European

commerce as the East European nobility, the nascent "nobility" of
Spanish America supplied agricultural produce to the mining centers

84P.J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico:
Zacatecas. 1546-1700 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971),
p. 116.
or

j

Jose M. Ots Capdequi, El Regimen de la tierra en la America
espanola durante el periodo colonial (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora
Montalito, 1946), see pp. 67-91 on the composicion of 1591. Also,
Chevalier, Land and Society, pp. 265-277.
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which exported precious metals to Spain - which then moved them to
Western Europe in return for manufactured goods.

This commercial net

work has been termed the European-world economy;®® and the crisis of
the seventeenth century in the European-world economy also appears to
have involved parts of the Spanish empire in America, particularly New
Spain (Mexico and Central America).
The impact of the seventeenth century crisis had not reversed
the trend towards a second serfdom in Eastern Europe and it even seems
to have accelerated the process in many areas.

In New Spain's

"century of depression"®^ and connected to the crisis, a similar
acceleration in seigneurialism occurred.
There are two arguments which seek to explain the acceleration
in the rise of the landed estate during the crisis.

The first states

that those Spaniards who possessed land (or could acquire it) moved
onto their landholdings in order to take refuge there against the
economic crisis; and that they managed their estates as self-sufficient
manors.

Thus, cumulatively the landowners sought to secure a resident

labor force, through debt peonage, and a monopoly on landholding, to
force additional Indians to move onto the estate.

One historian has

written on Central America:
Many Spaniards... abandoned the more overt com
mercial activities which had engaged them...
Some became hacienda owners in an impressive way
and converted themselves into fair imitations of

®®Pierre Chaunu and Huguette Chaunu, "The Atlantic Economy and
the World Economy." Earle, ed. Essays in European Economic History, pp.
113-127.
®7"From 1576 until well over a century later New Spain had a con
tracting economy." Wodrow Borah. New Spain s Century of Depression.
Ibero-Americana no. 35 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951),
p. 1 .
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feudal lords.®®
And others, referring to the mining dominated regions of Mexico
and Peru, have written:
Miners and merchants shifted investment to land
and accelerated the formation of the latifundia.
Without the incentive or stimulus coming from
the mines, their output of silver, labor force
and dependents, the large estates tended to
become relatively self-sufficient.®9
The second argument states that the accumulation of land and
labor continued at a rapid pace because the decline in the Indian popu
lation meant declining Indian agricultural production; therefore, the
seventeenth century presented even greater commercial opportunities by
QQ
way of supplying the population centers.

Woodrow Borah has written:

The solution to the problem of Spanish food
supply lay in decreasing or eliminating direct
dependence upon the enfeebled Indian communities.
The most obvious solution was to extend to other
essential crops the system of Spanish-owned large
estates which were already raising wheat and
livestock for the cities.91
Amongst those social scientists defining capitalism (or its
absence) on the existence (or non-existence) of a market and commercial
activity, this debate is basic to the characterization of the hacienda
as pre-capitalist or c a p i t a l i s t . H o w e v e r ,

differences in the several

®®Murdo J. MacLeod, Spanish Central America: A Socio-economic
History. 1520-1720 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973),
p. 153. The classic work forwarding this argument is Chevalier's
Land and Society in Colonial Mexico.
®9stein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage, p. 38.
9®Borah, New Spain’s Century of Depression, pp. 30-44.
91Ibid., p. 32.
92S ee Andre Gunder Frank, "Capitalist Latifundia Growth in Latin
America," Latin America, pp. 231-248.
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arguments might be explainable in geographical terms, because they are
based on research in separate regions; e.g. Chevalier's study focused
on northern Mexico, while Borah focused on central Mexico.
What is significant in these developments is not that the impact
of the seventeenth century generated different responses in different
regions, which can be explained as the result of differing circum
stances, but rather that it generated similar responses in different
regions of differing circumstances, i.e. the responses to the crisis
accelerated the development of seigneurial relations in societies
already in the process of seigneurialization!

And, regarding the

issue of commercial orientation, the following quote of Eric

Wolf

seems to have captured it best:
The dual nature of the hacienda - its ability to
retrench in times of adverse markets, its ability
to increase production if demand rose - allowed
it to adapt even to conditions which differed
from those that gave it birth. ^
Through a monopolization on landholding, the hacendado eliminated
competition and attracted impoverished Indians to settle on the estate
as peons.

The best land of the estate served as the demesne and the

less desirable lands were provided for the peons, often their own
former lands,
service.

in return for a specified number of days of labor

Thus, during normal times the peons provided for themselves

and their labor service provided for the demesne production, "to
furnish not only returns of capital invested, but also to furnish the
funds needed to feed the owner and to support his aspirations for power

93Wolf, Sons, p. 210.
94Ibid., p. 215.
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and prestige."9^

When markets improved (or were depressed) it was

only necessary to increase (or decrease) the peons' required labor
services, and perhaps to alter the size of the demesne as well.
The Indians' movement from their communities to the landed
estates was not only the development of seigneurialism at the expense
of the colonial-tribute relations, but it also furthered the rise of
the uniquely American mestizo racial classification:
There is no reason to doubt that the surge of the
haciendas profoundly changed the structure of the
rural population and that, at the same time, it
accelerated rapidly the processes of miscegenation
and transculturation.
The rising numbers of mestizos were due not only to the further
mixing of the Indian and European races, but also because, at a
certain stage in the growth of the mestizos' numbers, the "racial"
characteristics differentiating amongst Indian, mestizo, and bianco
became less significant (less distinguishable?) and differentiation
was increasingly class based, i.e. more a social issue than a
bio-racial

issue.

Thus:

...at least in the rural sector, the Indian was
generally the member of a community that func
tioned according to the hispano-Indian norms
established in the Laws of the Indies.97
while the peons of the hacienda were becoming mestizado.
In review, the "long sixteenth century" in the Spanish Empire in

^5Eric R. Wolf and Sidney W. Mintz, "Haciendas and Plantations
in Middle America and the Antilles," Social and Economic Studies, vol.
6 , no. 3 (September 1957), p. 387.
^^Magnus Morner, Estado. razas v cambio social en la hispanoamerica colonial, Sep Setentas no. 128 (Mexico: Secretarfa de Educacion
Phblica, 1974), p. 115.

97Ibid., p. 125.
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America was a formative period.

The conquest and immediate coloniza

tion of the New World was a period of plunder and the creation of
colonial relations combining the institutions of expansion developed
in Iberia and the tribute relations found in America.

However, the

decline of the Indian populations, coupled with the growth of the
Spanish demands for labor service for the mines, obrajes, public works
and agricultural production, instigated a competition between the
colonial-tribute system and the seigneurial ambitions of the colonizers.
Increasingly, the colonizers sought to acquire private, dependent labor
forces for their holdings, at the expense of the colonial-tribute
system and the Indian community upon which it was based.

The demands

on the tribute system came to depend more and more upon reduced com
munity populations, making the Spanish estates appear as an increas
ingly preferable alternative to them.

Attracted by a salary advance,

and land to cultivate, the Indian peasants moved onto the Spanish
lands, where they became peons, tied by debt and increasing material
and psychological dependence.
The haciendas' development began in the sixteenth century and
the crisis of the seventeenth century accelerated its formation.

And:

When the depression of the seventeenth century
came to an end in the economic upswing of the
eighteenth century, the hacienda, too,
participated in the renewed expansion.^®
Not all of the Indian communities were absorbed, or even
threatened by the growth of the landed estate; however, it is during
this period that the struggle between the hacienda and the community
(which was always weighted in favor of the estate) took on its

9®Wolf, Sons, p. 211.

traditional character.
The formation of seigneurialism in colonial Spanish America has
thus far been examined with reference to Mexico (New Spain) and Peru,
particularly the former.

A further example of the development of

seigneurialism, which is unique - but similar,®^ is the conquest and
colonization of Chile.
The conquest of Chile followed upon that of Peru.

Beginning in

the mid-sixteenth century, it persisted into the seventeenth (and
beyond) as the frontier was pushed further south at the expense of the
Indians.

In a fashion similar to the subjection of the Indians of

prior conquests, the native population of Chile was parcelled out to
the colonizers in encomiendas.

The encomienda system was, thus,

introduced into Chile when it had already begun its decline in the
older colonial regions
Originally, as was thought to be the case in the other developing
colonial societies, the encomienda system was assumed to be the origin
of the landed estate and its dependent labor force:
The land which was assigned to a conqueror was
called repartimiento and the Indians who lived
on it and who were also assigned to him,
encomienda, because he had them in his care...
and he made them work. 101.
However, research by Mario Gongora has clarified the

99"Diversity in similarity, similarity in diversity," a guiding
phrase in Latin American studies.
lOOgalvat Monguillot, "El Regimen de encomiendas en los tiempos
de la conquista," Revista Chilena de Historia y Geograffa. no. 132
(1964), pp. 5-59.
lOlLuis Galdames, A History of Chile, trans. and ed. Isaac Joslin
Cox (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 55.

89

encomienda-hacienda relationship in Chile by showing that it was not
only that they were equivalent but that very often the encomendero
also acquired land which he succeeded in locating near his labor force
- and many times within the limits of the encomienda.

102

Thus, land

and labor do appear to have been united quite often under the same
colonizer.
The Indian labor force was not acquired merely through encomienda.
Additional labor was brought onto the land in the form of slaves,
acquired in the constant Indian wars along the southern frontier.

And

"the Indian slaves worked and lived together with the Indians of the
encomienda, there being no more than a juridical

difference.

"103

The encomienda system persisted longer in Chile than in the other
colonial societies.

Although there were attempts to eliminate it in

the late sixteenth century, it was not finally shorn of the labor
service until 1635 - and it remained as a tribute system until 1 7 9 1 . ^ ^
The persistence of the encomienda led to the assumption that the
dependent peasants, the inquilinos, of the nineteenth and twentieth
century Chilean estates were the descendants of the encomienda and
slave

Indians,

1^5

However, recent research b y Gongora argues that the

102jferio Gongora, Encomenderos v estancieros. pp. 4-16.
103^^varo j arflji "Salario en una economfa caracterizada por las
relaciones de dependencia personal," Revista Chilena de Historia y
Geografla. no. 133 (1965), p. 54.
104porres, "La Encomienda ind^gena," pp. 13, 90-91. On the
history of the Chilean encomienda system, see Domingo Amunategui Solar,
Las Encomiendas de indfgenas en Chile. 2 vols. (Santiago: Imprenta
Cervantes, 1909).
lO^Helen Douglas-Irvine, "The Landholding System of Colonial
Chile," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 8 , no. 4 (November
1928), pp. 449-495.
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inqullinos have predominantly other origins.
Following the conquest and colonization of Chile in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the further expansion of
the frontier became limited.

The military forces, composed of "poor

Spanish" and mestizos were, therefore, unable to fulfill their seig
neurial ambitions and were forced to resort to smallholdings.

The

small landholdings which they secured were obtained from the large
landowners in return for a stipulated annual labor service.

The land

owners, resident in the urban centers, used their land for cattleranching, and the labor service they required of their tenants involved
working at round-ups and rodeos.

It is amongst these poor Spanish and

mestizos, as well as the Indians in encomienda and slavery, that
Gongora locates the origins of the inquilinos.

In the eighteenth

century, the Chilean economy responded to the opportunity of exporting
wheat to Peru.

The landowners converted grazing land to grain culti

vation and exported the wheat to Peru.

In their seigneurial fashion,

the landowning aristocracy did not "modernize" the social relations of
production, they merely increased the labor requirements of their
tenants.

Market production was thus accomplished by the landed aris

tocracy within the seigneurial regime they had established.

Gongora

has written:
In sum, then, the rural tenancies from the
grants to inquilinaje had nothing to do with
the encomienda or the Conquest.
It proceeds
from the second period of colonial history.107

lO^Mario Gongora, Orfgen de los inquilinos en Chile central
(Santiago: Universldad de Chile, 1960).
107Ibid., p. 116.
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Thus, could it not be argued that the social relations of seig
neurialism, characteristic of colonial Spanish America, were not depen
dent merely on the privileges of conquest and racialism, but even more
so on the "sociology" of Spanish society and the transplantation to
America of the seigneurial idea?
The development of colonial Spanish American society and agrarian
Spanish America necessarily involves mention of the church, not only as
the spiritual arm of the conquest and colonization, but also because of
its role as a financial, landholding and welfare institution.
been recognized by historians that the church,

It has

through its various

units and chapters, was a major source of capital in colonial society
and that, as a result of the mortgages it held, tithes it collected,
and exemptions it possessed, the church was able to accumulate extensive holdings.

108

The significance of the church as an economic

institution, however, was not that it furthered economic development.
Rather, the church's operation might be seen as having been "in
certain respects...an economic burden upon the colonies."109
Ecclesiastical holdings were acquired through four means:
mercedes, purchases, estate owners' obligations to the church, and
mortgages,

Mercedes and purchases were, of course, not unique to

the church; however, estate owners' obligations and the great number

10®Haring, The Spanish Empire, pp. 176-178, and Gibson, Spain,
pp. 84-85.
109Ibid., (Haring), p. 177.
llOey

estate owners' obligations is meant the practice of placing
encumbrances on landholdings to provide the church with an income to
carry out pious works.
See J. Vicens Vives, Historia econ6mico y social
de Espana v America (Barcelona: Editorial Teide, 1957), vol. Ill, pp.
511-514.
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of mortgages held by the church were the result of the church's dual
role as the dominant spiritual institution and the dominant credit
institution of colonial society.
The non-capitalist - if not anti-capitalist - character of the
church should be evident in that the "investments" it made included
not only loans and purchases, but also such economically non-productive
activities as church construction, missionary work, charitable founda
tions, etc.:

"Even when its enterprises function according to

capitalist canons they are subject to extra-economic g o a l s . " H I
Therefore, when the leading financial institution and single property
owner does not operate according to the "spirit of capitalism" how can
the society be termed capitalist?
At the same time that the agrarian sector of the Spanish Empire
in America was developing seigneurial relations of production, other
non-agrarian sectors were also developing.

These other sectors

included mining, merchant operations, the obrajes, and artisanry.
These sectors have been termed "embryos of capitalism."U-2
An elite of the potential bourgeoisie was the class of mineowners who produced - or rather, extracted - precious metals for export
to Spain.

Originally, the mineowners had depended on the labor service

of the colonial tribute system to recruit workers; however, although
large masses of laborers were never required (relative to agriculture),
the mineowners increasingly turned to other more secure methods of
labor recruitment, e.g. debt b o n d a g e . H 3

Seeking to clarify the

H l s e m o , Historia del capitalismo. p. 115.
H 3 g ee Bake we 11, Silver Mining, pp. 121-129.

^-^Ibid., p #

mining sector's relation to land and labor, one historian has written:
It must not be forgotten that the majority of
the mines are small enterprises enclosed within
the haciendas... Generally the systems of
extraction and processing are primitive and the
workers are the same peons or Indians that are
occupied in agriculture. ^
However, with the resurgence in mining in the eighteenth century
(and the longer separation of the workers from their conmunity origins)
the system of debt bondage appears to have given way to a more volun
tary system of labor recruitment in some regions.

Referring to New

Spain, David Brading noted:
Mexican mineworkers, far from being the oppressed
peons of legend constituted a free, well-paid geo
graphically mobile labor force... The vast majority
of Mexican mineworkers, they did not number more
than 45,000 individuals, worked voluntarily.
Although a significant source of colonial wealth, the capitalist
social relationship developing between the mineowners and the mine
workers remained a quantitatively limited one in the colonial social
structure (relative to agrarian pursuits).

The mineowners attracted

laborers from the communities - both by force and by salary advances,
thus they weakened village cohesiveness.

However, the mineowners did

not challenge the seigneurial regime which was developing.
no need to.

There was

Their wealth and future profits did not require a large

consumer market because they were based on the export of precious
metals.

And the mineowners' enterprises provided them with the wealth

they required to purchase estates and enter the colonial aristocracy:

^ ^ S e m o , Historia del capitalismo. p. 148.
115Davi(j A. Brading, Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico.
1763-1810 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 146.
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"Wealthy merchants and miners employed excess capital for the purchase
of rural estates, and needy hacendados contracted marriage alliances
with willing merchant and mining families."^®
Another motivational factor in the mineowners'

land purchases

was that the mineowners were rarely permitted to entail their mineholdings, thus they purchased estates in order to establish
mayorazgos.
The merchant-bourgeoisie of colonial society was very similar to
the mineowning elite in its ambitions and behavior; and to its commer
cial counterpart in Spain.

Like them, the merchants of colonial

Spanish America were eager to protect their wealth and to "deliver it"
intact

to their heirs.

them under entailment.

Thus, they too purchased estates and placed
"Such an arrangement coincided with the wealthy

merchant's usual ambition to found a noble f a m i l y . " H ®

Clarence Haring

has commented:
Land was the principal source of riches and pres
tige in a society which disdained trade and indus
trial pursuits, and the successful miner Land merchantj invested his income in farms and haciendas.
Landed property was also an indispensable requisite
for the exercise of the few political rights which
the colonists enjoyed. A minority of fortunate land
owning Creoles lived much like their Spanish ancestors,
imbued with similar aristocratic prejudices, and with
similar improvidence and lack of foresight.

l ^ L . N . McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change in New
Spain," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 48, no. 3 (August
1963), p. 368.
H-^Parry, The Spanish, p. 316.

^^Brading, Miners. p. 103.

H e a r i n g , The Spanish Empire, p. 241. Genovese raised a similar
issue on the Hispanic social psychology when he stated: "Those who
would dismiss the historical debate on the "spirit of capitalism" as
mere metaphysics, might ponder the combined effects of the pre-bourgeois
Luso-Hispanic ideology and psychology." The World The Slaveholders Made.
p. 59.
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Another argument explaining the limited industrial development
of colonial Spanish America has been Spanish mercantilism; however,
as J.H. Elliott has written, referring to imperial policy:
...it could be cogently argued that it was pre
cisely because of the lack of any consistently
pursued mercantilist policies that the country
CSpainl ran into such serious economic difficul
ties.
There was no attempt at systematic exploi
tation of the resources of the New World other
than those of the mines, and almost nothing was
done to develop in the New World an economy which
might complement that of Castile.
It is true that
the government ordered the destruction of the
newly planted Peruvian vineyards and olive groves,
for fear of their competition w i t h . ..the exports
of Andalusia; but colonial industries were allowed
to develop unchecked, and Charles V gave specific
encouragement to the silk industry of New Spain
although this was an obvious competition to the
silk industry of Granada .*•2 ®
Haring does not so readily agree with Elliott's argument of
limited restrictions:
Manufacturing industries had no extensive develop
ment in the colonies, in part because the Spanish
government after the period of the conquest was
inclined to discourage or forbid industries which
competed with the manufacturers and trade of
another c o u n t r y . 1^1
And yet, he adds that: "Interference by the metropolis with colonial

122

industry, however, was never very systematic. *

These conflicting arguments of Elliott and Haring indicate an
inconsistency on the part of the crown regarding the relationship
between Spain and its American colonies.

Genovese has offered an

interpretation of mercantilism which proposes that the mercantile
policy of a state be viewed with respect to the "social bases of state

120Ellio tt, Imperial Spain, p. 196.
l^Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 242.

122jbid.
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1O'*
power,11
i.e. that because the rise of absolutism was based on
differing alliances in different states, the policies of those states
would have reflected their class bases. Thus, while the mercantilisms
of England and Holland were linked to the alliance of the state and
the bourgeoisie, the mercantilism of Spain was not.

The exploitation

of the mineral wealth of the colony did not go to developing capitalist
industry in Spain, but rather provided the funds to support Spanish
imperialism in Europe and for "shoring up the decaying hidalguia."124
The inconsistency of the crown might then be understood as having been
due, perhaps, to the contradictions involved in securing immediate
revenues while keeping the colonies supplied.

As opposed to "mercan

tilism in the sense of a league between the state and the capitalist
interest,"125 Spanish mercantilism was the policy of a state based on
an alliance with seigneurial nobles and merchant-seigneurs.
Within the limits of Spain's inconsistent policy, or "seigneurial
mercantilism," there arose a guild system patterned after the one in
Spain, and a textile industry based on the obrajes.
The guilds, or gremios. organized the artisans by their crafts:
"silversmiths, goldbeaters, harness and saddle makers, potters, weavers,
hatters, candlemakers,"^^ "shoemakers, furniture makers, glassworkers
and practitioners of other c r a f t s . " ^ ^

These guilds have been noted

l^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders M a d e , p. 56.
12% b i d . , pp. 57-58.
See Leopoldo M. Solis, "La Influencia del
mercantilismo espanol en la vida economica de America Latina," El
Trimestre Economico, vol. 31, no. 2 (April/June 1964), pp. 200-209.
125yfeb er> General Economic History, p. 257.
126naring, The Spanish Empire, p. 252.

127Qibson, Spain, p. 127.
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for their anti-capitalist orientation:
The small artisanal producer understands that his
interests demand the preservation of his monopo
listic position and for that reason he mobilizes
his forces and those of the guild to prevent
competition,128
Economically considered, the guilds were anti
capitalist institutions because...the spirit of
enterprise and individual initiative were absent
...the members of the guilds were unable to
invest in their businesses as potential indus
trialists because the guild structure impeded
it.129
On the other hand, the obrajes represented a nascent capitalism
developing in the midst of the seigneurial society and colonial
economy.

However, the obrajes were opposed by the guilds,1^0 inhibited

by the Atlantic trade which continued to supply the colonies with the
manufactures desired by the dominant classes, and limited in its
development by the limited size of the colonial market.

Furthermore,

the qualification of the obraje as nascent - or embryonic - capitalism
is essential to an appreciation of it.

Xts origins depended on compul

sory labor service and debt bondage; and even in the late eighteenth
and very early nineteenth centuries the relations of production
between the obraje owners and their labor force were not very far
1 Ol

removed from those origins.

Writing in the last few years of the

128Semo, Historia del capitalismo. p. 161.
129j{anuel Carrera Stampa, Los Gremios mexlcanos: la organizacion
gremial en Nueva Espans. 1521-1861 (Mexico: EDIAFSA, 1954), p. 265.
On Peru, see Gustavo Adolfo Otero, La Vida social en el coIonia1e (La
Paz: Editorial Juventud, 1958), pp. 280-281.
130ibid,f (Carrera Stampa), p. 266.
131])iego G. Lopez Rosada, Historia v pensamiento economico de
Mexico (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaci6n Economics, Universidad
Nacional, 1969), pp. 224-230; Fernando Silva Santisteban, Los Obrajes
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colonial period, Alexander von Humboldt described the laboring
situation of the obrajes:
Free men, Indians and men of color are confused
with galley slaves whom the courts distribute to
the shops to make them work... Each shop appears
more or less like a jail; the doors, which are
double, are always locked to prevent the workers
from leaving, and those that are married only
return home on Sundays.
These obraje owners are
like those of Quito and are similar to hacendados
in their b e h a v i o r . 132
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the historical
development of Spanish America were a formative period, in which the
Spanish conquerors and colonizers sought to establish relations of
production with the conquered peoples similar to those which existed
in Spain.

In spite of the inconsistent opposition of the crown and

clergy, and the varying resistance of the Indian communities, the
Spanish colonizers were extremely successful in establishing seigneu
rial relations in the New World.

Thus, the colonial system in Spanish

America was being transformed into a colonial society founded on the
class relations of dominant landowners and dominated peasantry.

The

reforms of the eighteenth century did little to alter the direction of
this p r o cess.^-33

The Spanish colonial system was based primarily on the

en el virreinato del Peru (Lima: Museo Nacional de Historia, 1964),
pp. 37-41; John Leddy Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth
Century (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 68-70.
132Alexander von Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre el reino de la
Nueva Espana (Mexico: Editorial Porr6a, 1966), p. 452.
133grian Hamnett, Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico. 17501821 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), and John Fisher,
Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System. 17841814 (London: University of London Press, 1970).
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exploitation of precious metals and the monopolization of imperial
commerce by Spain - which served the function of the "merchant"
between Western Europe and the colonies.

Unlike the later colonial

empires of Western Europe, which supported the capitalist-industrial
development of the colonizing societies, Spain’s colonial system did
not support such change:
...the new colonial system which emerged in the
middle of the seventeenth century became one of
the chief elements.. .in the preparation of the
industrial revolution.
But - and this is the
mouc important - the new colonial system only
emerged fully in those countries which had no
access to the old, and after the collapse of
the old.134
Thus, while Spanish America was imprinted with the seigneurialism
of Spain, neither did Spain itself experience capitalist development.
Weber recognized:
...that it depends entirely upon the nature of
the labor system what tendency will result from
an inflow of precious metal.
The gold and silver
from America, after the discovery, flowed in the
first place to Spain, but in that country a
recession of capitalist development took place
parallel with the importation.
There followed
on the one hand the suppression of the conmuneros
CsicJ and the destruction of the commercial
interests of the Spanish grandees, and on the
other hand, the employment of the money for military
ends. Consequently, the stream of precious metals
flowed through Spain scarcely touching it, and
fertilized other countries, which in the 15th
century were already undergoing a process of
transformation in labor relations which was favorable
to capitalism. 135

134-Eric j # Hobsbawm, "The Seventeenth Century in the Development
of Capitalism," Science and Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring 1960), p.
197.
135weber, General Economic History, pp. 259-260.

CHAPTER IV

SPANISH AMERICAN SEIGNEURIALISM

The Spanish American Wars for Independence (1808-1826) were not
social revolutions, and the political conflicts of the early national
period, although infused with the competing ideologies of liberalism
and conservatism, appear to have been merely elitist, intra-class
battles for control of the State, rather than struggles over the
structure of society.
In those colonial Spanish American societies of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries where the Indian peasantry
and working classes had risen in rebellion against the increasing
exactions of the creole'*' and Spanish landowners, miners, and officials
of the empire, the creoles and Spaniards had united to suppress them.
However much the creoles might have begun to favor independence from
Spain - motivated by the political and economic ideologies of the
Enlightenment, the example of the successful United States War for
Independence, the opportunity to expand commercial relations with
North America and Europe, and the opportunity to eliminate the social
1
*The creoles were those Spaniards who were born in America.
(They were considered "inferior" to Spaniards born in Spain.)
^For Peru and the Andes, see Daniel ValcArcel, Rebeliones
indigenas (Lima: Editorial P.T.C.M., 1946), and La Rebelion de Tupac
Amaru (Mexico: Fondo de Culture Econ6mica, 1947); for Mexico, see
Hugh Hamill, The Hidalgo Revolt - Prelude to Mexican Independence
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966).
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and legal obstacles to their upward mobility in the governmental strucO
ture and the military^ - they were unwilling to support independence
movements which potentially challenged their current and future domina
tion of the Spanish American societies.

And when the creoles did

finally favor independence and seek to establish it, it was because they
recognized that they could no longer afford to depend on the power and
questionable will of Spain to secure them against the possibility of
social revolution by the laboring classes, or invasion by a foreign
power.4
Undeniably, the ideas of the Enlightenment and the example of
the French Revolution influenced the Spanish American independence
movements; however, it was the less radical Anglo-American liberalism
and the example of the United States which became their ideological
style.

John Lynch has explained:
...embracing the principles of liberty and
applauding the rights of man.
Equality was
another matter.
Situated as they were between
the Spaniards and the masses, the creoles wanted
more than equality for themselves and less than
equality for their inferiors... The more radical
the French revolution became and the better it
was known, the less it appealed to the creole
aristocracy... The influence of the United
States was more benevolent and more enduring...
its existence...and its embodiment of liberty
and republicanism.5

^Robin Humphreys and John Lynch, eds., The Origins of the Latin
American Revolutions (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).
^John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions. 1808-1826 (New
York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), pp. 20-24. Also, see F. Stirton
Weaver, "Political Disintegration and Reconstruction in 19th Century
Spanish America: The Class Basis of Political Change," Politics and
Society, vol. 5, no. 2 (1975), pp. 162-170.
■’ibid., (Lynch), pp. 28-29. As well as the liberal movement
towards independence there was, at the same time, a conservative
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The Spanish American Wars for Independence, thus, ended three
centuries of Spanish colonial rule.

The dominant classes of Spanish

America removed the Iberian-Spanish elite from politico-economic con
trol and established republican governments; the control of which were
to be fought over by rival factions of those "liberated" dominant
classes.
But except for the removal of the Iberian-Spanish elite, whose
political position was filled by members of the Creole aristocracy and
whose economic position was filled both by Spanish Americans and newly
arrived foreign merchants,^ the social structures of the Spanish
American societies were little changed.

Or, as the historian, Robin

Humphreys, has written:
The hierarchical structure of society remained
intact... The Indians were by far the largest
element and after them the mestizos. But the
coming of independence meant little or nothing
to the Mexican peon, Peruvian Indian, or the
Chilean inquilino, and the social and economic
power of a small territorial aristocracy was
in no way diminished.^

Liberalism and Agrarian Reform
Although the Spanish American societies were not "structurally
revolutionized" by the Wars for Independence, the formation of inde
pendent states and the creation of governments (whose politico-economic

movement sometimes opposed, sometimes allied with, the liberals for
independence. The achievement of independence led to the political
battles between these two "parties" during the early national period.
6See Tulio Halperin Donghi, The Aftermath of Revolution in Latin
America (New York: Harper and Row - Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 44-52.
^Robin Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt in Latin America (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 10-11.

orientations were to be decided) did lead to significant changes, even
- if not particularly - in the countryside.

As well as the abolition

of slavery (immediately in some countries and later in others)® there
were also agrarian reforms enacted, and often implemented, which
greatly affected the Spanish American land tenure structures.
It may have been the liberalism and republicanism of the French
Revolution and the United States which provided the ideology for the
Spanish American Wars for Independence, but it was the economic
liberalism of Britain which provided the Spanish American liberals
with their ideology of political economy.

However, British liberal

economic theory had emerged as the ideology of the bourgeoisie of a
developing capitalist and industrializing society,^ while the Spanish
American societies had experienced almost three centuries as conquest
and colonial societies, dependent on agriculture and mining, and
dominated by admittedly commercial, but seigneurial, classes.
Liberalism, thus, appears incongruent as an ideology championed
by a significant faction of the dominant classes of the Spanish
American societies, particularly when one considers that the liberal
ideology was directly opposed to "feudal'* politico-legal property
systems and relations of production, and that it posited the free,
private landowning yeoman-farmer as the ideal agrarian c l a s s . ^

®Mellafe, Breve historia. pp. 141-168.
®See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the
Present Day (London: Penguin Books, 1969).
lOcharles Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora. 1821-1853
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 175-179, and Frederick
B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1967), pp. 64-69.

However, as we have seen, the Spanish American landowning classes were
not "feudal nobilities" - aristocratic though they appeared.

Rather,

they were classes which remained open and available to successful
members of the merchant and mining "bourgeoisies."

That is, social

mobility for the middle ranks of society*’*' (often, the creole heirs to
the Spanish merchants who had established themselves in the colonies)
into the dominant, landowning class was possible:*-^ "Independent
Mexico, as in colonial times, saw large amounts of commercial capital
channeled into large landed estates; constituting a new agrarian aris
tocracy of bourgeois origins."*■•*

And in Chile, where "The great mass

of the population was dominated by a small oligarchy of creoles..."
Some of the newer members of the creole
oligarchy had made their money in trade, but
used it to acquire estates, land being the
basis of all wealth in the colony.*-^
This is not to argue that those merchants abandoned their com
mercial enterprises, although some historians have argued that they
did, but rather to recognize that the landed "aristocracies" of the
Spanish American societies were continually strengthened by the

^ U s i n g the term "middle ranks" loosely.
*-^Some historians and sociologists have defined feudal societies
in terms of "estates" rather than classes, emphasizing the improbabi
lity of social mobility; this is another reason why it has been argued
that Spanish America cannot be defined as "feudal."
*--*Francisco Lopez cSmara, La Estructura economica y social de
Mexico en la epoca de la Reforma (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1973), p. 206.
*-^Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics in Chilean Independence.
1808-1833 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 5. The
creole merchants had continued to affirm Dobb's hypothesis that a
merchant class "is likely to struggle to 'muscle in' upon an existing
form of appropriating surplus labor, but it is unlikely to try to
change this form." Dobb, Studies, p. 18.
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admission of new families which had secured their entree to the power
and privilege of landed status through wealth acquired in mercantile
activities.

Or, as one Latin American sociologist has commented: "The

Latin American oligarchy is permanent, but its members change with each
generation.
Not "feudal nobles," the members of these dominant classes did
not hold their estates by "feudal" prerogatives, but rather as indivi
dual private landowners.

Thus, except for the institution of mayorazgo,

i.e. the entailment of estates (which was abolished rather early every
where but Chile) the Spanish American landowners would not be threa
tened by the enactment and implementation of liberal agrarian reforms,
directed at "feudal" property systems.

In fact, as we shall see, they

could only benefit from such reforms.
Regarding the social relations of production between the Spanish
American landowners and their work forces: Negro slavery was being
abolished and the peasantry was legally free.

That is, the peasants of

the estates were not bound to them by any legally sanctioned servile
status, as were their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe.
Neither was debt peonage, which was more common in some regions than
in others, officially sanctioned; although both the Spanish Crown
during colonial times, and the weak, landowner-dominated, governments
of independent Spanish America lacked either the power or the will to
suppress it.

(And there were even those who would argue that indebted

laborers were very dissimilar to serfs, because actually they were

*-5Fernando Guillen Martfnez, "Paternalism, Individualism, and
the Strategy of the West," in Norman A. Bailey, ed., Latin America:
Politics. Economics and Hemispheric Security (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1965), p. 85.
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merely laborers fulfilling contracts.)
Hypocrisy?

Perhaps, but the landowners who favored a liberal

political economy for their governments, and liberal agrarian reforms
directed against supposedly "feudal" property systems, were not
opposed by conservatives who challenged their mode of domination in
the countryside; for they, too, as landowners, practised that same
form of social control.

However much the conservatives might oppose

liberalism, they were either defeated by the liberals or were at least
defeated long enough for liberal agrarian reforms to be enacted,
enabling them to profit by them as well!
Varying according to their respective significance in each of
the Spanish American countries, the "feudal" property systems which
came under attack from the liberal agrarian reforms were the land
holdings of the Church and its associated bodies, the communally-owned
lands of the Indian peasantry, and the mayorazgos.
An attack on "feudal" property structures had, necessarily, to
include ecclesiastical holdings, which, although often managed quite
efficiently, represented a corporate monopoly on property.^

Further

more, the church's role as mortgage-holder and credit institution
generated increasing antagonisms, and the lack of financial resources
of the newly-established Spanish American governments led the liberals,
and conservatives alike, to recall the dictum of Adam Smith that "the
richer the Church, the poorer the S t a t e . " ^

l^Not to be confused with private business corporations and
monopolies.
l^Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannon (New York: The Modern Library,
1937), p. 765.
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The desamortizacion. i.e. the alienation of ecclesiastical pro
perties, which the liberals sought, was not without precedent.*-®
the late

In

eighteenth century, the Spanish crown had seen fit toexpell

the Order of Jesuits from the empire and put their numerous, and valuIQ
able, holdings up for sale,

which were then purchased by merchants

and miners, eager to enter the landed class, or by the already landed:
The removal of the Jesuits had several important
short-term effects in Chile... It also strengthened
the economic and social power of several creole
families who were able to buy up Jesuit estates. u
Through a variety of laws the Spanish Americans "liberated"
ecclesiastical properties from entailment and religious encumbrances,
or

at least reduced the

mortgage-holder.2*-

role of the church as a credit institution and

In theory, the desired effect of this processwas

to generate a market in land, in order to give rise to the much
idealized class of yeomen-farmers; however, the process of desamorti
zacion and related acts, followed a more predictable path.

That is,

rather than create a middle stratum of farmers, the disentailment of
ecclesiastical holdings merely furthered the concentration of landownership in private hands.

For example, in Mexico, where the aliena

tion of ecclesiastical property was carried out on the broadest scale,
the class which benefited most was the already landed, i.e. the
hacendados, whose mortgages were reduced and encumbrances removed.
Also able to take advantage of, and benefit from, the liberal agrarian

*-®For example, revolutionary France, and even Spain.
^ A r n o l d Bauer, "The Church and Spanish American Agrarian Struc
ture, 1765-1865," Americas, vol. 28, no. 1 (July 1971), pp. 82-84.
2®Collier, Ideas and Politics, p. 33.
2*Bauer, "The Church,"

pp. 84-86.

reforms were the merchants, both native and foreign, and the urban
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professionals who aspired to landed status. *
The communal landholding systems of the Indian peasantries were
also defined as "feudalistic" and obstacles to "modern'' agriculture
because the peasant's lands were entailed to the community; thus pro
hibiting the development of private landownership and the evolution
of the more capable peasants into yeomen-farmers.

At the same time,

this issue was related to the greater social issue of "Indian
integration."
The Spanish Crown, as we have seen, exhibiting the inconsistency
evident in all colonial regimes, had sought to protect the Indian
peasantries in their communities at the same time that it harnessed
those Indian communities to serve as a mode of social control and as
a system for colonial exploitation via the encomienda and the repartimiento.

Thus, to favor the dissolution of the Indian peasantry's

communal system and the subdivision of their communal lands into pri
vate landholdings represented not merely an attack on the system of
communal-entailment, but also an attack on a remaining structure of
the colonial regime, which had maintained the Indians in their
"separate" and "unequal" status.^-3
Opposition to the dissolution of the Indian peasant communities

22see Jan Bazant, Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico: Social
and Economic Aspects of the Liberal Revolution. 1856-1875. trans.
Michael P. Costeloe (London: Caui>ridge University Press, 1971).
^^Hale, Mexican Liberalism, pp. 220-221; and Thomas M. Davies,
Indian Integration in Peru (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1974), pp. 17-43. In Peru, the colonial tribute system persisted in
several regions for much of the nineteenth century, in spite of laws
against it.
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and the subdivision of their lands was divided between those conserva
tives who wished to continue the ,rprotective,, policies of the former
colonial regime and those liberals who recognized the contradictions
in their own policies.

They saw that to remove the "legal obstacles"

to the development of private property amongst the Indian peasantry
would also be to remove what little protection the Indian peasant land
holders possessed.

That is, the Indians would merely pass from a sys

tem of communal landholding to a condition of landlessness.

However,

the politically powerful of the Spanish American societies were the
hacendados, supported by the urban commercial classes and professional
stratum eager to become landowners.^
The promulgation of laws disentailing the community landholding
s y s t e m s ^ did not immediately lead to the peasantry's loss of their
lands and their relocation onto the latifundia.

The community land-

holding systems continued to persist through the strength of custom
and in spite of the laws.

(And, significantly, those communities which

did lose their lands often persisted within the latifundia which had
swallowed them up.

Thus, the peasants ceased to own their lands, but

they continued to possess them.)

However, the reform laws did faci

litate the encroachment, both illegally (by force) and legally (by
purchase), by the hacendados and "would-be" hacendados on the
communities' lands.

^ T . G . Powell, El Liberalising v el campesinado en el centro de
Mexico, 1850-1876. Sep Setentas no. 122 (Mexico: Secretarfa de Educacion
Publica, 1974), pp. 66-70; and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp.
67-69.
^^For Mexico, see Powell, El Liberalismo. pp. 74-100; for Bolivia,
see Ramiro Condarco Morales, Zarate, el "temible" Wilka (La Paz, 1965),
pp. 41-49; and for Peru, see Davies, Indian Integration, pp. 19-31.

The Indian peasantries did not necessarily accept the liberal
reforms pacifically.

Throughout the nineteenth century, and into the

twentieth, the Mexican, Bolivian, and Peruvian countrysides experi
enced numerous peasant uprisings, generated by encroachment or the
threat of encroachment on the lands of the communities.^
The legislative and physical encroachment on the lands of the
Indian peasant communities was, of course, a significant issue only in
those countries where the communities had survived the conquest and
colonization.

In Chile, where the Indian population had been greatly

reduced in numbers, or limited to the southern territories, the
peasantry was generally mestizo, and it had developed along with the
estates.

Neither was the issue of ecclesiastical landownership sig

nificant in Chile, compared to the other Spanish American countries,
because the major ecclesiastical landholder had been the Order of
Jesuits, \rtiose lands had already been confiscated and sold off to
private purchasers late in the eighteenth century.

But what appear

to have been more significant in Chile than elsewhere were the
mayorazgos.
The legislative struggle over the mayorazgo issue followed the
changing balance of conservative-liberal politics.

In 1818, the

Chilean independence leader, O'Higgins, had decreed the abolition of
2fi

Jean Meyer, Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias (18211910), Sep Setentas no. 80 (Mexico: Secretaries de Educacion Publica,
1973); Condarco Morales, Zarate: and Jean Piel, "The Place of the
Peasantry in the National Life of Peru in the Nineteenth Century,"
Past and Present, no. 46 (February 1970), pp. 108-133. Of interest is
the fact that during the Mexican conservatives' attempt to establish a
monarchy with French support and an Austrian prince, the Indian pea
santry of some regions gave their support to the conservatives because
they hoped it would mean a return of the protectionist policy of the
colonial period.
(See Powell, El Liberalismo. chapter 4.)
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the mayorazgo system, but his decree had no effect at all - except to
further the split between liberals and conservatives.22

Again aboli

shed by the liberal constitution of 1828, it was restored by the con
servatives in 1833.2®

It was not finally abolished until 1852.

The mayorazgo issue has traditionally been viewed by historians
as part of a major socio-political struggle between the "landed arisqn

tocracy" and more progressive urban interests,

which one historian

has updated to argue that the landed aristocracy was losing political
sway to the merchant class.

31

However, most recently, it has been

shown that the socio-economic and political significance of the mayo
razgo issue has been exaggerated.

That is, the issue was more an

ideological one between conservatives and liberals than a socio-economic
one, because mayorazgos were fewer in number than previously assumed
and, thus, disentailment would not seriously threaten the landowners'
estates.

They would remain intact: "Mayorazgos went without a bang

and barely a whimper, while the great landowners remained firmly in
control of the countryside."^2

(Furthermore, considering the origins

and ties of the landowning class, the "struggle" between it and the
merchant class would have been more of a "family-feud" than inter-class

22Collier, Ideas and Politics, pp. 247-248.
28Ibid., pp. 292, 324.
2^Luis Galdames, A History of Chile, p. 292.
30Ricardo Donoso, Las Ideas pol^ticas en Chile (Mexico: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1946), pp. 115-173, (chapter 5 "La lucha contra la
aristocracia").
31jay Kinsbrunner, Chile: A Historical Interpretation (New York:
Harper and Row - Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 59-60, 67-70.
•^Arnold Bauer, Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest
to 1930 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 20-21.
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conflict.)
The attacks on and alienation of ecclesiastical property, the
threats to and encroachment on many Indian peasant communities, and
the less significant, but actual disentailment of mayorazgos, were
supposed to give rise to a class of yeomen farmers.

And yet, without

doubt, the greatest obstacle to the development of such a class was
the latifundia land tenure pattern.
haciendas were inviolable.

However, as private property, the

Although there were critics of the land

tenure pattern, the direction of the agrarian reforms, and the seig
neurial mode of domination in the countryside, the liberal intelli
gentsia could not challenge the private property system they were so
eager to further; nor would the liberal (and conservative) political
chieftains have accepted such legislation, when their socio-economic
strength and political power were based on their landownership.

Thus,

however successful the liberal legislators might be in their attacks
against "feudal," entailed property systems, their goal was contra
dicted by their own ideology.

And the reforms which were enacted,

instead of changing the structure of rural Spanish America, had the
effect of actually reinforcing and expanding seigneurialism in the
countryside.

Seigneurial Domination
The liberal agrarian reforms carried out in Spanish America
during the nineteenth century - involving the disentailment of
ecclesiastical holdings, Indian peasant communal lands, and mayorazgos,

3^A s we would expect: "...the liberal attack on latifundia was
also undermined for social reasons, since most of the legislators
themselves were landowners." Hale, Mexican Liberalism, p. 181.

furthered the concentration of private Landownershlp and strengthened
the landed aristocracy by freeing the land from religious encumbrances,
and also, by permitting the entry of new families to landed status.
However, the concentration of landownership in the hands of a
single class does not necessarily constitute the formation and
persistence of a seigneurial regime.

For although the class structure

of a society is based on those classes’ relations to the means of pro
duction, those relations are not determined merely by the classes’
positions in relation to property.

The relations themselves may vary.

That is, there may be extreme concentration of landownership, but the
landowner-laborer relationship may be that of capitalist-proletariat,
landowner-tenant, or landlord-peasant.

Or, as Marx wrote:

The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus
labor is pumped out of the direct producers, deter
mines the relation of domination and servitude as
it emerges directly out of production itself and
in its turn reacts upon production... It is always
the direct relation between the masters of the
conditions of production and direct producers which
reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation
of the entire social edifice... This does not prevent
an economic basis which in its principal characteris
tics is the same, from manifesting infinite variations
and gradations, owing to the effect of innumerable
external circumstances, climatic and geographical
influences, racial peculiarities, historical
influences from the outside, etc. These variations
can only be discovered by analyzing the empirically
given circumstances.
There was a definite similarity to the agrarian social relations
of production of the Spanish American societies.

The terms peonage

(Mexico), huasipunguale (Ecuador), colons1e and yanaconale (Peru and

^Karl Marx from Capital (Vol. Ill), Karl Marx: Selected
Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, trans. and ed. T.B.
Bottomore and M. Rubel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 99.
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Bolivia), and inquilinaje (Chile) all referred to the relations of pro
duction in which the landowner ceded a parcel of land to the peasant in
return for labor service on the estate itself.

And yet, noting Marx,

these seigneurial relationships existed within specific agrarian struc
tures (and national societies, which to a greater or lesser extent were
involved in the world economy) exhibiting their own structural features
and variations.^5
In Mexico, travelling from north to south, one passed through
three agrarian regions.

The northern region of Mexico was dominated

by the great estate with its dependent labor force of peons.

The

Mexican peons were not maintained on the estates merely through their
tenancy on a parcel of land granted by the hacendado.

They were also

often held on the land through a system of debts, which Marx termed
slavery:
In some states, particularly in Mexico...slavery
is hidden under the form of peonage. By means
of advances, repayable in labor, which are handed
down from generation to generation, not only the
individual laborer, but his family, become defacto,
the property of other persons and their families.
Occasionally, on the more extensive latifundia, there were also
tenant-farmers.^7

35xhe significance of the variations amongst and within the
Spanish American agrarian structures directly affected the possibili
ties for and the course of peasant mobilizations and agrarian reforms,
as we shall see in this and the next chapter.
3*>Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1967),
vol. 1, p. 168, footnote 2.
37i?ranjois Chevalier, "The North Mexican Hacienda: Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Centuries," in A.R. Lewis and T.F. McGann, eds., The
New World Looks at its History (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1963), pp. 95-107.
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In Central Mexico the hacienda continued to dominate the
countryside, but more often It "coexisted" with numerous

independent

peasant villages whose members depended to differing degrees on the
seasonal employment offered by the estates.®®

And in the southern

region, rural Mexico was characterized by Indian peasant villages
which had survived the conquest and colonization alongside large, and
ever-encroaching, but less overwhelming

haciendas.

In Peru, regional variation in the agrarian structure existed
between the Sierra and the Coast.

The Peruvian Sierra (and the

Bolivian highlands)^® were characterized by the symbiotic coexistence
of the haciendas and the Indian peasant communities which were
struggling to persist.

The haciendas' labor forces consisted of the

colonos. and often satellite Indian peasant communities resident on
their own lands or their former lands, tfiich had succumbed to the
expanding latifundia.^

The Indian peasant communities - even when in

possession of their own lands, often provided a reserve labor force for
the estate by virtue of the hacienda's monopolization of local
resources; which might range from additional grazing land to control
of the water supply, or perhaps merely control of the path between the

®®Powell, El Liberalismo. pp. 44-46.
®^William B. Taylor, "Landed Society in New Spain: A View from
the South," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 54, no. 3
(August 1974), pp. 387-413.
^^Dwight B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus, and Hans C. Buechler,
Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1969).
^ H e n r i Favre, Claude Collin Delavaud, and Jose Matos Mar,
La Hacienda en el Peru (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1967),
pp. 247-255.

116

village and the villagers' lands in the next valley, for which a
"toll" might be levied.^2

Of course, there were areas where the

Indian peasant communities were not threatened nor dominated by
haciendas; however, following the liberal agrarian reforms these
areas were reduced in number.
Latifundia also dominated coastal Peru; however, the mode of
production on the coastal estates

/Q

was originally based on African

slavery, introduced early in the colonial p e r i o d . ^

Negro slavery

persisted in Peru even after independence and was not finally abolished
until 1854.

When it was finally abolished, the landowners responded

by changing the relations of production from slavery to yanaconaje,
i.e. the former slaves and additional Indian laborers were settled on
the latifundia in a system similar to colonaje in the S i e r r a . ^

A

further change in the relations of production on the coastal latifundia
was the "importation" of Chinese laborers to Peru, both to work in the
guano deposits and on the plantations.

These Chinese laborers were

held on the plantations by a system of debt bondage.

Thus, the coastal

latifundia came to depend on two labor forces: the Negro and Indian
yanacona and the indebted C h i n e s e . ^

^2Ibid.
^^Which have been called plantations from early on, because of
the export orientation of sub-tropical and tropical produce, e.g.
sugar and cotton.
^ F r e d e r i c k Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru: 15241650 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974).
45piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," pp. 122-124.
46Ibid., p. 125. Also, see Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in
Peru: A History of Chinese Coolies in Peru: 1849-1874 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1951).
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Chile, as we have seen, was conquered and colonized by the Spanish
later than Mexico and Peru.

And yet, there too, seigneurial relations

of production had developed in the countryside: at first by locating
the estate near the encomienda grant, or by relocating the Indians onto
the estate itself; and later by inviting the settlement of mestizos and
poor Spaniards onto the margins of the latifundia, for which they
supplied a specified amount of labor service to the landowner.

Also,

in a manner similar to the hacendados of the other developing socie
ties of Spanish America, the Chilean landowners responded to increased
market demands and opportunities by enlarging the size of the demesne
and increasing the required labor service of the peasantry
(inquilinos)
In addition to the resident labor force of inquilinos, the
estate owners could also call upon a reserve labor force known as
AO

afuerinos. °

The afuerinos were peasants who lived outside the

boundaries of the latifundia on smallholdings and yet depended for
their subsistence on the seasonal employment offered by the estates.
The situation of the afuerinos in relation to the estates,
although similar to that of the satellite Indian peasant communities
of the Mexican and Peruvian haciendas, was not actually comparable to
them, because the afuerinos were not bound together through any
traditional communities as were the Indian peasantry:

^ B a u e r , Chilean Rural Society, pp. 145-159.
^®The afuerinos are also referred to as peons by many writers;
not to be confused with Mexican peonage.
^^Bauer, Chilean Rural Society, pp. 145-159.

The majority of them CafuerinosU lead an entirely
nomadic life, rarely remaining in the same place
and passing without hesitation from one province
to another as if movement and change were their
only necessity.
Nor were the inquilinos and afuerinos the only labor forces
available to the landowners.

There also developed a third peasant

stratum in relation to the estates.

This third stratum, the

voluntarios. lived in the homes of the inquilinos and remained
directly dependent on them.
inquilinos.)

(Often, they were relatives of the

The inquilinos maintained the voluntarios so that,

during the seasons when the inquilinos were required to render
increased labor service on the estate, for example at harvest time,
they were often able to send the voluntarios in their p l a c e s . T h u s ,
when the Chilean estate owners found it necessary, they were able to
call upon the labor of their inquilinos, the marginal, yet dependent,
afuerinos, and the voluntarios.
The Spanish American agrarian sectors were not, therefore,
structurally uniform.

Although the dominant social relations of pro

duction on the estate were based on the seigneurial relationship which
had developed between the landowners and their dependent, resident
labor forces, there was diversity amongst the agrarian structures of
the Spanish American societies as well as variations within them.
Mexico was regionally differentiated on the extent of the hacienda's

^ C l a u d i o Gay, Historia f£sica y politica de Chile: agricultura
(Santiago: Museo de Historia Natural, 1862), vol. 1, p. 198.
51-Solon Barraclough, Agrarian Structure in Latin America
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 136-137.
This book is a
resume of the CIDA Land Tenure Studies of the early 1960's.
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expansion in relation to the Indian peasant communities.^

Peru's

regional differentiation was between the coastal plantations with
their yanacona and Chinese laborers, and the Sierra with its hacienda
system of colono laborers and satellite Indian peasant

communities.-^

And the agrarian structure of Chile, which in the nineteenth century
referred to central Chile (where Indian communities had all but ceased
to exist), was dominated by latifundia, upon which three strata of
peasantry depended: the inquilinos, afuerinos and voluntarios.
Nevertheless, even in its diversity, rural Spanish America - as
the product of the conquest and colonization by Iberian Spain, followed
by the liberal agrarian reforms, was characterized by latifundia and
pre-capitalist modes of production.

And yet, thus far we have merely

explained the formation and described the structures of agrarian
Spanish America, we have not explained those structures as "total"
modes of domination and exploitation.
Eugene Genovese, whose own work has been extremely critical of
those historians and social scientists who promote "economic
"determinisn,"^ has explained that:
A particular base (mode of production) will
generate a corresponding superstructure (political
system, complex of ideologies, culture, etc.) but

^ A l though we have been referring to them as Indian peasant
communities, many of the Mexican peasant communities, particularly in
the central region, had become mestizo, socio-culturally.
^ T h e agrarian structure of the Peruvian sierra, as we have
indicated, was also characteristic of highland Bolivia.
^ O n Genovese, see the essays by William F. Steirer, "Eugene
Genovese: Marxist-Romantic Historian of the South," The Southern
Review, vol. 10, no. 4 (October 1974), pp. 840-850, and "Let Us Begin
with the Masters: Eugene Genovese and the Slaveholders," Southeastern
Latin Americanist, vol. 19, no. 1 (June 1975), pp. 3-6.

120
that superstructure will develop according to
its own logic as well as in response to the
development of the b a s e . ^
And along these lines, Alexander Gerschenkron, the economist,
has quoted one of his colleagues to the effect that: "Although Marxian
analysis claims to be most concerned with the economic Infrastructure
it is actually more concerned with the superstructure."^

But, perhaps

Antonio Gramsci, the Italian political philosopher, has presented the
issue most clearly in his concept of the "historical bloc":
...in which precisely material forces are the
content and ideologies the form, though this
distinction between form and content has purely
didactic value, since the material forces would
be inconceivable historically without form and
the ideologies would be individual fancies
without the material forces.^
Thus, to understand the seigneurialism of rural Spanish America
it is necessary to examine not only the "content" (material forces),
but also the "form" (ideologies) of the landlord-peasant relations of
domination and dependence.
Marx recognized the significant difference between the seigneurial and capitalist modes of production.

Although both are relations

of exploitation, the seigneurial mode of production differs from the
capitalist mode of production because it involves extra-economic ties
between the landowners and their dependents which bind them together
in personal relations beyond that of merely property owners and

55Genovese, In Red and Black, p. 322.
5<>Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, p. 96.
57Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans.
and ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (New York: International Publishers,
1971), p. 377.
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That is, the relationship of exploiter and exploited of

the seigneurial mode of production is embedded in more extensive
personal relations; unlike the capitalist mode of production in which
"...the relation between property owner and worker...ClsJ confined to
the economic relationship of exploiter and exploited.
Max Weber wrote that the power of a seigneurial lord was com
posed of three elements: "first, landholding (territorial power),
second, possession of men (slavery), and third, appropriation of
political rights."^®

The landowning classes of Spanish America were

very successful in living up to this ideal-type.

One mid-nineteenth

century traveller to Mexico wrote of the landowners' domination of
the peasants:
The rich who rule everything - even the minds of
the poor... They have the power to punish to
almost any extent - even death, and are served
with the most abject deference by their peons or
slaves.
(As slavery is not recognized the word
servant is more proper.) They are bound to their
masters for some debt, which the latter take care
shall never be paid...neither mind nor hope above
their present condition...when addressing their
masters they take off their hats and speak in a
hesitating and trembling manner as though they
were in the presence of a Superior Being.61
Jesus Silva Herzog, the Mexican historian, described the
nineteenth century hacienda in the following terms;
The peon of the hacienda can't be called a serf,

^®Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. and ed. T.B. Bottomore (New
York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1964), pp. 114-115.

-^Ibid.
^^Hfeber, General Economic History, p. 63.

61-William W. Carpenter, Travels and Adventures in Mexico (New
York: Harper and Bros., 1851), p. 148.
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nor the landowner a lord, nor the agrarian
structure feudal - strictly speaking; however,
if one is seeking a certain analogy by which to
compare the economic and socio-political struc
ture of the Mexican countryside, then it is
European feudalism: the great hacendado with
the European lord of the seventeenth century
and the peon with a medieval serf.6^
Similarly, the Peruvian writer, Jose Carlos Mariategui, wrote of
the latifundia of his own country:
The hacienda is run like a baronial fief. The
laws of the state are not applied in the latifundium without the tacit or formal consent of
the large landowners.
The authority of politi
cal or administrative officials is, in fact,
subject to the authority of the landowner in
his domain. The latter considers his latifundium
to be outside the jurisdiction of the state...63
And of Chile, resident foreigners and travellers noted that:
"The proprietor is a magistrate and has power to put a man in irons if
he deems it necessary."6^ and "These owners of haciendas are really and
truly as much the owners of the peasantry as the feudal lord was of the
serf."65
These and other descriptions of the domination of the landowners
over the peasantry of the Spanish American estates refer also to the
jails located on the estates, beatings and whippings of the peasantry
by the landowners and their overseers, the customary right of the

6^Jesus Silva Herzog, El Agrarismo mexicano y la reforma agraria
(Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economics, 1964), p. 130.
65Jose Carlos Mariategui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian
Reality, trans. M. Urquidi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971),
p. 63.
6Slevin 0. Winter, Chile and Her People of Today (Boston: L.C.
Page, 1912), p. 199.
65George Byam, Wanderings in Some of the Western Republics of
America (London: John Parker, 1850), p. 8.
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landowners Co pursue, capture and punish runaway peasants.

One

traveller, after describing the servile status of the peasants and
their families on the estates of Andean South America, summed it up
well in recalling the following episode:

After witnessing a peasant

receive a thrashing from the landowner he asked why the peasant
deserved to be whipped:
Most courteously he responded that the Indian
had run away from his home upon the landowner's
estate in order to go to La Paz to be a workman.
But he was caught and thrashed and brought back.66
According to these and other descriptions, the domination of the
peasantry by the landowners could be harsh, if not brutal, and yet the
domination by the Spanish American landowners depended on more than
merely the "brutalization" of the peasantry.

One authoress, after a

residence in Peru, broadened the picture of domination - and tempered
it, when she wrote:
The happiness of such Indians depends almost
entirely on the disposition of their owner,
for they, like their fields, belong to the
master of the farm. Some hacendados bring
sin and disgrace into the lives of their
Indians, while others rule with gentle
kindness.67
But even the recognition of individual variations is obviously
still too incomplete for an historical appreciation of Spanish American
seigneurialism.

For, as Genovese has written, paraphrasing Gramsci:

"Historically, class hegemony is achieved and maintained by consent,
not force."68

6&Alexander Adams, The Plateau Peoples of South America: An
Essay in Ethnic Psychology (London: Rutledge, 1915), pp. 61-66.
67ceraldine Guinness, Peru (New York: Revell, 1915), p. 166.
68Genovese, In Red and Black, p. 406.
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Marx wrote that a seigneurial lord's domination of his peasantry
was both political "and even has an agreeable s i d e . " ^
American
by

And Spanish

landowner-peasant social relations were characterized not only

theharshness of seigneurial domination,, but also by thepaternalism

of seigneurial domination.
George McBride, the historical and social geographer, and
author of two classic studies on rural Spanish A m e r i c a , r e c o g n i z e d
the duality of the landowners' domination of their work forces when
he wrote in his work on Mexico:
Over this aggregation [the hacienda] the owner
presides in a more or less patriarchical manner,
the degree of paternal care or of tyranny
varying...The life of a Mexican hacendado is a
curious mixture of primitive rusticity and
modern luxury, of self-indulgence and fatherly
solicitude for his dependents, of stern
administration and paternal discipline.. ,^
Later, in his work on Chile, after describing the harshness of
the peasant's life and condition, he wrote of the landowner-inquilino
relationship:
...the traditional relationship that exists
between the inquilino and the hacendado - between
master and man - somewhat ameliorates the hard
ships of the inquilino's condition.
The land
owner is not only employer, he is also patron.
The system is quite patriarchal in its actual
operation. The inquilino usually feels a sense
of loyalty and even of devotion to the farm
owner. The latter, in turn, looks upon the
inquilinos as his wards, almost as his children.
He regards them with solicitous care.^2

G^Marx, Early Writings, p. 114.
70George M. McBride, The Land Systems of Mexico (New York:
American Geographical Society, 1923), and Chile: Land and Society
(New York: American Geographical Society, 1936).
^Vlbid.

(The Land Systems), pp. 28-29.

72McBride, Chile, p. 162.
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Nor were the landowners of Peru unlike their fellow Spanish
Americans in their mode of social c o n t r o l . A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s working
in the Peruvian Sierra recognized that paternalism was an essential
element of landowner-peasant social relations:
The patron of a Peruvian hacienda is likely to
exhibit a great deal of personal kindness, to
allow indulgences, so long as the work of his
Indian laborers and tenants is carried out to
his satis faction.74
Another anthropologist noted that: "One very great advantage of
the peon-hacendado relationship is the protection which the patron may
give to his Indian peons."75
In part because of the landowners' paternal domination, but also
as a result of the peasants' having been born and raised on the
estates, the peasants developed an attachment and sense of identifica
tion with the estates - which in turn lent support to the landowners'
position of dominance.76

George McBride recognized this sense of

attachment when he wrote on Mexico:
...many of these peons have proprietary claims
on the land which they and their ancestors have
occupied and cultivated for generations. Uhile
it is true, their tenure has no legal status,

^^Mario C. Vasquez, Hacienda, peonaie. v servidumbre en los
Andes peruanos (Lima: Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1961), pp. 26-42.
74ihomas r . Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainesville: University
of Florida Press, 1955), p. 111. The author adds, referring to the
landowner: "His display of injured righteousness in response to the
exploitation charges of would-be reformers is not feigned, but quite
genuine."

75william W. Stein, Hualcan: Life in the Highlands of Peru
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 40.
76see Marx, Early Writings, pp. 114-115, on the personal identi
fication of the seigneurial estate owner with the land and the
peasants' relationship to the estate owner.

it has generally been recognized by the owners
of the haciendas and has survived in custom
because it has proved advantageous to the land
lord no less than to the native. Furthermore,
the peons feel an attachment to the land that a
stranger unacquainted with their psychology can
hardly appreciate.
Upon it their ancestors have
lived for generations, have followed the one
occupation of tilling these fields, and have
looked to the owner as their patron. As a
result, the peons not only feel that the land
belongs to them, but that they belong to it,
and a deep-rooted sentiment binds them to the
estate.77
Similarly, it has been written of the Chilean estates - in a
manner which highlights the way the peasants' sense of attachment
inhibited class consciousness:
A principal duty of service tenants was to guard
the estate against forasteros - the outsiders
Cafuerinos3 - and to ride in escort with the
owner...Most came to identify with the estate
itself; the land was his land, the cattle better,
the bulls braver than on other haciendas. This
attachment between inquilino and hacienda went
deeper than the owner himself. Landowners bought
and traded property with surprising frequency and
someone has correctly pointed out that Chilean
landowners appear to love the land but not any
particular piece of it. This was not so with the
service tenantry who often, in fact, had a longer
history of residence than the owner.78
The peasantry's "attachment to place"79 and their identification
with the estates and the estate owners not only inhibited class con
flict by "softening" the landowners' domination, but also because it
"subjectively" rounded out the "objective" differentiation of the

77McBride, The Land Systems, p. 30.
7®Bauer, Chilean Rural Society, p. 164. Or, as one Latin
American sociologist has commented: "Latin American paternalism is
carried on by one changing and absolute minority." Guillen Martinez,
"Paternalism," p. 86. Also, see McBride, Chile, p. 149.

79Ibid.
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peasantry according to their respective positions in relation to the
estates.

That is, the Spanish American peasantries were not homo

geneous classes, and their heterogeneity divided them, strengthening
the landowners' domination.®®
In Chile, as indicated in the above quote, the inquilinos' iden
tification with the estates made them view the afuerinos with hostility.
And their advantaged tenure position on the estates placed the volun
tarios in a position of dependence, i.e. subordinate to the inquilinos.
This differentiation increased the difficulties of peasant
mobilization.®^The differentiation of the peasantry in the Peruvian Sierra
inhibited class action there, as well.

One anthropologist noted the

effect which differentiation of the peasantry in relation to the
latifundia had on inter-village relations:
Some rivalry, perhaps even basic hostility, exists
between the people of Huante and Monus.
The latter
look with some longing at the property and conse
quent freedom and independence of the former...on
the other hand, Huante people are likely to resent
the protected position of the peons.®^
And he added that the independent peasants "looked down" on the peons
and called them serfs.®®
Differentiation of the peasantry in Mexico had a similar effect.
Even in the midst of the Revolution (1910-1920), when the villagers of

80ln fact, it might be argued that the term "peasantry" in
Spanish America refers historically to several classes, not one, e.g.
peasant-serfs of the estate, members of the Indian-peasant communities.
®*See Norma Chinchilla and Marvin Sternberg, "Chile: The Agrarian
Reform and Campesino Consciousness," Latin American Perspectives, vol.
1, no. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 106-128.
®2stein, Hualcan. pp. 43-45.

®®Ibid.
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the south were fighting to regain the lands they had lost to the
haciendas, the peons of the estates (acasillados) were immobilizable.
John Womack, in his work on the Zapatista movement of the Mexican
Revolution, has written:
Only rarely did they recruit rebels among the
gente de casa. who anyway preferred their
bonded security, and nowhere evidently did
they excite these dependent peons to rise up
and seize the plantations they worked on.84
And a team of Mexican researchers found that when the revolution
arrived in a certain region, the peons of the estate remained on the
estate so long as the landowner or his representative remained, but
when the patron fled the estate, they did too!®^
In those regions of Mexico (and Spanish America) where the dif
ferentiation of the peasantry was colored by ethnicity, i.e. socio
cultural differences (e.g. mestizos on the estates and Indians in the
communities) the division of the peasantry was accentuated.

One

historical anthropologist, in the study of a Mexican village during
the Revolution, found that the acasillados "scorned everyone who spoke
Tarascan,11®^ and:
Mainly, because of cultural or economic ties, the
acasillados initially sided with the hacendados,
often hiring themselves out as militiamen or
gunmen (pistoleros).”

S^John Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (London: Penguin
Books, 1972), p. 127.
Helguera, S. LtSpez, R. Ramirez, Los Campesinos de la tlerra
de Zapata (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, 1974),
pp. 108-109.
®6paul Friedrich, Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 44.

®^Ibid., p. 112.

On the plantations of coastal Peru in the
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Thus, the differentiation of the peasantry, as well as the
paternalistic domination of the landowners and the peasants'
"attachment to place," Inhibited class action.
And yet, it must be added, that not all peasants accepted the
landowners' domination and their seigneurial mode of social control.
There were peasants who resisted, particularly in Mexico and Peru.
Not only the peasants of the communal-landholding villages, but also
social bandits - or, as Eric Hobsbawm has termed them: "primitive
rebels"®® - were nuisances to the seigneurial regime.

In a major work

on nineteenth century Mexico, supervised by the historian, Daniel
Cosfo Villegas, it was written:
peasant discontent is banditry:

"One of the manifestations of the
the runaways from the haciendas formed

gangs of bandits, the social cancer of the Republic."®^

And in some

regions of the Peruvian Sierra, the "primitive rebels" disrupted the
social order of the latter half of the nineteenth century so seriously
as, on one occasion, to threaten the seigneurial regime itself:
requiring the use of army troops to suppress them.^®

nineteenth century, the landowners also practised "divide and rule" by
exploiting the racial differences and when necessary the Indian and
Negro yanacona and Chinese laborers were used to suppress each other.
(Stewart, Chinese Bondage, pp. 100-101.)
®®See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1959), and Hobsbawm, Bandits (London: Penguin Books,
1972). The author writes: "The point about social bandits is that they
are peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but
who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people
as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even
leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped
and supported." (Bandits, p. 17).
®^Daniel C o s l o Villegas, Historia moderns de Mexico. Part I,
La Republica Restaurada. Vol. 3, Vida Social (Mexico: Editorial Hermes,
1956), p. 351.
®®Piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," pp. 129-131.
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At the same time, the political significance of the social
bandits can be too easily exaggerated.

For, as the Peruvian socio

logist, Anibal Quijano Obregon, explained: "Even though clearly a
form of social protest against the injustices of the most powerful, it
never develops a "broader Ideology" than revolt against specific abuses
and o p p r e s s i o n . B e s i d e s ,

the majority of Spanish American peasants

continued to accept the seigneurial domination of the landowners, its
harshness and its paternalism.
Thus, the end of Spanish colonial rule did not end Spanish
American seigneurialism.

The Spanish American societies persisted in

their seigneurial molds, inherited from Spain, the conquest and the
colonization.

In fact, Spanish American independence enabled the

landed aristocracies to expand their "ownership" of the countryside
and their seigneurial mode of production and domination at the expense
of the church and the Indian-peasant communities.

And it strengthened

the landowning class by permitting the entry of new families of
"bourgeois" origins to landed status.
The historico-economic significance of the persistent strength
of the pre-capitalist structure of society and the seigneurial domina
tion of the countryside, has been recognized by development economists.
Summarizing their conclusions, Genovese has written:
While the peasantry remains tied to the land,
burdened with debt, and limited to minimal pur
chasing power, the labor recruitment and market
preconditions for extensive manufacturing cannot
emerge. Land reform - that is an agrarian
revolution - constitutes the essential first step

^ A n i b a l Quijano Obregon, "Contemporary Peasant Movements," in
Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in Latin America
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 301-340.
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In the creation of an urban working class, the
reorganization of agriculture to feed growing
cities, and the development of a home m a r k e t . ^

^Genovese, The Political Economy, p. 159.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The Spanish American societies had been characterized historically
by the hegemony of a seigneurial landowning class; and rural Spanish
America had experienced the formation and continuous expansion of the
latifundia land tenure pattern and the persistence of seigneurial
social relations of production.

That is, the Spanish conquest and

colonization had transferred to America - enhanced and further
elaborated - the Iberian "historical-bloc": the seigneurial mode of
production and the norms and values of the Iberian superstructure.

And

the independence of the Spanish American societies, instead of reducing
the hegemonic position of the landowning "aristocracies," led to the
strengthening of their domination both in the countryside and in the
national societies.

The Steins, in their book, The Colonial Heritage

of Latin America, have summed up the historical pattern of land tenure
up to this century by writing:
Until the twentieth century, the basis of oligarchy
in Latin America has been the monopolization of, and
access to, landownership. In fact, the most signi
ficant feature of the history of land tenure there
until recent decades has been the spread of the large
estate into frontier areas, or the aggrandizement of
long established estates, if not for control of cul
tivable lands or scarce water rights, then for control
of scarce labor, agricultural manpower. In Latin
America, the nineteenth century may be viewed as a
period of acceleration in the rate of estate formation
and estate owners' control of manpower.*
lStein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage, p. 138.
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And yet, since the 1930's the Spanish American societies
- Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile and Peru - have experienced land
reforms which, unlike the reforms of the nineteenth century, which
furthered the concentration of landownership and the landowners*
seigneurial domination of the countryside, have seriously challenged
- if not eliminated - that concentration.
The political histories of the Spanish American countries
during this century are, of course, unique to the respective national
societies.

However, the fact that after four centuries of the forma

tion, development and persistence of the latifundia land tenure
pattern and seigneurial domination, there have occurred serious - if
not decisive - challenges to the hegemony of the landowning classes of
Spanish America leads the researcher to seek a common socio-historical
experience and pattern in those changes.

Thus, the question 'why did

seigneurialism persist in rural Spanish America?' is now placed in
relation to the question 'why have there recently been major changes
in rural Spanish America?'
Eastern Europe,

which, as it has been shown, experienced the

"second serfdom" historically parallel to the persistence of Spanish
seigneurialism in the formation and development of seigneurialism in
Spanish America, also experienced liberal agrarian reforms in the
nineteenth century.

Significantly, with respect to an extended com

parison with Spanish America, the liberal reforms of Eastern Europe,
although abolishing serfdom, left intact the latifundia, i.e. the
socio-economic power base of the noble landowners; which meant that

^Excluding the Russian Empire.
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seigneurialism might persist beyond the feudal politico-legal struc
tures which had sanctioned it.
And yet, of further - and, perhaps, greater - historico-compara
tive significance is that seigneurialism was not finally eliminated in
Eastern Europe by land reform, as had been the case in Spanish America,
but rather by the proletarianization of the peasantry.-*
Lenin wrote, prior to the Russian Revolution, that there had been
two paths to capitalist development in agriculture: "The survivals of
serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of
landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord lati
fundia...

He called the first path the "Prussian path" and the

second path the "American path" (though he might have been better
calling it the French path).

That Eastern Europe tended towards the

first path while Spanish America has apparently tended towards the
second, considering the similarity in their historical development,
can provide a comparison by contrast.-*

Persistence and Change in Eastern Europe
The "development of underdevelopment" model advanced by Andre
Gunder Frank argues that the backwardness of rural areas of Spanish

^Eastern European history was, of course, dramatically changed by
the Second World War, followed by Soviet domination, and collectivization.
^V.I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Problem of the Social Democrats,"
Collected Works of Lenin (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,
1962), Vol. 13, p. 238.
-*An interesting and suggestive article on this subject has been
written by Cristobal Kay, "Comparative Development of the European
Manorial System and the Latin American Hacienda System," Journal of
Peasant Studies, vol. 2 no. 1 (October 1974), pp. 68-98. I wish to
thank Dr. Kay for encouraging me to pursue this issue further.

PLEASE NOTE:
This page not included in
material received from the
Graduate School. Filmed
as received.
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

136

America** is a function of the development of the more advanced areas,
and that the "underdevelopment" of SpaniBh America is, in fact, the
result of its exploitation by the developed, capitalist economies.
Critical of Frank's model - though not rejecting all of its ele
ments - F. Stirton Weaver,^ the economist, has written:

"...frequently,

too much stress has been laid on the effects of the political and
economic hegemony exercised by the dominant capitalist nations."®

And

he has proposed that the persistence of the pre-capitalist social
structures of Spanish America may be due more to the "changes which
have occurred in the internal dynamics of the industrialization
process itself..."^
It is Weaver's thesis that the "old evolutionary dialectic is
dead."*-®

That is, the very success of the bourgeois revolutions in

England and France and the industrial revolution initiated by England,
meant that later industrialization and capitalist development would,
necessarily, proceed differently.

The historico-social variation

between earlier and later capitalist-industrialist development can be
seen in the following contrast:

^Frank's model pertains to all of Latin America.
?See F. Stirton Weaver, "Positive Economics, Comparative
Advantage, and Underdevelopment."
®Weaver, "Relative Backwardness and Cumulative Change: A Com
parative Approach to European Industrialization," Studies in Comparative
International Development, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1974), p. 71. The
author states that he derives his methodology from a synthesis of the
work of Alexander Gerschenkron, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Leon Trotsky.
9Ibid.
l^Weaver, "Growth Theory and Chile," Journal of Inter-American
Studies and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (January 1970), pp. 55-61.
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...in the first stages the main body of capital
and more particularly of entrepreneurs that pro
duced the upheavals of the industrial revolution
was of modest and nearly always agricultural
origins.
It would seem, however, that the later industria
lization began, the greater was the contribution
of the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, with
occasional financial aid or even direct parti
cipation from the landed aristocracy . ^
According to Weaver, this historico-social variation between the
early and late Industrializers represents the changed nature of the
industrialization process, i.e. changes in the economy and technology
of industrialization.

11

In those societies of early (in the case of

England, original) industrialization, the process was generated by a
numerous rising class of capitalists possessed of revolutionary sig
nificance:
tions.

for examples, let us note the English and French revolu
However, in those societies of later industrialization, the

process was able to be imported at an already advanced level by a less
numerous (already elite?) class of capitalists, and, as already indi
cated in the above quote, often with the participation of the landed

IVPaul Bairoch, "Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution,
1700-1914," in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of
Europe. Vol. 3, The Industrial Revolution (London: Fontana Books, 1973),
p. 496.
*-2J.F. Bergier, "The Industrial Bourgeoisie and the Rise of the
Working Class, 1700-1914," in Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History
of Europe. Vol. 3, The Industrial Revolution, p. 410.
l^See Weaver, "Relative Backwardness." An important work on
this subject is David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the
Present (London: Canfcridge University Press, 1969).
l^See, on England, Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution.
1603-1714 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1961), and, on France,
Albert Soboul, The French Revolution. 1789-1799. trans. A. Forest and
C. Jones (New York: Vintage Books, 1974),
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aristocracy.

For examples, Weaver contrasts Germany with England:

...in Germany, unlike England during the early
years of its industrial revolution, industria
lization did not diffuse economic power among
a large number of owner-operators from diverse
backgrounds, but instead made for a new con
centration of economic power controlled by
those who had access to the considerable finan
cial resources necessary for establishing an
enterprise on an economically viable scale.15
And he noted that, in contrast to the earlier "liberal" capita
list development of England, France (and the United States), the later
capitalist-industrial development of Germany was "conservative:"!®
"Industrialization no longer had to come from below, tranforming all
dimensions of social life, but could come from above, preserving and
strengthening traditional hierarchies and cultural f o r m s . I n
Germany, although not without conflict between the bourgeoisie and the
landed aristocracy - as evidenced by the Revolution of 1848,1® the less
numerous capitalist entrepreneurs of later industrialization were more
easily absorbed by the dominant class into a ruling

b l o c .

Even the

liberal elements of the bourgeoisie had to accept alliance with the
landowning aristocracy because of the threatening proletarian

l^Weaver, "Relative Backwardness," p. 75.
16Ibid., p. 79.
l?Ibid., P* 89. It is interesting to note that Marx recognized
a revolutionary path and a conservative path to capitalism.
The revo
lutionary path occurred when the producer became capitalist, and the
conservative path occurred when the merchant took possession of
production.
See Marx, Selected Writings (from Capital), p. 130.
l®See Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration. Revolution and Reaction:
Economics and Politics in Germany. 1815-1871 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966).
l^Weaver, "Relative Backwardness," p. 77.
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movement.
And yet, what was the significance of the changes in the nature
of the industrialization process for rural Eastern Europe (and Spanish
America)?
During the nineteenth century, Germany's independent kingdoms
were being "pushed and pulled" towards unification.
eastacross the geography
Eastern

Europe.

Moving west to

of Germany was to travel from Western to

In fact, western Germany more closely resembled

France than eastern Germany (Prussia), rural sociologically speaking.
And, in turn, Prussia more closely resembled Eastern Europe than
western Germany.

Stated simply, this referred to "the small holdings

of the west and the great estates of the east;"2 ^1 the former being
similar to the French countryside and the latter to the countryside of
Eastern Europe.
The contrasting land tenure patterns of western and eastern
Germany were the product of the different histories of agricultural
economy of the respective regions.
In the states of the west, the nobleman became
increasingly an absentee landowner, deriving
the bulk of his wealth from peasant dues.
Since his rights as a feudal overlord were con
verted into annual dividends, his direct control
over the soil weakened. 22
But in eastern Germany, on the other hand, the landed aristocracy
(the Junkers) had been more directly active in the grain trade and,

2®see Hamerow, Restoration, on the workers' role in the
Revolution of 1848. He points out that the proletariat was in forma
tion, i.e. being displaced from artisanry and crafts due to the rapid
development of industry.
Thus, they were a conservative, anti-capitalist
force; a potential ally of the landed aristocracy.

21Ibid., p. 40.

22Ibid., p. 50.
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since the sixteenth century, rural Prussia had experienced the "second
serfdom" characteristic of Eastern Europe.
Thus, because of the landed aristocracies' respective
relationships to their lands and their peasants, the movement towards,
and results of, the emancipation of the serfs differed.
In the west, from the late eighteenth to the middle of the nine
teenth century, the gradual, historical trend towards peasant emanci
pation moved at a more rapid pace; under the liberalizing influence of
the Enlightenment on the bourgeoisie which had been developing there,
the disruption of the expansion of the French Revolution, and finally
- but significantly - the strength of the peasant uprisings during the
Revolution of 1848.

In this process the peasants* proprietary rights

to the lands they occupied were recognized and ratified,

ffius,

seigneurialism was finally eliminated with tae emancipation of the
peasantry and their victory in securing landownership.
But in Prussia, where the countryside was dominated by large
seigneurial manors, worked by both resident and non-resident peasantserfs, laboring part-time on the lord's demesne and part-time on either
land ceded to them by the lord or on their own lands, emancipation
ratified the Junkers' property rights (and those of non-resident landholding peasants).

In fact, the Junkers gained in the process because

the non-resident peasant-serfs had to redeem themselves and their land
by cash payments or the cession of part of their own land to the lord.^
And a more subtle gain, though extremely significant in the long run,
was that the process of emancipation furthered the social distance

^Ibid., see chapters 6 and 9.

^*lbid., pp< 50-52.

between the landholding peasants and the landless peasants of the
estates, whom one historian has called the "real victims."2^

This

differentiation of the peasantry decreased the possibility of any
unified peasant mobilization, for with the passage of time those
peasants who survived the tranformation to agrarian capitalism (in
the east and west of Germany) increasingly identified themselves with
the estate owners, as agrarian entrepreneurs and employers of
agricultural workers.
The Junkers also gained because the emancipation of the peasants
from the burdens of serfdom also relieved the Junkers from the obli
gations of lordship.

One historian has even commented that the pro

cess of peasant liberation "degenerated into a movement dominated by
the great estateowners."2®
In the Revolution of 1848 (the final blow to "servile dues") the
Junkers - though threatened by an alliance of bourgeois, proletariat
and peasant - were able to secure their landownership because the
bourgeoisie had no intention of challenging a basic tenet of their
ideology, i.e. the inviolability of private property.

To do so would

have set a very dangerous precedent.2^

2^Kurt Borchardt, "The Industrial Revolution in Germany, 17001914," in Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of Europe. Vol. 4,
The Emergence of Industrial Societies. Part I, p. 98.
2^Werner Conze, "The Effects of the Nineteenth Century Liberal
Agrarian Reforms on Social Structure in Central Europe," in F. Crouzet,
W.H. Chaloner, and W.M. Stern, eds., Essays in European Economic
History. 1789-1914 (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), p. 65.
22See Hamerow, Restoration, p. 170 ff. Note the similarity
between the liberal agrarian reform of Germany and those of Spanish
America. Also see, on this historical period, Eric J. Hobsbawm, The
Age of Revolution. 1789-1848 (New York: Mentor Books, 1962).
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Thus, In the process of peasant emancipation, the Junker estates
remained intact, which meant in addition that: "The former paternal
authority could be retained within the 'manorial district,1 thus
carrying part of the old overlordship into the new e r a . " ^
In the west of Germany, the historical pattern of land tenure
and the course of the peasants' emancipation from servitude led to a
countryside of predominantly peasant farms, while in the east:
Abolition of servitude, of monetary and labor
dues, did not mean for the aristocracy, as in
the west, the loss of the class basis of
existence as hitherto known; on the contrary,
it cleared the path from the old manorial to
a capitalist system of large estates.^9
Increasingly, towards the end of the nineteenth century, with
the rapid development of German industry and the creation of a national
market, the Prussian estates made the transition to the capitalist mode
of production, their labor forces reflecting the past and the future.
Writing late in the century, Max Weber, in his study of the agricul
tural situation of eastern Germany, reported the changes on the estates:
Capitalism had gnawed at the social character
of the Junker and his laborers. In the first
half of this last century, the Junker was a
rural patriarch. His farm hands...were by no
means proletarians...they did not receive
wages, but a cottage, land and the right of
pasturage Cet cetera]... Thus they were...
agriculturists with a direct interest in
their lord's husbandry.
But they were
expropriated by the rising valuation of land;

28conze, "The Effects of," p. 67.

^9ibid.

30For a brief description of the relations of production on the
estates as they reflected the past and the future, see Reinhard Bendix,
Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1962),
pp._16-19. Cristobal Kay recognized the similarity between the
Prussian estates and the estates of Chile.
("Comparative Development,"
pp. 85-86.)

the lord withheld pasture and land, kept his
grain, and paid them wages instead. Thus, the
old community of interests was dissolved, and
the farm hands became proletarians.^
Weber also noted that the estate owners were replacing their
German workers with the cheaper, seasonal labor of Polish and Russian
migrant workers: "...since the maintenance of idle hands throughout
the year would be too heavy a bu r d e n . " ^
It, thus, appears that the Junkers had responded and were
continuing to respond to the expanding national market by "modernizing"
the social relations of production on their estates, but this was not
entirely the case.

To understand the changes which were taking place

in rural eastern Germany, it is necessary to place those changes back
into the context of the national unification and the development of
capitalism and industry in Germany, where this analysis began.
Weber indicated the socio-economic pattern of the national uni
fication when he wrote: "The east continued to be, and henceforth
became more and more, the seat of agrarian capitalism whereas indus
trial capitalism tooks its seat primarily in the west."33

That is,

the west had been industrializing prior to, and continued to do so
during and after, the unification period.

Western Germany had not

experienced the "second serfdom" and the consequent inhibition of the
development of a bourgeoisie.

During the later eighteenth and into

the nineteenth centuries the west German bourgeoisie borrowed heavily

3lMax Weber, "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," in
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed. and with an Intro
duction by A.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1946), p. 382.
32Ibid.

33Ibid., p. 380.

from British industrializing experience and foreign capital (British,
French, Belgian, Swiss) was significant in the capitalization of
Q/

German industries.

The bourgeoisie of western Germany favored uni

fication to increase the size of their "domestic market" and provide
for a strong protective tariff for their industrialization against
west European industries.^-*
Eastern Germany, which, though benfiting from west German econo
mic development and the growth of the national grain market, did not
experience industrial development comparable to that of the west.

The

Junker landowners were, therefore, opposed to a protectionist policy
which might jeopardize their grain exports to Western Europe.

Never

theless, the Junkers were fervent nationalists, because they were
opposed to the influence, and possible political leadership of AuBtria
in a German federation.

'

Thus, supported by the west German bourgeoisie, hopeful to
enlarge its markets and protect them, and favored by the Prussian
ruling class, eager to unify Germany in a national structure excluding
Austria, unification proceeded.

It was finalized in the 1870's with

the creation of the German Empire - which coincided with the Junkers'

^^Borchardt, "The Industrial Revolution in Germany," pp. 81-83;
and Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, p. 158. Also, see W.O. Henderson,
The Industrialization of Europe: 1789-1914 (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1969), and Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Develop
ment of Europe. 1800-1914 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), pp. 223-242.
^^Hamerow, Restoration, pp. 12-14, 134-136.
36lbid. Also opposed to protectionism were the merchants of
northern, coastal Germany.
37p0r a short synopsis of German unification and the role of
Prussia, see Norman Rich, The Age of Nationalism and Reform. 1850-1890
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1970), pp. 75-95.

movement towards favoring a protectionist policy against the growing
competition of American and Russian grains.
And yet, there was a contradiction in the Junkers' support for
national unification (and industrial development), for it indirectly
furthered a growing threat to their own existence as a class.

The

threat came not from the peasantry, whom they continued to dominate,
but

from the increasingly wealthy bourgeoisie, who were purchasing

estates both for
landed status.

capitalist agriculture and to acquire the

prestige of

Thus, a process of capitalist encroachment upon the

property base of Junker seigneurialism was occurring; a continuous
process paralleling the unification and development of
capitalist-industrialization.

Peter Stearns has pointed out:

In Prussia, a third of the Junker estates were
bought by members of the middle class between
1815 and 1848 alone. By 1885 about 87 per cent
of east Prussian estates had changed hands...
[[throughout Central and Eastern Europe] increas
ingly many estates were administered by the
middle class on a commercial basis.39
The transition from seigneurialism to capitalism, therefore, was
not merely the commercial response

of the Junkers to expanding market

opportunities, as it might appear,

but rather it may also have been a

matter of survival.

Weber himself had indicated it:

He would like to be a feudal lord, yet he must
become a commercial entrepreneur and a capita
list.
Other powers, rather than the Junker,
endeavor to snatch the role of the landlord.

"The Industrial Revolution in Germany," p. 127.
On this issue, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), pp. 43-50.
3%orchardt,

■^Peter S t e a m s , European Society in Upheaval: Social History
Since 1800 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 90. Also, Hamerow,
Restoration, p. 51.

The industrial and commercial capitalist begin
increasingly to absorb the land.^O
Many Junkers lost their lands and devoted their conservative
energies to the military and government of the German Empire; others
attempted to maintain their "old patriarchal way of life" though it
was uneconomical in the capitalist society that had developed; still
others made the transition to capitalism.^

At the same time, the

bourgeois purchasers of estates were not necessarily anti-aristocratic.
They joined the Junkers in supporting the entailment of estates,
which represented the "aristocratization" of their wealth.

For Weber,

the "marriage of iron and rye" increasingly meant the "amalgamation
between a landed aristocracy corrupted by money-making and a capita
list middle class corrupted by aristocratic pretensions."^
Barrington Moore has written of the transition to capitalism in
Germany:
Marx and Engels in their discussion of the
abortive 1848 revolution in Germany, wrong
though they were on other major features,
put their finger on this decisive Ingredient:
a commercial and industrial class which is too
weak and dependent to take power and rule in
its own right and which, therefore, throws
itself into the arms of the landed aristocracy
and the royal bureaucracy, exchanging the right
to rule for the right to make m o n e y . ^
The "Prussian path" (as Lenin termed it) to agrarian capitalism,

40^eber, "Capitalism and Rural Society," p. 383.
41-Bendix, Max Weber, pp. 38-41.

^ I b i d . , p. 4 0 .

^ Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the M o d e m World (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1966), p. 437. He adds: "...even if the commercial and
industrial element is weak, it must be strong enough (or soon become
strong enough) to be a worthwhile political ally."
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whereby the estates remain intact and the peasantry is proletariani z e d , ^ was the path followed by most of the Eastern European societies.
And yet, though similar in that seigneurlal estates were transformed
into capitalist estates, the transition was made in differing "politi
cal" circumstances.

That is, while Germany was experiencing national

unification, the empires of Eastern Europe (the Austro-Hungarian, and
the East-Central European sectors of the Russian and Ottoman) were
challenged by rising nationalism.^
In the latter part of the eighteenth century, influenced by the
ideas of the Enlightenment, the Hapsburg Monarchy sought to stimulate
economic growth and development as well as "modernize" the empire,
particularly Austrian society.

Thus, the first steps toward peasant

emancipation were d e c r e e d ^ and the crown instigated and supported the
Austrian nobility to participate in commercial and industrial
activities with foreign capitalists and the wealthy, but limited,
Austrian bourgeoisie:
Germans, Swiss, Italians and Greeks were pro
minent in domestic and foreign trade and con
nected activities. At the same time, many
Industrial entrepreneurs were of the nobility.
Not only because they had resources at their
disposal, often under-employed manpower and
natural wealth (in forests and mineral deposits)

^ T h e path "which condemns the peasants to decades of most
harrowing expropriation and bondage." Lenin, '!rhe Agrarian Problem,"
p. 239.
45in South-Eastern Europe, Serbia and Bulgaria gained indepen
dence from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and in the
process removed seigneurialism.
(On this period, see Rich, The Age of
Nationalism.)
^ T h e s e first stepB refer to the acts taken between 1740 and
1790 by Maria-Theresa and Joseph II. See Rud£, Europe in the
Eighteenth Century, pp. 34-35.
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for which they saw new opportunities of gainful
activity; but also because they had easier access
to government subsidies, grants, and loans.
Nevertheless, their pioneering role, in many
cases undertaken at the Empress's instigation,
was also indicative of the retardation of the
bourgeoisie.47
Thus, in the Austrian regions of the empire, capitalist
development began in the late eighteenth century - instigated from
above - with the active participation of the landed aristocracy:
which might be termed the "embourgeoisment" of the nobility.
In the countryside, on their estates, the aristocracy also
expanded their commercial activity and even began some petty-industrial
activities there.

At first demanding increased payment of servile dues

mixed with wage labor, but increasingly threatened by peasant unrest
and recognizing the economic advantages of free, wage laborers, the
Austrian landowners, it has been argued, welcomed the outcome of the
1848 revolution, i.e. peasant emancipation, because it opened the path
for the entrepreneurial landowners to transform their estates to the
capitalist mode of production.48

Of course, the aristocracy's attitude

toward the emancipation of the peasants was conditioned b y the terms
of it, which, though providing more lands on more favorable terms to
the peasants than the reforms in Prussia, was similar to the Prussian
reform in that the landed aristocracy maintained ownership over the
body of the estates and received some compensation for the loss of

47n.T. Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg
Monarchy, 1750-1914," in Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of
Europe. Vol. 4, The Emergence of Industrial Societies. Part I, p. 229.
48see Jerome Blum, Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria.
1815-1848 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948).

''feudal incomes."^9
The agrarian reform in Austria, therefore, left the estates
strongly intact and created a class of free peasant landowners.

The

peasant landowners either succeeded on their holdings and increasingly
identified with the conservative estate owners, or failed to keep pace
and lost their lands, in which case they either went to work in indus
try or as wage laborers on the large estates which were undergoing
capitalist t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . I n the latter half of the nineteenth
century, wage labor became increasingly common on the Austrian estates.
The changes were carried out either by a modernizing noble landowner
or a bourgeois purchaser or l e a s e h o l d e r . A n d in this manner, similar
to Germany, the peasantry was increasingly split between those owning
land and the landless, who were being proletarianized:

"...it must be

remembered that interests conflicted not only between lords and pea
sants but also between peasant owners and landless proletariat."^
Furthermore, the weak alliance between the bourgeoisie and the
peasantry easily broke down following the 1848 Revolution - again, for
reasons similar to those of Germany - and the bourgeoisie and landed
aristocracy formed a ruling bloc under the monarchy.^3

The Austrian

49Ibid., pp. 203-238.
5°Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg Monarchy,"
p. 257.
51ibid. Also, see Ivan Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Economic
Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chapter 2, "Agrarian Transfor
mation and Modern Agrarian Development," particularly pp. 40-42, 44-48.
52ibid., (Gross), p. 256.
53on the political history - with reference to socio-economic
and cultural change - of the later Hapsburg monarchy, see Arthur May,
The Hapsburg Monarchy. 1867-1914 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968).
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ruling bloc was also conservative, but unlike German conservatism which
was nationalistic and developmental, Austrian conservatism was antinationalistic in opposition to the nationalisms which threatened the
coherence of the empire.

And it has been argued that this seriously

inhibited Austrian development:
The most advanced bourgeoisie in the Monarchy
thus became a partner of the supranational
forces which held the Empire together, although
these were mostly the very groups whose
interests were endangered by capitalism in
general and rapid industrialization in
particular.54
And if capitalist development and industrialization were slowed
by the persistent power of the aristocracy in alliance with a conser
vative bourgeoisie, as in Austria, what would be the situation in
those societies where the bourgeoisie was even weaker - or barely
existed at all - in relation to the power of the landed aristocracy?
In Hungary, a semi-autonomous state in the Hapsburg empire, where
the emancipation of the serfs paralleled that of Austria, the landed
aristocracy maintained its hegemony even more effectively because of
the more dependent position of the commercial class.

As a result of

the weak bourgeois impulse the Magyar landed aristocrats persisted in
their seigneurial mold and the transition to a capitalist mode of pro
duction on the estates was s l o w e r . A l s o ,

the land tenure pattern of

the Hungarian countryside was more characteristically latifundiaminifundia than in Germany and Austria, accentuating the peasants'
dependence on the estate owners and leading to the gradual

S^Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg Monarchy,"
p. 250.
55conze, "The Effects of," pp. 77-78.

proletarianization of those peasants whose parcels were insufficient.^^
Furthermore, (and significantly with comparative reference to
Spanish America), the weaker bourgeoisie in Hungary, compared to
Germany and Austria, and the greater capitalization required for
industrial development to be competitive, meant that to an even larger
extent capitalist development would depend on foreign capital in
alliance with the landed aristocracy and its commercial dependents . ^
It has been commented that: "...the strongly enhanced export of capital
from Western Europe in the closing decades of the nineteenth century
became the principal factor in the economic transformation of these
countries.
Not only Western European capital, but also German and Austrian
capital was heavily involved in the capitalist development of Hungary.
And yet, the initially less significant Hungarian role increased from
the latter half of the nineteenth century to become the principal
cq

force in Hungarian capitalist development,

due to the growth and

participation of the bourgeoisie, as well as the ever-increasing
participation of the landed aristocracy.®®

At the same time, the

Hungarian economy and society were not so rapidly "modernized:"
"...the advanced economic fields of industry and banking were really
only islands in an ocean of backward agrarianism burdened by the
weight of traditional farming."®*'
An even more extreme case was Rumania, where the peasantry was

5®Ibid.

57uerend and Ranki, Economic Development, p. 99.

58ibid.

59ibid., pp. 100-104.

61-Ibid., p. 165.
of Spanish America.

60Ibid., pp. 163-165.

Such a description also appears representative
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finally emancipated from serfdom In 1864, but the estates remained
C*y

intact and seigneurialism persisted.

It was more extreme because

industrialization in Rumania was not only instigated originally by
foreign capitalists, but also because, to a great extent, it was
limited to the extraction and exportation of petroleum.

That is,

capitalist enterprise stimulated less change due to its high concentration and the nature of the industry,

and "...rural stagnation

which often preserved pre-capitalist conditions was compatible with
the powerful monopoly organizations..."^

But "stagnation" does not

refer to the absence of commercial activity, for while seigneurial
social relations persisted in Rumania®^ the beginning of the twentieth
century witnessed the country's becoming the second largest oil
producer in Europe and "...fourth among the world's grain exporters...
exporting about 40 per cent of its grain."
Thus, to summarize, in Eastern Europe where the bourgeoisie
found it convenient or necessary to accept an alliance with the landed

62see David Mitrany, The Land and the Peasant in Rumania (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
Berend and Ranki, Economic Development, pp. 106-107. Also, see
the work edited by Doreen Warriner, Contrasts in Emerging Societies:
Readings in the Social and Economic History of South-Eastern Europe in
the Nineteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965).
She notes in the Introduction: "Apart from Hungary, what plainly failed
to occur in these countries was the general rise of a capitalistic
class, capable of transforming social attitudes and acting as a dynamic
force.
Even in Hungary the growth of capitalistic industry did not
undermine or rival the power of the landowner."
(p. 18.)
^ B e r e n d and Ranki, Economic Development, p. 165.
6 % i t r a n y termed it "neo-serfdom."
chapter 4, pp. 63-91.
^^Warriner, Contrasts, p. 21.

See The Land and the Peasant.
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aristocracy In a conservative ruling bloc, the path to agrarian
capitalism was carried out on the latifundia, and gradually the former
serfs were proletarianized.

Through a temporary alliance between the

peasants and the liberal elements of the bourgeoisie, serfdom was
finally eliminated; however, pushing the revolution further was beyond
the goals of the bourgeoisie and they moved towards the alliance with
the aristocracy.

The peasants, on the other hand, were split between

those securing landownership and those left landless.

The more success

ful peasants, as petty entrepreneurs and employers, played a conserva
tive political role thereafter and the landless peasants, being prole
tarianized, continued to be dominated by the estate owners.
Moore has noted:

Barrington

"By themselves the peasants have never been able to

make a r e v o l u t i o n . B u t he added: "The allies that peasant discontent
can find depends upon the stage of economic development that a country
has reached and more specific historical circumstances."0

which leads

to the issue of a peasant-worker alliance.
Peter Stearns wrote: "...the discontented classes could not
easily cooperate,"*’® in referring to unrest in Eastern Europe in the
latter half of the nineteenth century.

In addition to the problem of

the urban-industrial worker as consumer and the peasant as supplier,
was the issue of "proletarian strategy."

The middle class leadership

of the workers' organizations and their representative parties were
opposed to an alliance with the peasantry, whom they believed would
eventually disappear as a class, submerging into the proletariat.

^Mo o r e , Social Origins, p. 479.
^teams,

European Society, p. 306.

^®Ibid., p. 480.

Also,
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their "orthodox" interpretation of Marx - as well as predicting the
disappearance of the peasantry - considered the peasantry a conserva
tive political force, which it often was.^®

Thus, when the workers

sought support in the countryside it was from the agricultural workers,
i.e. the rural proletariat, which further alienated the richer
peasantry.

The workers and the peasants did not form an alliance.71

The latifundia did persist, but not unchallenged.

Following the

First World War, there was increased agitation for land reform by
peasants and urban political groups; however, except for Rumania, the
land reforms which were attempted were immobilized by the aristocratic
landowners and the bourgeoisie.^

The estates persisted, and in the

1930's the aristocrats supported the Fascist and authoritarian regimes
emerging in Eastern Europe:
The aristocrats in eastern and southern Europe
were not solely responsible for the development
of authoritarian systems o*f government, but
they played a major role. Everywhere they had
been under new attack; their political traditions
were affected and their land bases threatened.
The reaction had been swift and effective.
Although the class in most instances had to
accept new types of regimes, it managed to
preserve some political power and succeeded,
for the most part, in saving the large
estates.73

7°0n this issue in Eastern Europe, see David Mitrany, Marx
Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1951).
7*Which is not to say that such an alliance was impossible, as
the Russian Revolution indicates.
72s t ea m s , European Society, p. 331; Gerschenkron, Bread, pp.
126-132; Berend and Ranki, Economic Development, pp. 186-192.

73lbid., (Stearns), p. 332.
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Persistence and Change In Spanish America
In Eastern Europe, the capitalist classes were weaker and more
politically and economically dependent upon the traditional ruling
classes of landed aristocrats than had been the earlier bourgeoisies
of Western Europe.

And, in the nineteenth century - though a temporary

alliance between the bourgeoisies and the peasantries finally eliminated
servile dues - the landed aristocrats maintained their estates intact
and the bourgeoisies and the aristocracies with foreign capital,
technology and enterprise, carried out "modernization from above."
Thus, if the process of modernization from above
is left to its own course, the peasantry is
doomed in the long run. It is only when external
political elements intervene, which present the
possibility of liberation and, above all, of
proprietorship to the peasantry and the elimina
tion of the latifundia or the manorial estate,
that the process can be different.
In the late nineteenth century, a process similar to that which
had been occurring in Eastern Europe began in Spanish America.

That

is, capitalist enterprise developed alongside the seigneurial relations
of production which dominated the countryside.

However, even more so

in Spanish America, the landed "aristocracy" seemed to maintain its
traditional seigneurial mode of production and domination.
The capitalist development of Europe, and especially the indus
trial revolution of the nineteenth century, increased the demand for
the resources which the Spanish American countries could provide.

Thus,

European (and eventually, North American) capitalists either established
enterprises in Spanish America with or without the participation of the
national commercial classes, or made commercial arrangements with the

7^Kay, "Comparative Development," p. 86.

Spanish American commercial and landed classes.

There was also in

this period the appearance o£ a new entrepreneurial group in Spanish
America, immigrants from Europe.
The world economy experienced in this period what has been des
cribed by one Latin American economic historian as the 'emergence of
an international division of

l a b o r . '^5

In Mexico, during the last few decades of the nineteenth and
first decade of the twentieth centuries - a period known as the
Porfiriato, after the dictator, Porfirio Diaz - great amounts of
foreign capital were invested in the development of the country's
infrastructure (for example, Mexico's railway system) and the exploita
tion of the country's resources, as well as industrial activities.^®
The major sources of foreign investment in Mexico were the United
States, Great Britain and France.

The United States' Investors and

enterprises were heavily involved in mining activities and railway
development; the British invested mostly in the railway system and
public services, as well as in the nascent petroleum industry; and the
French were most active in commerce and industry.

German investors

were also interested in Mexico, to a lesser extent, and most of their

^ C e l s o Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey
from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution, trans. Suzette Macedo
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 27-34.
7 % e e Daniel Cos£o Villegas, Historia moderna de Mexico. Part II,
El Porfiriato. La Vida economica. Vol. II, (Mexico: Editorial Hermes,
1965), chapter 10, "Las Inversiones extranjeras," pp. 973-1177.
For
shorter surveys on several Spanish American countries in this period,
see Roberto Cortes Conde, The First Stages of Modernization in Spanish
America, trans. Toby Talbot (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). On
Mexico, see chapter 5, pp. 78-115.
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Investments were in manufacturing industries.77
Although many of the investments were initiated and directed from
abroad, leading to the term neo-colonialism, much of the capitalist
development was carried out by foreigners who were resident in Mexico,
and who were often immigrants intending to remain, in association with
Mexican commercial groups.

For example, in the early decades of the

national period, many French merchants had established themselves in
Mexico and not only expanded their commercial activities, but during
the Porfiriato, invested in industries serving the Mexican market
- however limited it was.

7 ft

The Mexican economic historian, Fernando

Rosenzweig, has written of the role of foreign capitalists in Mexico:
It is evident that many of the capitalists who
arose in Mexico were foreigners.
From the days
of Antunano there were foreign residents among
the merchants, artisans and small industrialists,
and even consular agents that supported the
creation of factories... Among the nationalists
represented there were Frenchmen, Englishmen,
Spaniards, Germans and North Americans whose
feeling for economic opportunities contributed
decisively to the formation of a capitalist
mentality.7^
Geographically, though much of the economic development was
located in the central region of the country, it was during this period
that the rapid development of northern Mexico, centered on Monterrey,
began, generated by foreign residents, immigrants, the Mexican mercan
tile and mining class (who were often major landowners too!), and

77Ibid., (Cosio Villegas), pp. 1149-1167.

78Ibid., pp. 1118-1119.
7®Fernando Rosenzweig, "El Desarrollo economico de Mexico de
1877-1911," El Trimestre Economico. no. 127, vol. 32, no. 3 (julioseptiembre de 1965), p. 429.
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additional foreign investment.®^

At the same time, the southern

regions of the country did not experience capitalist development
comparable to the center and north of Mexico.®*
Mexico, thus, experienced capitalist development in the late
nineteenth century, based on the growth of the national infrastructure
and the exploitation of its mineral resources.

However, in addition

to this capitalist development oriented to the industrializing
countries of Europe and North America, there was also the development
of industrial activity for the growing, though still limited, domestic
marke t .
In Peru, capitalist enterprise also emerged and expanded in the
late nineteenth century; however, it was even more limited to the
extraction of resources for export - though not totally so.
The first major extractive "industry" in the nineteenth century
was the exploitation of the guano deposits along the Peruvian coast,®^
which began in the 1840's and continued until the 1880's, dominated
by British companies.®®

And yet, although dominated by British firms,

which were able to supply the capital necessary for "ships, warehouses,

®^See Frederic Mauro, "El Desarrollo industrial de Monterrey
(1890-1960)," in David Barkin, ed., Los Beneficiarios del desarrollo
regional. Sep Setentas no. 52 (Mexico: Secretaria de Educaci6n Publics,
1972),

pp.

100-102.

®^See Kirsten Appendini and Daniel Murayama, "Desarrollo
desigual en Mexico (1900-1960)," in Barkin, ed., Los Beneficiarios.
pp. 128-137.
®^Guano is bird excrement, which served as an excellent source
of fertilizer.
®®See Cortes Conde, The First Stages, chapter 2, "Peru in the
Age of Guano," pp. 10-29.
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transportation, lodging and wages,"®^ the Peruvian commercial class
also profited from the expansion of commerce, and they often invested
those profits in coastal sugar estates.®-*
Furthermore, the income generated by the exports of guano
financed the construction of railroads ("...and by 1878 it was possible
to say that Peru was ahead of all Latin American countries in terms of
railways")®® and other infrastructural projects.
The guano deposits, however, were not in infinite supply, and by
the 1880's they were depleted.

ft 7

Therefore, although stimulating

infrastructural development and enriching the traditionally wealthy
mercantile class centered in Lima, the ephemeral nature of the guano
deposits did not generate the creation of a proletarian class,
particularly since the labor force had been predominantly "imported"
Chinese workers.®®
Nevertheless, Peru was increasingly penetrated by foreign cor
porations.®^

And expanding trade opportunities continued to enrich the

mercantile c l a s s . A l s o ,

foreign immigrants arrived with "money and

training" with which they established small industrial operations.

91

Especially significant were those immigrant-entrepreneurs who started

®4lbid., p. 17.
®->Peter F. Klaren, Modernization. Dislocation and Aprismo:
Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party. 1876-1932 (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1973), pp. 4-5.
®®Cortes Conde, The First Stages, p. 27.

®^Ibid.

8®See Stewart, Chinese Bondage.
89pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 134.

90jbid.

91-Ibid. Also, Jorge Basadre, His tor ia de la repub lica del Peru
(Lima: Editorial Peruamericano, 1963), Vol. Ill, pp. 3425-3430.
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the Peruvian textile industry based on domestic sources of cotton and
wool. 9 2
It was also in this period that Peru experienced what one his
torian has termed, the "renac imiento minero.

Beginning late in the

nineteenth century, and expanding rapidly in the twentieth, foreign
corporations, particularly United States ones, purchased mines and
lands in Peru to exploit the rich copper deposits there.
In the extreme south of Peru there were large nitrate deposits
which began to be exploited as the guano deposits were depleted,
however, they were lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879).
Thus, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and continuing
until the end of the First World War, it was Chile which received the
income generated by the exportation of nitrates.

The actual exploita

tion of the nitrate fields was carried out by Chilean and British
capital with Chilean

l a b o r e r s . ^4

Prior to the nitrate boom, copper had been the dominant mining
industry and major mineral export of Chile, but in the last few decades
of the century, Chilean copper suffered from cheaper foreign competi
tion.^^

In the early part of this century, technological advances made

92j)avid Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 96-100.
93Basadre, Historia de la republics, p. 3203.
^^Cortes Conde, The First Stages, pp. 66-69; Kinsbrunner, Chile,
pp. 105-111. For an interesting article on this subject, see Harold
Blakemore, "Limitations of Dependency: an historian's view and case
study," Bolet(n de estudios latinoamericanos y del Caribe. no. 18
(junio de 1975), pp. 74-87.
95ciark Reynolds, "Development Problems of An Export Economy: The
Case of Chile and Copper," in Markos Mamulakis and Clark Reynolds,
Essays on the Chilean Economy (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pp.

210-212.

the exploitation of Chilean copper competitive and profitable again;
however, the technological advances required higher capitalization
favoring foreign enterprise.

Thus, the expansion of copper mining in

Chile was dominated overwhelmingly by foreign capital.

Also, to

stimulate its rapid expansion, the government did not tax the mining
enterprises for the first twenty years (1904-1925)
Nevertheless, the income generated from the nitrate boom had
provided capital for infrastructural development.^

Also, in the last

few decades of the nineteenth and the first few decades of the twen
tieth centuries, Chile experienced, similar to Mexico and Peru, the
arrival of foreign immigrants with varying amounts of capital and
entrepreneurial ability who established their own enterprises or
became active in already established Chilean and foreign-owned com
panies.^®

Thus, in Chile too, capitalist development resulted from

foreign investment and enterprise, foreign immigrants' capital and
entrepreneurial talents, and the ever-growing wealth of the Chilean
commercial and mining class.
In Mexico, Peru, and Chile, the renewed exploitation of the
"traditional" mineral wealth, and newer exploitation of "non-precious"
mineral wealth, led to the expansion of capitalist enterprise and
social relations of production.

In Bolivia, also, where the social

structure closely resembled that of the Peruvian highlands, it was the

96Ibid., pp. 214-227.
9^Ibid., p. 210; and Cortes Conde, The First Stages, p. 67.
9®Dale Johnson, "Industrialization, Social Mobility, and Class
Formation in Chile," Studies in Comparative International Development.
vol. 3, no. 7 (1967-68), pp. 134-137.
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resurgence of mining activities that initiated capitalist development:
...from the middle decades of the century Bolivian
and foreign entrepreneurs were able to draw on the
capital being generated by the English and the
Chileans in the copper, nitrate, and guano mines
along the coast. By the late 1860's capital
began pouring into the altiplano and almost over
night production Cof silverJ began to climb
dramatically.
The resurgence of the silver mines continued until late in the
century and then declined in significance, "and its preeminent place
in the Bolivian economy had been taken by tin," which was increasingly
in demand due to the industrial growth in the United States and
Europe.100

Mining expansion also instigated the modest development of

a railway system and other infrastructural p r o j e c t s , w h i c h increased
in number in the early decades of this century, with the continued
growth of the tin mining industry.

There were also some light

industrial factories established in this period, but they were
relatively insignificant.
Nor was Venezuela unlike the other Spanish American countries
where history and society had been dominated by seigneurial landowners
of varying orientations and degrees of involvement in the local and
world economies and a commercial class eager to enter the landed

^^Herbert S. Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia.
1880-1952 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 16.
lOOibid., p. 31.
101Ibid., pp. 42-43. Also, see J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia: Land.
Location and Politics Since 1825 (London: Cambridge University Press,
1972), pp. 247-248.
102jbid., (Klein), pp. 58-59.

10%bid,, p. 59.

aristocracy.^-®^

As a Venezuelan historian has written:

The new and significant of this period Cthe first
decade of the twentieth century] in the economic
structure of Venezuela is represented by the form
of production instigated by the investment of
petroleum capital, that is, the introduction of
the capitalist mode of production in the global
system of pre-capitalist and latifundia relations
of production.1®*
Thus, foreign capital and enterprise, the immigration of poten
tial entrepreneurs, and the participation of the national commercial
and mineowning classes generated capitalist development in the Spanish
American societies.

Although it was often limited to the expansion of

the exploitation and exportation of mineral and natural resources, the
development of the infrastructure (particularly a railway system), and
significantly - but less frequently - the establishment of
manufacturing industries, it did give rise to an "urban-industrial"
proletariat.
At the same time, what was the impact of the expansion of the
world economy, the industrialization of the United States and Europe,
and the development of the capitalist mode of production in Spanish
America on the Spanish American countryside and the national and rural
hegemony of the landed aristocracy?
The expansion of mining operations, although increasingly
modernized and carried out by advanced industrial techniques and a
"modern" proletariat, had always been compatible with Spanish American
seigneurialism, because the mineowners - who were often landowners

I04see F. Brito Figueroa, Historia economica y social de
Venezuela. Vol. I (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1966).
i°5lbid., Vol. II, p. 399.
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themselves - were not In need of a national market for their resource
exports.

And, although foreign capitalists might interfere in rival

ries amongst political elites, they would not necessarily welcome
socio-political revolution and upheaval which might threaten their
investments.
Nor would the arrival of entrepreneurial-immigrants, and their
economic activities represent a threat to the ruling bloc of landowners,
merchants and miners.

Limited in numbers and socio-economically

distant from the Spanish American masses, they did not challenge the
Spanish American regimes.

If their enterprises were successful, they

could be absorbed by the ruling bloc.^®^
In fact, referring to this period, one historian has written
"The Creole landowning aristocrats...never had it so good."*®^
Similarly, Frederick Pike has commented:
In their endeavors to conserve the sort of social
structure inherited from the colonial past, the
privileged classes in Spanish America sensed that
they could combine their traditional ideals and
values with the advantages of foreign capital.
This referred to the fact that foreign capitalists' activities
in the Spanish American countries also benefited the traditional ruling
bloc of landowners and merchants.

For example, the income and revenue

generated by foreign investments in mining and similar operations

^■^See Franpois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary
Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 46-47; and Frederick B.
Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations in Chile, 1850-1960," in Petras and
Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, pp. 202-219.
107simon Collier, From Cortes to Castro: An Introduction to the
History of Latin America. 1492-1973 (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 224.
lOSprederick B. Pike, Spanish America, 1900-1970: Tradition and
Social Innovation (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), p. 38.

provided capital for infrastructural projects, reducing the need to
tax the national propertied classes (if that were possible).

In turn,

infrastructural development benefited the merchants eager to expand
their commercial activities and the landowning aristocracy, which was
not opposed to markets and profits furnished by others.

As Paul Baran

wrote on the Third World:
The interests of these two groups run entirely
parallel with those of the feudal landowners
powerfully entrenched in the societies of the
backward areas. Indeed, these have no reason
for complaints about the activities of foreign
enterprise in their countries. In fact, these
activities yield them considerable profits.
Frequently, they provide outlets for the pro
duce of landed estates, in many places they
raise the value of the land, often they offer
lucrative employment opportunities to members
of the landed gentry.109
What was the response of the Spanish American landowning class
to the growing commercial opportunities of the export and domestic
markets?

To a certain extent, although one historian has termed the

period a "renacimiento minero." it might very well be termed a
"renacimiento senorial" with reference to the countryside.
In Mexico, where the resurgence of mining activities, the spread
of a national railway system and infrastructural projects, and the
beginnings of industrialization were generating capitalist development,
the agricultural sector was also affected by new commercial opportuni
ties. H O

There was not merely a growing demand for foodstuffs in the

mining, commercial and industrial zones, but also a growing export

lO^Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 338.
H ^ S e e Cosfo Villegas, El Porfiriato. Vida econ6mica. Vol. I , on
"La Agriculture," pp. 1-134.
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market for uniquely regional agricultural products; for example,
cotton from irrigated zones in northern Mexico, sugar from Morelos,
and henequen from the Yucatan.
However, although commercialization increased, it was generally
carried out in the traditional manner.

The physical expansion of the

Mexican latifundia by encroachment upon the Indian peasant communal
landholdings was accelerated by commercialization, generating increased
peasant uprisings and rural d i s c o n t e n t . T h e

landowners not only

absorbed the peasants' land, but also sought to absorb and attach the
peasants themselves as laborers on the estates.

That is, commercial

expansion was generating seigneurial expansion!
There is evidence that in certain regions of Mexico there was an
increasing use of wage labor, but in fact - except in the northern
states^-2 _ the "wage" labor was merely an extension of the system of
debt peonage (bondage).

In comparing the Porfirian hacienda to the

previous land and labor situation in rural Mexico, Fernando Rosenzweig
has written:
The consolidation of the Porfirian hacienda with
its private property, market production and wage
labor signified a triumph over the old state of
things, but Cthe old state!] persisted in peonage,
that restricted the free mobility of the worker, in
extensive exploitation of the land held in monopolis
tic ownership...in consequence there was little
capitalization and dynamism in agriculture within
the market economy.

lllMeyer, Problemas campesinos. pp. 116-152.
112gee Freidrich Katz, "Labor Conditions on Haciendas in
Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends and Tendencies," Hispanic American
Historical Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (February 1974), pp. 31-37.
H^Rosenzweig, "El Desarrollo," p. 427. Later he wrote of "The
resistance and incapacity of Porfirian agriculture to adapt to the
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Frank Tannenbaum commented that: "the hacienda kept Mexican
agriculture from being modernized.
In the Yucatan, on the henequen plantations, the social relations
of production were basically that of slavery.

Yaqui Indians, who had

lost their lands in northern Mexico were forcibly relocated to the
Yucatan plantations and attached to them along with impoverished Mayan
peasants of the region.
In Peru, as well, commercialization instigated further seigneurial
expansion.

Similar to the process of latifundia expansion in Mexico,

the commercial opportunities presented by the export market accelerated
the encroachment on the Indian peasantry's lands by the estate owners
in the Peruvian highlands.

Land was not so much acquired for cultiva

tion as for the grazing and herding of sheep and cattle to supply the
export market with wool, hides and m eat.H*’ Also, as in Mexico, rural
discontent grew and expressed itself in banditry and localized
Indian peasant uprisings.
Again, commerce did not "revolutionize" the mode of production

circumstances created by the ascent of capitalism in the country."
(p.447.)
114prank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York:
(Macmillan, 1929), p. 128.
the nineteenth century Yucatan and the conditions on the
plantations, see Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1964), and John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous
Mexico (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1910).
ll^see Piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," p. 125, and "El
Problems de la tierra en la region de Cuzco en la epoca contemporanea
(fin del siglo XLX-prineipios del siglo XX)," in Regiones v ciudades
en America Latina. Sep Setentas no. Ill (Mexico: Secretarfa de Educacion Publica, 1973), pp. 15-21. There was also increased demand for
sheep and cattle products for Peruvian mills and population centers.

H7lbid., ("The Place of the Peasantry"), p. 126 ff.
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of the estates.

One social historian has written of this period: "The

latifundia was maintained in a state of technical and social archaism
...its labor force in a servile condition."

118

And, because the sheep

herding and ranching activities required less labor than the Indian
peasantry's primitive cultivation, there was labor displacement, which
provided workers for the mines and coastal plantations.
On the Peruvian coast, there was also a resurgence of economic
activity on the plantations in the last decades of the nineteenth cen
tury, following the War of the Pacific, which had ruined them.

Because

the Chinese labor source was no longer available, the plantation owners
turned to a system of labor recruitment called enganche: "...a traffic
in Indian labor which gave the spurious impression of being based on
free c o n t r a c t . B y

this system, Indian peasants were brought down

from the highlands by middle-men (enganchadores) for seasonal and/or
permanent employment on the coastal plantations and held there for as
long as they were needed, by debt.

120

The Chilean countryside was also affected by the changing world
economy.

In the 1840's and '50's, Chilean landowners experienced a

rapid increase in demand for wheat from California and Australia;

121

however, the Pacific export market was limited, compared to the export
market of later decades:

118piel t "El Problems de la tierra," p. 17.
H^Piel,

"The Place of the Peasantry," p. 131.

120jQareilj Modernization, pp. 25-30.
121see Sergio Sepulveda G., El Trigo chileno en el mercado
mundial (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1959), pp. 37-54.

From about 1860 o n t rail and steam put European
markets in reach of the peripheral zones.
Chilean exports to England grew steadily while
at the same time the northern mining districts
and Santiago increased their demand for food,122
The landowners' response was to increase the inquilinos’ labor
service and to expand the land area under cultivation.

123

Beyond

that, the landowners absorbed additional numbers of peasant families
onto the estates from the ranks of the afuerinos.

Arnold Bauer has

written of Chilean agriculture of this period, placing it in
comparative perspective:
Within the countries that supplied Europe's
food in the nineteenth century, expansion
created wholly new agrarian societies in some
cases and provoked deep reform in others. In
Chile, expansion took place within a traditional
society and the effect was to strengthen the
institutions already present.12^
Similarly, on Venezuela, it has been commented that foreign
investment in capitalist enterprise and increased export opportunities
led to the "fortification of the rural-latifundist economic struc
ture."1^5
Thus, to borrow the phraseology of Raymond Carr: "the change in
the classical agricultural structure of Spanish America was achieved
by a rearrangement of the traditional economy, by

its expansion in

space, not by any fundamental change."12®
It appears, therefore, that the impact of the world economy in

122A m o l d Bauer, "Chilean Rural Labor in the Nineteenth Century,"
American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 4 (October 1971), p. 1074.
123Ibid., pp. 1074-1083.

124Ibid., p. 1083.

125Brito Figueroa, Historia economica, p. 397.

126See Chapter 2, page 51.
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the late nineteenth century and Into the twentieth century, on the
Spanish American societies had the combined effect of generating the
development of capitalist social relations of production, at the same
time that it strengthened seigneurial relations of production in the
countryside.

The Spanish American societies were, thus, characterized

by the coexistence of seigneurial and capitalist social relations, in
a manner not dissimilar to that in which Leon Trotsky had described
pre-revolutionary Russia, which he called: "combined development;"
that is, "a drawing together of the different stages of the journey,
a combining of separate stages, an amalgam of archaic with more
contemporary forces."127
In Eastern Europe, capitalist development was carried out from
above and the transition to agrarian capitalism followed the Prussian
path.

That is, capitalist development in the countryside involved the

proletarianization of the peasantry on the estates.

The transformation

of the social relations of production was accomplished either by the
landed aristocrats themselves or - often - by the purchases (or renting)
of the estates by members of the bourgeoisie, which, in turn, instigated
the landed aristocrats to modernize their mode of production.

But in

Spanish America, although the landed "aristocracy" was often of
"bourgeois" origins, the relations of production on the estates, while
affected by the world economy and capitalist development in the national
societies, remained more ch*-acteristically seigneurial.

There are a

number of possible explanations.
First, is that capitalist development had begun earlier in

127Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, ed. F.W. Dupee (Garden
City: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 4.
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Eastern Europe, particularly in Germany and Austria where the national
bourgeoisies were moat active in manufacturing industries rather than
in merely export-extractive industries typical of Spanish America.
Most comparable to Spanish America in this respect was Rumania, both
a leading grain producer and petroleum exporter, where a seigneurial
mode of production persisted longest.

Thus, the East European bour

geoisies were more "capitalistically” challenging to the seigneuriallsm
of the landed aristocrats, and their purchases and modernization of
estates pushed the transition to agrarian capitalism.
Second, is that the Revolutions of 1848 and the earlier attacks
on serfdom and servile dues forced a more rapid transition to capita
list social relations in Eastern European agriculture.

There was no

similar movement in the Spanish American societies in the nineteenth
century (except perhaps against slavery) because "serfdom" did not
exist by law.
Still a third possible explanation was the strength of the land
owners' hegemony.

The landed "aristocracy," as we have stated, was

more open and available to successful members of the middle strata
because entry to the class was based more on the fact of landownership
than "aristocratic heritage or noble birth," as was the case in Europe.
Thus, the hegemony of the landed class was strengthened by that class'
openness and, to a certain extent, this meant that the norms and values
of the seigneurial superstructure permeated the middle strata more
effectively.

128purthermore, although it must be admitted that it has not
been adequately treated herein, the racial-ethnic dimension lent (and
lends) additional strength to class domination in Spanish America.

And yet, even in Spanish America, the impact, challenges, and
influences of foreign capitalist enterprise and the expansion of
national capitalist development and social relations began to"diffuse"
the capitalist mode of production through the countryside.
In Mexico, as already indicated, while debt peonage and seigneurialism characterized the relations of production in central and
southern rural Mexico (and the Yucatan), it appears that the estates
of far northern Mexico were making the transition to the capitalist
mode of production.

129

There are several possible explanations for

the changes on the northern estates.

Freidrich Katz has suggested

that the northern estate owners had to modernize the labor system or
risk the loss of their labor forces to the mining or industrial centers
developing in that region, to which the peons could escape and where
they could secure employment.

Another alternative for the peons was

provided by the proximity of the U.S. b o r d e r . K a t z

added that this

factor - the alternative presented by mining, industrial centers, and
the United States - also instigated the landowners into experimenting
with more "modern" forms of paternalism.
Another possible explanation is that the northern Mexican
estate owners were experiencing a challenge to their class basis of
existence similar to that which the Junkers had experienced.

That is,

northern Mexican lands and estates were being purchased by foreign
entrepreneurs (particularly North American) and were being operated
capitalistically.

1

A

Thus, both because they were forced to compete

129xatz, "Labor Conditions."

I30jbid., p. 33.

13*On the extent of foreign landownership in Mexico during the
Porfiriato, see Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, chapter
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and because the more enterprising landowners recognized the advantages
to the capitalist mode of production, the transformation was being
m a d e .

132

A n d

because many of the northern landowners were also mine-

owners and participants in industrial activities, the capitalist mode
of production was being introduced onto the estates.
At the same time, it should be remembered, that while the far
northern peasantry was being proletarianized, the peasants in the
central and southern regions were laboring as "serfs" or "slaves," or
being absorbed as such by the

expanding seigneurial estates.

In Peru, it was the coast which, at the outset of the twentieth
century, was being transformed into a region of capitalist plantations.
In the early 1870's, coastal Peru had begun to experience an increased
demand for sugar exports, and

the guano boom brought new investment

the coast.

commented that:

One historian has

to

Now, perhaps more than at any time since the early
eighteenth century, the planter aristocracy of the
valley.,.were able to enjoy the seigniorial life
that had long been the ideal of Hispanic-Peruvian
society.133
However, the collapse of the guano boom, followed by the War of
the Pacific, severely damaged coastal agriculture and "Some four
decades later...almost all of these prominent planter families had

15, pp. 358-370. For example, Tannenbaum points out that 40% of the
total privately owned land area in Chihuahua was foreign-owned. (p. 360)
132gee Roger D. Hansen, Mexican Economic Development: The Roots
of Rapid Growth (Washington: National Planning Association, 1971), pp.
26-27; and Dudley Ankerson, "Some Aspects of Economic Change and the
Origins of the Mexican Revolution, 1876-1910," Working Papers no. 12
(Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, University of Cambridge,
no date), p. 12.
133Klaren, Modernization, p. 3.
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disappeared from the valley."*-34
The planter aristocracy attempted to revive the estates and
introduced the system of enganche-labor, but they were incapable of
overcoming the decadence.

In their place appeared a new group of

entrepreneurs, foreign immigrants who purchased and modernized the
IOC

plantations, as well as foreign corporations, like W.R. Grace & Co.

J

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, and particularly in the
first decades of the twentieth, these new landowners modernized the
plantations, expanded the labor force via the enganche system and
basically "industrialized" coastal agriculture.

In the process, the

Indian peasants of the enganche system became a distinctly proletarian
class.136
The cotton plantations of the coast were also experiencing a
transition to more characteristically capitalist social relations of
production, but not so rapidly as the sugar plantations.

At the out

set of this century, the cotton estates utilized several modes of pro
duction: Indian peasant yanacona, Oriental sharecroppers, and Negro
l a b o r e r s . 137

But in the 1940's, there began a definite trend towards

mechanization and the transformation of the labor forces of the
estates into a proletarian class.*-3®

l34lbid.

l35Ibid., pp. 6-23.

136ibid., chapter 2, "The Rise of a Rural Proletariat," pp. 24-50.
137iouis C. Faron, "A History of Agricultural Production and Local
Organization in the Chancay Valley, Peru," in Julian Steward, ed.,
Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies, Vol. 3 Mexican and Peruvian
Communities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 227-294;
see outline of labor force history on pp. 232-233.

l38Ibid., pp. 232-233, 254-257.
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Highland Peru had persisted In Its seigneurial framework; in
fact, commercialization had furthered the expansion of the seigneurial
relations of production.

However, in recent decades even the sierra

had begun to be penetrated by the capitalist mode of production and the
proletarianization of the p e a s a n t r y . N o t i n g

the changes which had

been taking place in the 1950's, one Peruvian anthropologist wrote
that: "...the traditional Andean hacienda is acquiring a new social
and economic physiognomy...in imitation of the coastal haciendas.
It should be added that the transformation begun was gradual and was
often the result of foreign enterprise and/or coastal plantation
owners purchasing highland estates.
In Venezuela, too, there was the emergence of capitalist social
relations of production on new estates formed during the 1920's.

The

expansion of commercial agriculture may have been the cause of
capitalist estate formation at the same time that it furthered the
expansion of the traditional, seigneurial estates.
And in Chile, in the 1930's, there also began a trend towards
proletarianization of the estates' labor f o r c e s , w h i c h became most

139vaZque2> Hacienda, chapter 8, "Cambios en la estructura de la
hacienda," pp. 43-48.
l^Olbid., p. 43.
141piel, "El Problems de la tierra," p. 26. Also, for a case
study, see Solomon Miller, "Hacienda to Plantation in Northern Peru: The
Process of Proletarianization of a Tenant Farmer Society," in Steward,
ed., Contemporary Change. Vol. 3, Mexican and Peruvian Communities,
pp. 133-226.
142John Duncan Powell, Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan
Peasant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 23.
143james Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Agrarian Radicalism in
Chile," in Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems, pp. 512-513.
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pronounced in the 1950's.

(This is especially interesting because

it occurred simultaneously with a rapid decline in demand for Chilean
wheat in the export market, and continued during the period when
Chilean agricultural production was stagnating and the country became
an importer of grains and foodstuffs
The proletarianization process appears to have been related to
a "turnover" of landownership in rural Chile, not dissimilar to what
had occurred in Prussia in the nineteenth century:

..between 1925

and I960 some 60 per cent of the arable land in Chile's fertile
central valley changed h a n d s . " ^ ®

That is, urban, bourgeois and middle

strata purchasers were becoming estate owners and the impact of their
ownership was the proletarianization of the p e a s a n t r y . T h e

Chilean

estates were being transformed "consciously" by the introduction of the
capitalist mode of production and mechanization in this period

148

and,

in a more subtle way, by the "dilution" of seigneurial relations.
Furthermore, population growth in the countryside was enlarging the
rural proletariat relative to the inquilinos.*-^
Thus, in Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Chile - at least on a
regional basis - a transition to capitalist social relations of pro
duction had begun in a manner similar to the process which had occurred

l^Chinchilla and Sternberg, "The Agrarian Reform," pp. 106-109.
l^5See Sepulveda G., El Trigo chileno. pp. 104-124.
l ^Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations," p. 214.
^®Kay,

147jbid.

"Comparative Development," p. 86.

l^ R o b e r t ^ Kaufman, The Politics of Land Reform in Chile.
1950-1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 27.
150Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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in Eastern Europe.

And yet, unlike Eastern Europe, land reforms have

occurred since the 1930's in the Spanish American societies which have
both seriously challenged seigneurlallsm and, apparently, halted the
proletarianization process.
To understand both the beginning of the proletarianization
process and the land reforms which halted it, the Spanish American
countrysides must be placed within the larger context of their
respective societies and the world economy.

Populism. Capitalism and Land Reforms
Introduced in the form of a contradiction, it can be stated that
the same force which generated the proletarianization process also
generated the land reforms which halted it.

That is, the capitalist

development generated by foreign enterprise, in cooperation with the
landed aristocracies and commercial bourgeoisies, also generated the
development of classes in those societies which provided the Spanish
American peasantries with the necessary alliances against the
landowners.
Somewhat relevant to this issue is the comment by George
Lichtheim:
...to say that monopolistic capital tries to
exploit foreign countries is to say that
indirectly it helps to develop them - unless
one make the totally unrealistic assumption
that exploitation can be permanently divorced

15lThe qualification made by the use of the word "apparently"
refers to the uncertainty of Chilean political society and economy and
the land reforms which have taken place, as well as the persistence
- by their exclusion from the reforms, of capitalist estates in regions
of the other Spanish American countries!
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from development.

152

It might be argued - and it surely must be - that the nature of
the capitalist development carried out by foreign enterprise has not
been (nor is) necessarily the type of capitalist development which
would have been

most

beneficial for the societies involved.

Never

theless, it was

that

capitalist development - however

incompleteand

limited - which

gave

rise to those classes which have

been most

instrumental in

the formation of the Spanish American "populist"

alliances.
The Spanish American "populist" alliances have been multi-class
movements which were politically formalized into parties, involving
- with historical variation, depending on the particular country - the
peasantry, a sector of the bourgeoisie (which Octavio Ianni has called
the bourgeoisie "in formation"),
tariat.

the middle class, and the prole

They have, again, with variation, presented themselves in

opposition to the ruling blocs (most often referred to as oligarchies)
of landowners and mercantile bourgeoisies, and, what they argued was
excessive foreign ownership and control of their national economies.

1 Sfi

*52{;eorge Lichtheim, Imperialism (London: Penguin Books, 1974),
p. 136.
153gee Octavio Ianni, La Formacion del estado populista en
America Latina (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1975).
154ib id., pp. 60-65.
1 5 5 A 1 s o , see Gino German!, Torcuato S. di Telia, and Octavio
Ianni, Populismo v contradicciones de clase en Latinoam^rica (Mexico:
Ediciones Era, 1973).

15<)Ianni, La Formacion. pp. 60-65.
It should be restated that
the political histories of the respective countries are, of course,
unique to the respective societies, but, at the same time, an especially
common characteristic of the Spanish American societies has been the
formation of these populist alliances and political parties.
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In Mexico, the populist alliance developed out of the Revolution
(1910-1920) and was formalized in the 1930's, under the leadership of
Lazaro Cardenas, in the creation of the Partido de la Revolucion
Mexicans (FRM).^^
The origins of this populist alliance were in the Mexican
Revolution.^--*®

The Revolution was directed against the dictatorship

of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) and the landowning and mercantile
oligarchy which had been strengthened by the activities of foreign
capitalists.
In the central and southern regions of the country, the
Revolution was characterized by peasants seeking the restoration of
their village lands from the haciendas, which had always dominated
rural Mexico and were now threatening to convert the countryside into
"one large estate."
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At the same time, in the industrial and mining

centers of the north - as well as on the railroads - the proletariat
had been attempting to organize unions but were prevented from doing
so, often forcibly, by the Diaz government.

Thus, they, too, were

opposed to the Diaz regime and the foreign capitalists for whom they

■*-^The forerunner to the PRM was the Partido Nacional
Revolucionario (FNR), but it was greatly reorganized by Cardenas into
the PRM. In the 1940's, with some slight revision, it became the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional. which it has remained.
See, on
the political sociology of Cardenas' administration, Arnaldo Cordova,
La PoljLtica de masas del cardenismo (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1974).
158on th e Mexican Revolution, see J. Silva Herzog, Breve historia
de la revolucion mexicana. 2 vols. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica,
1960).
* ^ S e e Womack, Zapata. Also, Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the
Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Sow, 1969), chapter 1, "Mexico,"
pp. 3-48.
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worked.
In addition to peasant resistance and rebellion, and labor
unrest, there was also growing dissent within the Mexican bourgeoisie
and the middle sectors - particularly in the northern states.
James Cockcroft has written:
In spite of a record of having collaborated with
foreign capital, Mexico's bourgeoisie was not
immune to the pressures of foreign competition
and economic nationalism. While some Mexican
businessmen profited from collaboration with
foreigners, others suffered an economic squeeze.
Thus, many families of the northern Mexican bourgeoisie, mineowners and industrialists, moved in opposition to the regime because
of its links with foreign capitalists who, as far as they were con
cerned, were monopolizing the Mexican economy.

Significantly, many

of the families were also being challenged by foreigners (especially
from the United States) who were purchasing land and competing for the
regional and export m a r k e t s . N a t i o n a l i s m intensified when the
government sold off large tracts of public land in the north, enabling
foreigners to purchase huge acreage.

It was even further accentuated

when the government made grants of land to those foreign companies
building the railways.

160Ibid., (Wolf), pp. 20-21.
^^Ibid., pp. 22-25. Also, see James D. Cockcroft, "Social and
Economic Structure of the Porfiriato: Mexico, 1877-1911," in Cockcroft,
et a t . , Dependence and Underdevelopment, pp. 47-70; and Ankerson,
"Some Aspects of," pp. 7-14.
*62lbid., (Cockcroft), p. 52.
^-^Ankerson, "Some Aspects of," p. 12; and Wolf, Peasant W a r s ,
pp. 22-23,

■^^Ibid., (Ankerson), p. 9.

Although the peasants and the proletariat provided the armies of
the Revolution, it was the urban middle class and the bourgeoisie which
often provided the leadership.

Still, in the Constitution of 1917, the

rights of labor were guaranteed, land reforms for the peasants were pro
mised, and the State was provided with greater authority over the
1£ C
national economy and resources.

However, the contradictions, com

petitions, and conflicts of the multi-class (populist) alliance which
had emerged from the Revolution, inhibited any action from being taken
to implement the intentions of the new constitution.

(For example,

landowners from the north opposed wide-scale land reforms which the
southern peasantry had fought for.)

Except for isolated circumstances,

like the rise of a radical state governor, little effort was made to
Implement land reform and break up the latifundia.
At the same time, although the national government was failing
to carry out the reforms intended, the countryside was not peaceful.
Unrest characterized many rural areas and battles continued to break
out between peasants and hacendados.

Furthermore, labor union

organizers were increasingly able to mobilize workers in the extractive
and industrial centers, and even began to mobilize peasants and
agricultural workers into syndicates.

168

l ^ O n the Mexican Constitution of 1917, see Charles C. Cumberland
Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press,
1968), pp. 259-272.
^><>See Michel Gutelman, Capitalismo v re forma agraria en Mexico
(Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1974), pp. 86-101.
167see Gerritt Huizer, "Peasant Organization and Agrarian Reform
in Mexico," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., Masses in Latin America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 445-464.
l68Ibid. Also, see Arturo Anguiano, El Estado v la poljftica
obrera del cardenismo (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1975), pp. 22-29.
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The world economic depression of the 1930's regenerated the
populist alliance in Mexico (and, as we shall see, instigated similar
movements in the other Spanish American societies).

The export

economy declined and, in turn, reduced Mexico's ability to import
manufactured consumer products.

(Ianni has referred to this period

as a "gran crisis para las ollgarqufas.")
The resurgent populism in Mexico brought L^zaro Cardenas to
presidential power (1934-40) and under his leadership the populist
coalition was consolidated at the same time that reforms were carried
out.

In fact, they were two sides of the same p r o c e s s . T h e

peasants were organized into the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC),
which became one of the corporate bodies of the PRM, and were supported
against the l a n d o w n e r s . T h e result of peasant mobilization with
government support was a wide-scale land reform by expropriation,
which, though not affecting all latifundia, effectively eliminated
seigneurial!sm in Mexico.
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The workers' movement, like that of the peasants, was
strengthened by government support, and the workers' unions were mobilized into a single federation incorporated as a body into the PRM.
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The workers' demands were supported by the government against Mexican
and foreign enterprises - particularly foreign ones.

In fact, govern

ment support of labor led to the nationalization of the railways and

169purtado, Economic Development, pp. 39-42.
170see Cordova, La Polftica de masas.

^^-Ibid., pp. 93-122.

l^Gutelman, Capitalismo y reforma agraria. pp. 105-111.
l^Cordova, La Polftica de masas. pp. 67-92; and Anguiano,
El Estado y la polltlca obrera.
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foreign petroleum companies, which strengthened national capitalism.
Under Cardenas, the Mexican bourgeoisie, which had dominated the
populist alliance, was strengthened in its domination - though it had
to accept the necessity of the populist reforms - and was enlarged
through the admission of middle class elements.^75

And it was during

this period, i.e. the depression and the Cardenas administration, that
the government supported Mexican capitalists in order to stimulate
industrialization via import-substitution.

176

The bourgeoisie, as

such, was not represented as a distinct body in the party, but is now
represented formally, to the extent that it is necessary, in the
"popular sector," i.e. a third corporate body consisting of middle
class organizations, and in business leaders' associations.^77
Thus, the populist alliance which emerged from the Mexican Revo
lution, dominated by the Mexican "bourgeoisie in formation," harnessed
the unrest of the peasantry to oppose the oligarchy of landowners and
the commercial bourgeoisie.

In this way, the peasants secured the

alliance which enabled them to eliminate the seigneurial haciendas,
and in the north prevent their proletarianization, by granting them
proprietorship; which they were unable to accomplish by themselves.
(It should be noted, however, that not all of the latifundia were

174cuniberland, Mexico, pp. 308-317. See Howard F. Cline, The
United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 226-238.
I75()n Mexico and Cardenas, see Frederick B. Pike, Spanish
America, pp. 47-52.
176ibid., and Anguiano, El Estado. pp. 94-105.
177gee L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System (Boston
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 123-136, on the "formal" organization
of the middle class and bourgeoisie.

expropriated.

Many capitalist estate owners, particularly in the

north, were able to maintain ownership of their lands by several means.
These "neo-latifundists" manage their estates capitalistically, that
is, they employ a propertyiess agricultural proletariat, not an
"attached" peasantry. ) ^ 8
The populist alliance, formalized by Cardenas in the PRM, has
persisted, but it is no longer populist.

Beginning under Cardenas,

the populist alliance has become a national corporate structure
dominated by a public and private bourgeoisie.

James Petras has

described such a corporate structure:
...the corporatist approach, whereby the govern
ment controls and directs lower-class associations
and links them with existing economic elites in an
attempt to encourage collaboration for national
development.*-79
In 1952, Bolivia also experienced a populist revolution which
finally challenged and eliminated seigneurialism in the countryside.
There, even more than in Mexico and the other Spanish American socie
ties, seigneurialism had persisted as the mode of domination and pro
duction.

The capitalist development which had occurred in Bolivian

society was based, in particular, on mining, and though there had been
infrastructural and industrial development, it was limited.

By the

1930's, the Bolivian ruling bloc:

^78()n Mexico's agrarian structure since 1940, see Rodolfo
Stavenhagen, 'Social Aspects of Agrarian Structure in Mexico," in
Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems, pp. 233-235, 263.
179james pe tras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean
Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 5.
Also, see pp. 199-203 for a contrast of populism and corporatism.

...consisted of hacendados, mine owners, leading
merchants, bankers and the new industrialists,
...and made up a self-conscious oligarchy...which
directed the socio-economic and political life
of the nation... Cand wasD United by close ties
of marriage, conmon absentee ownership of estates,
Cetc .3180
However, as Herbert Klein recognized, "...the oligarchy could
not rule the nation alone, and depended for its political power on the
constantly expanding numbers of the urban middle c l a s s . A n d ,
With the development of the middle class there
also emerged an urban proletariat...With the rise
of light industry and heavy mining, the growth of
government service and, most important, with the
development of the communications and transportation
network, a new type of industrial wage worker came
into being. And with his emergence, almost exclu
sively confined to the urban and mining areas, there
now appeared on the Bolivian scene a modern labour
movement.182
The hegemony of the oligarchy remained stable until the nineteen
thirties; however, during that decade two events began to shake the
foundation of that hegemony and generated challenges to its domination
the world economic depression, and the Chaco War (1932-35) with
Paraguay.
The depression led to a decrease in demand for Bolivian tin in
the world market and forced a further decline in its price, which had
already been the trend since the end of the First World War.

This

led to a slowdown in mining operations which resulted in growing
unemployment amongst the Bolivian mineworkers.1®^

Furthermore, the

depression in the tin mining industry led to declining revenues upon

l®°Klein, Parties and Political Change, p. 168.
181Ibid.

l82Ibid., p. 60.

IS^Ibid., pp. 117 ff.

183Ibid., pp. 107-108.

which the government depended for its income and, in turn, the middle
class' position was weakened:

"Increasingly, the economic situation

began to occupy the public mind, and added new cause for unrest...
Though the entry of Bolivia into the Chaco War at first reduced
social tension by creating nationalist fervor, Bolivia's defeat
generated increased unrest amongst the middle class and proletariat.
Robert Alexander has written that:

"The Chaco War made the Revolution

of 1952 inevitable.
Not only did the middle and working classes begin to question
the hegemony of the oligarchy, the war also had an impact on the
countryside.

The mobilization of the peasantry to fill the ranks of

the army on the front line disrupted rural life and the seigneurial
mode of domination;
In the aftermath of the Chaco War the masses
showed signs of increasing restlessness. Many
Indian conscripts into the Bolivian army, now
that they had been given some of the rudiments
of a primary education and afforded a new
vision of their country and their position in
it by being uprooted and forced out of the
confines of their native localities, proved
reluctant to revert to their old style of life
once the war e n d e d .
Peasant unrest had manifested itself previously (as, for example,
in the late nineteenth century, Indian peasant resistance to the
expanding

haciendas); however, unlike previous periods

unrest, the peasantry

now possessed "potential" allies

of peasant
-though by no

185Ibid., p. 108.
186R0bert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 22,

^8^Pike, Spanish America, p. 63.
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means guaranteed, as evidenced by Eastern Europe - in the middle and
proletarian classes.

Following the Chaco War, the first attempts were

made to organize the peasants, carried out by mineworkers who still
maintained their ties with their peasant-village origins, and by
dissident members of the middle class.
In the urban and mining centers new political parties were
formed, ranging from neo-fascist to neo-marxist (and combinations of
the two!).

The two most significant parties were the Movimiento

Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) - based on middle class support and
including dissatisfied army officers - and the Partido de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria (PIR) - based on organized labor's s u p p o r t . T h e MNR
was nationalistic, and included both neo-fascist and neo-marxist
elements, while the PIR was marxist and radical nationalist.
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The ruling bloc was under increasing political pressure from the
middle and working classes.

And yet, it succeeded in forming, via its

own representative parties, temporary governing alliances with both of
the new parties - first with the MNR, and then with the PIR.

But what

resulted, by the late 1940's, was increasing working class support for
the MNR at the expense of the PIR, while the MNR "retained full support
of its urban middle-class elements.**191

Furthermore, during the same

period of the nineteen forties, the MNR was active in the countryside

188Huizer, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 49-50; and Dwight B. Heath,
"Bolivia: Peasant Syndicates among the Aymara," in Henry A. Landsberger,
ed., Latin American Peasant Movements (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1969), pp. 175-177.
^®9See Klein, Parties and Political Change, chapter 11, "The
Rise of the National Left," pp. 334-368.

ISOxbid., pp. 338-341.

191Ibid., p. 383.
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mobilizing the peasantry.
Thus, the MNR was becoming "a newly amalgamated party of middleclass and worker elements," and although dominated by the middle class,
the incorporation of more radical working class demands into its
program meant the MNR "represented a new type of radical populist
movement.

In 1952, the MNR staged what has become known as the

Bolivian Revolution.

Supported by the middle class and the proletariat

the MNR took control of the government, and "to begin with...the
lgA
entire tin industry

was

nationalized in October 1952."

But what

about the countryside?
Much more rapid and much less violent than the Mexican Revolution,
the Bolivian Revolution had not mobilized the peasantry, and although
the new MNR regime made some pronouncements about land reform, little
serious action was taken to implement it.

However, the rural organi

zing which had already taken place, and which was renewed at a more
rapid pace now that the urban revolution had been effected, roused the
peasantry to implement its own land reform through land invasions!

In

order to harness the peasant movement somewhat, and identify itself
with the reforms begun by the peasantry, the MNR government rapidly
approved a land reform law and gave full support to the peasants'
actions.Thus,

the latifundia were expropriated and seigneurialism

192ibid., pp. 379-380; Heath, "Bolivia: Peasant Syndicates,"
pp. 173-174; and Huizer, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 51-53.
193njid., (Klein), p. 401.

194Ibid., p. 403.

^•9^See Richard W. Patch, "United States Assistance in a
Revolutionary Setting," in Robert D. Tomasek, ed., Latin American
Politics: Studies of the Contemporary Scene (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1970), pp. 354-363.
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was eliminated from rural Bolivia.*’®®
Xn Bolivia, as in Mexico, the populist alliance was dominated by
elements of the bourgeoisie "in formation" and the middle class,
though it was necessary to carry out the reforms demanded by the pro
letariat and the peasantry (or accept what had already been set in
motion) in order to consolidate and maintain the alliance.

Frederick

Pike has written:
In revolutionary Bolivia, as in revolutionary
Mexico, steps were taken to facilitate the
growth of a new capitalist elite at the same
time as the quiescence of the masses was
assured...197
However, by the early nineteen sixties, the inherent contradic
tions of the populist alliance - that is, meeting the demands of an
aggressive workers' movement while, at the same time, furthering the
development of a national bourgeoisie and national capitalism - caused
its dissolution, and:
Rejecting its rather uneasy partnership with
organized labor, the middle class has now aligned
itself with the organized peasant groups in frank
opposition to labor and the extreme left.198
And, paralleling the collapse of the populist alliance was the

196()n the Bolivian land reform, see Antonio Garc{a, "Agrarian
Reform and Social Development in Bolivia," in Stavenhagen, ed.,
Agrarian Problems, pp. 301-346; and Heath, et al., Land Reform and
Social Revolution in Bolivia.
197pike , Spanish America, p. 69.
198itlein, Parties and Political Change, p. 408.
In a footnote
the author states that: "The middle class was now composed of...: the
merchants, industrialists, small miners, and a group which became
known a s ...los nuevos ricos. the members of the MNR and their supporters
who grew wealthy on the U.S. aid progranmes and the vast increase in
the government bureaucracy.
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development of the corporate socio-political structure and political
economy which now characterizes Bolivian society, similar to Mexican
corporatism, except for the position of
In Venezuela, a populist alliance

labor.
also began

to develop in the

nineteen thirties and emerged in the political party Accion Democratica
( A D ) . U n d e r middle class leadership, Accion Democratica forged a
populist alliance with labor, i.e. the workers in the foreign-owned
petroleum industry, and with the peasantry and emerging rural
proletariat.^®*1
The 1930's was a period of crisis
particularly the traditionally dominant

for the Venezuelan ruling bloc,
landowning

class. In addition

to the death of the dictator, Juan Vicente Gomez, under whose dictator
ship (1908-35) the ruling bloc had prospered due to the revenues on the
foreign-owned petroleum companies and the growing demand for export
crops produced by the Venezuelan latifundia, there was the crisis
caused by the depression.

909

The commercialization of Venezuelan agriculture and the expansion
of the latifundia had originally been accomplished by the incorporation
of independent minifundist-peasants onto the estates in seigneurial

199gee Melvin Burke and James Malloy, "From National Populism to
National Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia (1952-1970)," in Studies in
Comparative International Development, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1974),
pp. 49-73.
200gee John D. Martz, Accion Democratica: Evolution of a Modern
Political Party in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966) .
201ibid., pp. 255-286.
202pike, Spanish America, pp. 76-79; and Powell, Political
Mobilization, pp. 18-30.
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relations of production, and, as we have seen, during the 1920's there
also appeared capitalist estates where the peasantry was being proletarianized.

However, in the late nineteen twenties, and into the

thirties, the depression halted the growth of Venezuelan agriculture
and many estate owners began to lose their lands.

John Duncan Powell

has written:
Regardless of whether the estate operations that
spread under Gomez were classic latifundia or
rudimentary enserfment of increasing numbers of
peasants meant that they were being drawn into
an onerous relationship with a privileged class.
When commercial agriculture began to fail in the
1920's and continued to decline during the 1930's,
conditions on both types of operation undoubtedly
grew worse. Wages were lowered, working hours
extended, housing and feeding arrangements cut to
a minimum cost to the owner. Faced with dropping
prices and increased carrying costs for operational
credits, landowners adopted these and other manipu
lative extractions to keep a desperate situation
from getting even worse.
Thus, the landowning class
attempted to pass on the impact of the failure in
commercial agriculture to the rural labor force.2®3
In the midst of the worsening situation in the countryside, there
were reports of peasant unrest, social banditry, and even small-scale
uprisings.This

peasant unrest did not go unharnessed politically.

Middle class political parties, which had begun to develop during the
last

few years of the Gomez

dictatorship, became more activefollowing

his demise and Accion Democratica emerged in embryonic form.

It was

formally founded in 1941.
It was in this period, and into the first half of the 1940's,
that Accion Democratica began - successfully - to build a populist

203!bid.,

(Powell), p. 50.

204Ibid., pp. 54-56.

2^%lartz, Accion Democratica, pp. 17-48.

base amongst the proletariat and the peasantry.

And in 1945 the party

participated in a coup with reformist elements of the military.

Thus,

it gained access to state power which it held only until 1948.^®^
During those three years, AD initiated reforms characteristic of
the populist alliance it represented.

It negotiated and secured 50

per cent of the returns of the foreign-owned petroleum industry with
which it funded a national development corporation to stimulate
national capitalist-industrialization.

At the same time, it supported

the consolidation and expansion of the labor movement and workers'
organizations.

In the countryside, AD supported the organization of

syndicates to represent the peasants in their demands against the
landowners and, at the same time, harness the peasantry's political
support for itself.

Furthermore, and most significantly, AD outlined

and initiated a land reform which involved the expropriation - with
compensation - of privately owned lands.
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However, in late 1948,

the oligarchy responded to the threat of reforms with a coup carried
out by conservative elements of the military, and until 1958 the labor
and peasant movements were suppressed and the first attempts at land
reform were reversed.
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And yet, the populist alliance survived a ten year, conservative
military dictatorship and re-emerged in the late 1950's.

The reaction

in the countryside to the return of Accion Democratica to state power
was peasant land invasions to restore the reforms which had begun ten

206Ibid., pp. 49-80; and Powell, Political Mobilization, pp.
50-64.
2°7lbid., (Martz), pp. 81-88; and (Powell), pp. 65-86.

2^®Ibid., (Martz), pp. 89-96; and (Powell), pp. 87-99.

years previously and to carry them further.

The governing coalition

led by Accion Democratica sought to regain control of the peasant move
ment and the land reform - which it did - but first it had to accept
the de facto reforms carried out by the peasants themselves.
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After the initial reforms - often de facto recognition of the
peasantry's efforts - between 1959 and 1961, the land reform process
has slowed down and the peasantry has been harnessed and retained as
a major class base of support for AD, along with much of the labor
movement.

Nevertheless, seigneurialism appears to have been seriously

challenged as a result.
At the same time that the bourgeoisie "in formation" has consoli
dated its hegemony by carrying out a gradual land reform program
financed by petroleum revenues, it has also been able to expand social
services and finance further capitalist development from the same
source.

Thus, in Venezuela too, the elimination of seigneurialism has

been the product of a populist alliance which provided the peasantry
with class allies, enabling it to challenge the landowning class.
Unlike Mexico and Bolivia, however, Venezuela has not been
characterized by a change from populism to corporatism - in part due,
perhaps, to the luxury of the petroleum revenues.
Peru and Chile represent variations on the theme of Spanish
American populist alliances and the elimination of seigneurialism.
The Peruvian political party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (APRA), which was founded in the 1920's and developed into
a populist alliance during the decade which followed, though it served

209ibid., (Powell), pp. 103-114.
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as the "classical" model for Spanish American populist parties, never
secured state power.

210

tical element in Peru.

And yet, it has remained a significant poli
Significantly, it has been APRA's strongest

opponent, the Peruvian military, which has carried out the populist
reforms advocated by, and historically associated with, APRA itself.
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Beginning as a small group of radical, middle class student
intellectuals who were driven into exile, or underground in the 1920's,
APRA arose during a period of Indian peasant rebellion in the highlands
(in resistance to the continuing encroachment of the latifundia upon
their lands) and attempts at organizing the agricultural proletariat
on the coastal plantations.
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But a dictatorship maintained the

oligarchical domination of Peruvian society, and revenues on foreign
capitalist enterprise operating in the country supported it.
APRA re-emerged in Peru in 1930, during the depression, which
had a severe effect on the Peruvian economy and weakened the hegemony
of the ruling bloc over the middle class and proletariat.
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In the

next few years, APRA sought to create a populist alliance under its
leadership, and began - quite successfully - to mobilize elements of
both the middle class, which was increasingly disenchanted with the

210Grant Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru: The APRISTA
and Other Mass Parties of Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1971).
Julio Cotier, "Political Crisis and Military Populism in
Peru," in Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 6,
no. 5 (1970-71), pp. 95-118.
2^Pike, Spanish America, p. 110; and Klaren, Modernization,
pp. 39-49.
213ibid., (Pike), p. 112. Also, on the political history of this
period, see Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 250-281.
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ruling bloc of landowners and commercial bourgeoisie linked to foreign
capita lists, and the proletariat, particularly the coastal plantation
workers and industrial workers of the textile industry.2^

APRA also

began to penetrate the Peruvian highlands, and the possibility of an
urban-peasant alliance grew.2^
However, APRA's attempts to achieve state power through a popu
list alliance, at first by elections and then via a violent uprising
in northern coastal Peru, were prevented and suppressed, respectively,
and APRA's leadership was again forced into exile, or underground.2 ^
The oligarchy was so opposed to APRA - and, perhaps, fear
"populist revolution" - that it even supported Communist Party
activities amongst the workers to reduce APRA's strength.
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From the late 1930's to the late 1950's, the oligarchy maintained
its dominant position; however, the coastal-commercial bourgeoisie and
plantation owners had become far more powerful than the seigneurial
estate owners of the sierra and were steadily moving into the highlands.
As has already been noted, capitalist social relations of production
began to diffuse into the agrarian sector of the sierra.
But the proletarianization of the peasantry and continuing
encroachment of the latifundia upon the peasantry's lands did not go

^l^lbid., (Spanish America) . p. 113; Ford, Man and Land, pp. 121125; Klaren, Modernization; Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial, pp. 75-77;
and Julio Cotier and Felipe Portocarrero,
"Peru: Peasant Organizations,"
in Landsberger, ed., Latin American Peasant Movements, pp. 300-311,
2^ E r i c j. Hobsbawm, "Peasant Land Occupations," in Past and
Present, no. 62 (February 1974), pp. 134, 145-146.
2^Pi k e , The Modern History of Peru, pp. 261-268.
217Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial, p. 77.
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unchallenged.

In the early 1940's, and again in the late 1950's, APRA

was permitted to participate openly in the political process (and
during the other years had done so more subtly).

Although APRA ceased

to be a "revolutionary" party it remained essentially populist and
active in the labor movement and even amongst the peasantry.
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In

addition to APRA's work amongst the peasantry, there were more radical
political groups becoming active in the sierra.

21 9

And, similar to

Bolivia, there was a "backwash" effect from the mining and urban
Industrial centers.

That is, the workers provided experience - and

often leadership - in labor organization and mobilization, which they
brought back with them to the villages.^20

(In the same way that the

capitalist mode of production was being diffused through the rural
highlands, so was working class organizational experience!)
The combination of the gradual proletarianization of the estate
peasantry (which may be gradual on a regional basis, but can occur
rather suddenly on the estate level!), and the persistent struggle
between the Indian peasant villages and the estates, which were now
not only losing ownership of their lands but also possession of them,
with the peasants' growing awareness that the landowners' hegemony was
weakening, led, in the late 1950's, to strikes on the haciendas and
land occupations by the peasants.

221
L

Increasing in intensity and

2l8Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Political Parties (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 185-190; and Hobsbawm, "Peasant
Land Occupations," pp. 137-138.
219fluizer, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 73-83.
220nobsbawm, "Peasant Land Occupations," pp. 144-145.
^*Tbid,, pp. 141-147; for a case study, see Giorgi Albert, "The
Breakdown of Provincial Urban Power Structure and the Rise of Peasant
Movements," in Sociologia Ruralis. vol. 12, no. 3-4 (1972), pp. 315-333.
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territorial extent, by the early 1960's the Peruvian sierra was experiencing what seemed to be the beginning of a peasant revolution.

222

However, the government utilized the military to suppress it.
And yet, Peruvian society had been changing since the nineteen
twenties and thirties, and the military had also.

22^

The ruling bloc,

though still composed of the landowning aristocracy and the coastal
bourgeoisie, was no longer dominated by the seigneurial landowning
clsss, but by the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie itself was experiencing

internal conflict between the commercial bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie
"in formation," composed of industrialists and developmental sectors of
the middle c l a s s . A n d

the Peruvian military, not unlike other Latin

American militaries, was also becoming middle class:

225

In many respects Peru's officer corps constituted
a microcosm of the country’s...middle sectors. By
the 1960's, most of the officers, even generals,
came from a middle-class background, and felt a
sense of exclusion and frustration in their rela
tions with the top social elite, which they began
to refer to with increasing disdain as a plutocracy.

°

Thus, though the military suppressed the growing peasant revolu
tion, it did not seek to restore seigneurialism in the highlands.

At

the same time that it restored order in the countryside, it supported

222xn addition to Huizer, Cotier and Portocarrero, and Hobsbawm,
see Howard Handelman, Struggle in the Andes: Peasant Political
Mobilization in Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975).
^23gee Anibal Quijano Obregon, "Tendencies in Peruvian Develop
ment and Class Structure," in Petras and Zeitlin, eds., Latin America,
pp. 289-328; and Bourricaud, Power and Society.
224cotler, "Political Crisis," pp. 95-99.
225gee Jose Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Petras and
Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, pp. 145-185.

^^Pike, Spanish America, p. 162.
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a new "populist" political party, Acci6n Popular, in attempting to
initiate reforms,
state powerl).

(which also served to keep APRA from gaining hold of

However, the populist-civilian government proved too

inefficient and too slow to satisfy either the peasantry or the mili
tary. 227

Peasant unrest continued to threaten, and compounded by other

events, the military took power in 1969 and initiated the populist
reformswhich, as we have stated,
APRA.228

a

were historically associated with

Peruvian sociologist, Julio Cotier, has written:

The Armed Forces saw the need to institute refor
mist measures which would attack the country's
archaic structure and thereby neutralize the
emerging popular masses - which might otherwise
become an irrepressible force - while at the
same time reducing foreign dependence.
In Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela, populist political parties
- dominated by the bourgeoisie "in formation," with the middle class
- secured state power and initiated reforms, which included supporting
the peasantry in eliminating the seigneurial latifundia.
Mexico and Bolivia, populism gave way to corporatism.

And in

In Peru, the

populist political party, APRA, never secured power and the quasi
populist party of the early 1960's, Acci6n Popular, failed to accom
plish anything substantial.

It was the military, in a "middle-class

military coup," which carried out the populists' reforms.230

And

227see James Petras and Robert LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution:
The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America (New York:
Vintage Books, 1971), chapter 3, "Gradualism inBelaunde's Peru,"
pp. 33-124.
^^Cotler, "Political Crisis," pp. 99-101.

^ % b i d . , p. 102.

230gee joost Kuitenbrouwer, "The Function of Social Mobilization
in the Process Towards a New Society in Peru," Occasional Papers no.
32 (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1973).
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similar to Mexico and Bolivia, it has pursued the development of
national capitalism through national corporatism.

231

In the countryside, the military has instituted wide-scale
reforms.

The predominantly foreign-owned sugar plantations along the

coast have been expropriated and are supposed to become workers' c o 
operatives (though, thus far, they appear to have become state farms)232
while in the sierra the latifundia have been turned over to the peasants
and lands have been restored to the Indian peasant communities, which
are being supported in efforts to form cooperatives.

233

However, former landowners do not lose everything in the reform
process.

They have received bonds as compensation which they have been

encouraged by the government to invest in urban-industrial enterprises,
while the peasants who receive the land are expected to pay for it over
a period of time.

This has led at least one observer to write:

The peasants will be bound more closely to the
land, and will agree to pay up because of their
desire for security, while the hacendados turn
themselves into industrialists.
Nevertheless, seigneurialism has been eliminated from rural Peru.

231lbid. Also, see James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism, Corpora
tism, and Mobilization in Peru," in Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch,
eds., The New Corporatism: Socio-Political Structures in the Iberian
World (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 52-84;
and Cotier, "Political Crisis," pp. 102-113.
232For a critical analysis of the Peruvian land reform, see Ramon
Zald£var, "Agrarian Reform and Military Reformism in Peru," in David
Lehmann, ed., Peasants. Landlords and Governments: Agrarian Reform in
the Third World (New York: Holmes and Meier Publications, 1974), pp.
25-70.
233^ major problem, which also arose in Bolivia, was conflict over
the land between colonos, i.e. peasants on the estates, and comuneros,
i.e. Indian peasants whose lands had been lost to the estates.
2342aldivar, "Agrarian Reform," p. 45.
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Eric Hobsbawm has written, summing up the change in the countryside
and the role of the peasantry:
In the early 1960s the land invasions were indeed
sufficiently overwhelming in the central highlands
and...sufficiently serious in other parts of the
highlands to cause the highland hacienda system to
collapse. But unlike Marx's proletariat, the
spontaneous force of the peasantry, though capable
of killing landlordism, was unable to dig its grave.
It made Agrarian Reform inevitable.
But it took an
army coup, after several years of shilly-shallying,
to bury the corpse of the highland haciendas.235
What there had been on a populist alliance in Chile prior to the
nineteen sixties and the emergence of the Christian Democratic Party,
was a governmental coalition known as Frente Popular (Popular Front),
which was formed in the late 1930's.2®®
As we have seen, the Chilean ruling bloc, consisting of the
landed aristocracy and the commercial and mining bourgeoisie (as well
as the still limited industrial group), had formed in the late nine
teenth and early twentieth c e n t u r i e s . A t

the same time, the capi

talist development of the period had also created an urban middle class
and proletariat.2®®
Although the Chilean middle class "...on the whole remained
content to serve as the guardians of the aristocracy,"

23Q

it was

2®5Hobsbawm, "Peasant Land Occupations," p. 152.
236s ee John Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).
2®^Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations "
^3®An interesting,
tury is, Osvaldo Sunkel,
Veliz, ed., Obstacles to
University Press, 1965),

though brief, analysis of Chile in this cen
"Change and Frustration in Chile," in Claudio
Change in Latin America (London: Oxford
pp. 116-144.

239pijce> Spanish America, p. 95.
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represented in Chilean political life in a decidedly middle class
political party, the Radical Party, which played an increasingly signi
ficant role in governmental alliances in the nineteen twenties and
thirties.

Meanwhile, the proletariat was struggling to organize itself

into labor unions, which were often linked to a variety of socialist
political p a r t i e s . T h u s ,

the middle class and the proletariat were

incorporated into Chilean electoral politics in separate political
parties.

The peasantry, meanwhile, remained within the framework of

the seigneurial mode of production and
numbers

domination, and thoughtheir

were declining relative to the urban classes, theywere an

invaluable source of votes for the landowners' candidates.
The depression of the thirties, and the Communists' willingness
to participate in anti-Fascist alliances, led the Radical party - now
"...made up of largely middle-sector urban interests and including many
powerful industrialists."

- to form the Popular Front with a coali

tion of leftist-socialist parties.

The Popular Front was dominated by

the Radicals, thus, although it was a middle class and proletarian
alliance, it resulted mostly in benefits for the middle class and the
industrial bourgeoisie:
On the one hand, the Popular Front made consi
derable progress in creating an industrial
infrastructure, broadening the base of social
participation beyond a small elite, and
increasing conscious government involvement in

240gee Alan Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), chapter 2, "History of the
Labour Movement and its Legacy," pp. 11-41.
241petras, Politics and Social Forces, p. 262.
242p£ke> Spanish A m e r i c a , p. 97.
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the development process.
On the other hand, these changes tended to
enrich the upper and middle class In status,
wealth, and power, at the expense of the workers
and peasants.243
The Radical-dominated Popular Front sought to stimulate indus
trialization and established a governmental development agency (CORFO)
which became a "partner" to private capitalist development,^^

The

labor movement also expanded during the Popular Front years (which
lasted, with changes in the coalition, until 1950) through
unionization, in great part due to the expansion of industry.
In Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru this period experienced
populist alliances which included - or seriously threatened to include
- the peasantry, but in Chile the Popular Front, though it represented
a further decline in the landowning class' national political power,
did not threaten the hegemony of the landowners in the countryside.
And the bourgeoisie "in formation" became "socially and politically
integrated into the old oligarchy" - if it was not derived directly
from it.246
But neither did the middle class, nor proletariat pursue change
in the countryside.

As Arnold Bauer explains:

By the late 1930s and into the 1940s, organized
labor threatened to extend its influence into
the countryside and rural workers began haltingly

243petras, Politics and Social Forces, p. 132.
244vfeaver, "Growth Theory and Chile," p. 59; and Sunkel, "Change
and Frustration," pp. 122, 135.
^^Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement, p. 54.
246yeaverj "Growth Theory and Chile," p. 57; Pike, "Aspects of
Class Relations," pp. 210-214; and Petras, Political and Social Forces,
pp. 99-100, 133.
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to develop an 'exacting temperament* and push for
better salaries and conditions. As this occurred,
the landowners rattled the sabre of higher agri
cultural prices.
It was obvious to urban politi
cians that if higher food prices were allowed they
would cut into the earnings of the flourishing
industrial sector and create political problems
with the urban mass. Under these circumstances,
the industrialists, the proletariat and the
landowners struck a mutually beneficial bargain
at the expense of the rural workers: the land
owners agreed to accept controls on agricultural
prices in return for a hands-off policy in the
countryside. Rural workers were not permitted
to organize; protests were s q u e l c h e d . 247
The countryside was not experiencing widespread unrest.
peasant protests were extremely limited.

The

However, that they occurred

at all indicated that the impact of the capitalist classes was being
felt in the countryside.

That is, both socio-culturally, through

increased communications, and socio-economically, as the bourgeoisie
and the middle class purchased land and proletarianization gradually
diffused through the countryside, seigneurialism was in decline.
That neither the bourgeoisie nor the middle class, nor the
urban proletariat, supported peasant mobilization during this period,
as in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela, indicates not only the
extent of the integration of the bourgeoisie into the ruling bloc, but
also shows that a populist alliance does not automatically involve the
peasantry.
Thus, it appeared that the path to agrarian capitalism in Chile
would take place on the estates, involving the proletarianization of
the peasantry.
However, in the late 1950*s and into the early 1960's, a new,

247]jauer, Chilean Rural Society, p. 230.
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predominantly middle class, reform-oriented political party grew in
strength.

The origins of this party, the Christian Democratic, were

in the conservative Falange of the 1930's, which had favored the crea
tion of a corporate socio-political s t r u c t u r e . B y the early 1950's
the party had come to include leading elements of the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat, and involved two, potentially contradictory ideologi
cal orientations: one corporatist and the other populist; however,
during the mobilization process they were compatible.

2A Q

The Christian Democratic party had emerged in opposition to both
the pattern of capitalist development being pursued by the ruling bloc
and to the socialist challenge to capitalist development presented by
a Marxist coalition of the Socialist and Communist parties, the Popular
Action Front.250
As an alternative to the right and the left, the party grew
rapidly and took office in the national elections of 1964.

Its pro

gram included the "Chileanization" of major industries (particularly
mining), support of further industrialization, improved conditions for
the urban poor and residents of the rapidly expanding shanty towns,
and eventually, workers' participation in industry.25^
the Christian Democrats promised agrarian reform:
peasant organization.

Furthermore,

land reform and

o so
J

248petras, Politics and Social Forces, p. 209.
249Ibid., pp. 197-219.
250see xhomas G. Sanders, "The Christian Democrat Regime in
Chile," in Tomasek, ed., Latin American Politics, pp. 413-431.
251Ibid.

2^2Kaufmann, The Politics of Land Reform, pp. 86-97.
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The agrarian reform of the Christian Democratic government (196470) did initiate a land reform and dramatically increased peasant
organization; however, the contradictions of the multi-class alliance
and the increasingly opposed ideological orientations within the party
(i.e. corporatist and populist) inhibited the pursuance of an aggressive
land reform and, to a certain extent, the mobilization of the peas
antry. 253

The turnover of landownership in rural Chile, which had been

taking place since the late 1920's, represented purchases of land by
the bourgeoisie "in formation" and the middle class, which were the
dominant elements of the Christian Democratic Party.

Thus, the land

reform could not have proceeded very far without the party's challenging
its own class base.
The estates which were expropriated were often the more backward
and inefficiently operated ones, which were most easily challenged due
to the developmental orientations of the Christian Democratic govern
ment.

But many landowners blocked expropriation in the courts.

Nevertheless, the estates which were secured for the peasantry were
organized into cooperatives, called asentamientos. whose members were
the inquilinos of the estates.

Neither the voluntarios nor the

afuerinos (i.e. the rural proletariat) was included.

Thus, the

Christian Democratic agrarian reform was meant to be more than populistic, it was also intended to improve the performance of Chilean agri
culture which, unnecessarily, had been performing so poorly that Chile
had become an importer of foodstuffs.
^ ^ O n the Christian Democratic agrarian reform, see Petras and
LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution, pp. 125-252; David Lehmann, "Agrarian
Reform in Chile, 1965-1972: An Essay in Contradictions," in Lehmann,
ed., Peasants, pp. 71-120; and William C. Thiesenheusen, "Agrarian
Reform: Chile," in Peter Dorner, ed., Land Reform in Latin America:
Issues and Cases. Land Economics Monographs no. 3 (Madison: University
of Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 103-125.
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Christian Democratic reform was leaving the capitalist estates intact
and converting the inquilino into a privileged peasant stratum, which
employed the voluntaries and afuerinos, as an agricultural proletariat
when additional labor was

needed.

^54

While the land reform proceeded at an inhibited pace, the mobi
lization of the peasantry was moving rapidly.

In the late nineteen

fifties, peasant discontent increased in the countryside, due to
declining seigneurialism and gradual proletarianization, which also
meant a gradual, but steady, decline in living standards.

It also

meant that the totality of the landowrers' domination of the peasantry
was diminished, and with changes in the electoral law in 1958, the
Christian Democrats and the parties of the Popular Action Front sought
the support of the peasantry.^ 5

The nineteen sixties was a period of

even further and more rapid politicization and organization in the
countryside, particularly during the years of the Christian Democratic
regime when the political parties and the government were actively
mobilizing the peasants.
The politicization of the countryside generated increased peasant
unrest and gave rise to increasing work stoppages and land invasions.

2 57

(Lehmann), pp. 82-97.
255see Petras and Zeitlin, "Agrarian Radicalism," on peasant
voting patterns in the 1958 and 1964 elections. And, for a case study,
see James Petras and Hugo Zemelman Merino, Peasants in Revolt: A
Chilean Case Study. 1965-1971 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972).
256^^611^ Politics and the Labour Movement. Appendix 1, "Rural
Unionism," pp. 245-263; Petras and LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution,
pp. 233-242; and Lehmann, "Agrarian Reform," pp. 79-82.

257jbid., (Petras and LaPorte), p. 233.

And growing unrest in the urban-industrial and mining centers accen
tuated the contradictions in the Christian Democratic party.
in the late 1960's, the party split.

Finally,

The populist sector of the party

moved left to the Popular Action Front, and the more conservative and
corporatist elements moved right to the traditionalist parties, and
the 1970 elections produced a victory for the Popular Action Front,
renamed Unidad Popular (Popular Unity).
The peasants as a class also divided, into the beneficiaries of
the Christian Democratic reform and those who had yet to benefit - or
who had been excluded from land reform altogether.

With the election

victory of Unidad Popular the peasantry pushed the land reform on
their own through land invasions and occupations, and the government
had to give its s u p p o r t . T h u s ,

the latifundia, both seigneurial

and capitalist, appeared to have been eliminated in favor of peasant
proprietorship.
After three years in power, the Unidad Popular government was
overthrown by the military, which proceeded to undo the attempts at
socialist development which had begun.
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The future of the land

reform is in jeopardy.
Significantly, in comparative perspective, there has been dis
cussion of creating a national corporate socio-political structure,
in order to develop and assure capitalist hegemony.

260

258see Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural
Revolution in Allende's Chile," in Journal of Latin American Studies,
vol. 6, no. 1 (May 1974), pp. 135-159.
259see J. Ann Zammit, ed., The Chilean Road to Socialism (Sussex:
England and Austin: Institute of Development Studies, University of
Sussex and University of Texas Press, 1973).
^ ^ S e e Ronald C. Newton, "Natural Corporatism and the Passing of
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In Eastern Europe, capitalist development was carried out from
above by the already dominant mercantile class, limited industrial
bourgeoisie, and landed aristocracy.

In the 1848 Revolutions, the

peasantry was liberated from the remnants of serfdom and servile dues;
but the estates remained basically intact in the possession of the
landed aristocracy.

Nevertheless, seigneurialism gave way to capita

list social relations on the estates and the peasantry was gradually
proletarianized.

When, particularly in the 1920's, the peasantry and

the proletariat threatened the ruling bloc of the landowning aristo
crats and the bourgeoisie, there emerged the Fascist and authoritarian
regimes of the 1930's.

Thus, in Eastern Europe, where the peasants'

ally in the 1848 Revolutions, the bourgeoisie, had originally supported
them in the elimination of serfdom, but was unwilling to challenge the
aristocracy's proprietorship of the land, the elimination of
seigneurialism meant the gradual proletarianization of the peasantry.
In Spanish America, capitalist development also began as a pro
cess carried out from above by the ruling bloc of landowners and mer
cantile and mining bourgeoisies in participation with foreign capita
list enterprise, or often by enterprising foreign immigrants.

Thus,

in Spanish America, as in Eastern Europe, the bourgeoisie "in
formation" was not the classical revolutionary class of capitalists
described by Marx and others.
However, in Spanish America, the persistence of seigneurialism
led to the contradictions of combined, or heterogeneous development in

Populism in Spanish America," in Pike and Stritch, eds., The New
Corporatism, pp. 34-51.
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which capitalist and seigneurial relations co-existed.

That is,

seigneurial-dominated peasantries co-existed with rapidly emerging
working classes, organizing into labor movements, and urban middle
classes which provided potential allies for the peasantries to
challenge the landowners.
The historical conjuncture of growing peasant unrest against the
traditionally dominant landowners, generated by the continued loss of
peasant lands and/or the proletarianization process, and the emergence
of populist alliances composed of elements of the bourgeoisies, the
middle and working classes, against the patterns of capitalist develop
ment being carried out by the oligarchies enabled the populists to
harness the peasants into their alliances and, in turn, provided the
peasants with allies to challenge seigneurial domination and prevent
their proletarianization by securing the lands for themselves.
Thus, it might be stated, that although - as F. Stirton Weaver
has argued - the classical dialectic is dead, there has been a uniquely
Spanish American dialectic in which the contradictions of combined,
or heterogeneous, development generated populist alliances.
contradictions of the popular alliances appear to lead to the
development of national corporatism as the path of capitalist
development.

The

CONCLUSION

The first part of the thesis of this dissertation has been that
the Spanish American societies have - until recently - been character
ized by the domination of pre-capitalist ruling classes and that rural
Spanish America has been characterized by the persistence of pre
capitalist, predominantly seigneurial social relations of production
and domination.
It has been shown that Spanish American seigneurialism originated
in Iberian Spain.

Originally based on feudal-seigneurial prerogatives,

but increasingly on landownership, it was further enhanced and
elaborated through the process of conquest and colonization.
Comparatively with Eastern Europe, it has been argued that
commercial expansion had a conservative impact on the formation and
development of capitalism.

Although there is no denying the capital

accumulation by the mercantile and mining bourgeoisie, their wealth
was most often applied towards the purchase of estates and their own
seigneurialization; which had the effect of strengthening the hegemony
of the landowning classes and their pre-capitalist domination of the
Spanish American societies.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the dominant
classes of the Spanish American societies secured their independence
from the Spanish Empire, while at the same time maintaining their
pre-capitalist, seigneurial domination.

Having established their

independence, the Spanish American ruling classes proceeded to reduce
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the landownership of the Church and the Indian peasantry by eliminating
,'feudally,,-entailed properties, thereby expanding their seigneurial
domination of the peasantry.

It also further strengthened the hegemony

of the landowning classes by permitting the entry of new families of
"bourgeois" origins to landed status.
Although the Indian peasant communities often attempted to
resist the encroachment of the seigneurial latifundia upon their lands
they were generally unsuccessful, while the seigneurial mode of domina
tion on the estates immobilized that sector of the peasantry.

The

hegemony of the Spanish American ruling classes was, therefore, based
on the monopolization of landownership and the persistence of pre
capitalist social relations of production and domination, however
commercially oriented the landowners might be.
The second part of the thesis presented in this study has been
that the participation of the Spanish American societies in the
changing and expanding world economy of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries had the combined effect of strengthening seig
neurialism at the same time that it furthered the development of
capitalism in those societies.

Thus, the Spanish American societies

experienced the contradictions of combined, or heterogeneous, develop
ment (i.e. the coexistent expansion of seigneurial and capitalist
social relations of production), which, during the twentieth century
- under the impact of the world crises - generated the populist
(multi-class) alliances which have seriously challenged the pre
capitalist domination of the Spanish American societies and the
persistence of seigneurialism in rural Spanish America.
Again, comparatively with Eastern Europe, it has been shown that

the early successes of capitalist development and the cumulative
changes in the industrialization process meant that the capitalistindustrialization process itself could be imported at later, more
advanced stages, into pre-capitalist societies, and, therefore,
capitalist development could be carried out from above with decreased
revolutionary significance.

Thus, it appeared that the transition to

capitalist social relations in the countryside would also be carried
out from above, on the estates, involving the proletarianization of
the peasantry.

Which, as we saw, was what occurred in the Eastern

European societies in the nineteenth century, carried out either by
"modernizing" landed aristocrats or bourgeois purchasers of estates.
In Spanish America, even more than in Eastern Europe, the
development of capitalism appears to have been the product of foreign
capitalist enterprise and foreign immigrant entrepreneurs with or
without the active participation of the dominant classes.

And the

extractive-export character of much of the capitalist development
meant that the Spanish American societies would, again even more than
the East European societies, experience the contradictions of com
bined, or heterogeneous, development, that is the coexistent expansion
of seigneurial and capitalist social relations.

And yet, even in the

Spanish American societies, the development of capitalism began to
diffuse gradually into some regions of the countryside, either due to
the purchases of estates by foreign or national capitalists or the
"embourgeoisment" of landed "aristocrats."
However, the development of capitalism also gave rise to those
classes which "potentially" provided allies for the peasantry to
challenge the persistent expansion of the seigneurial latifundia and
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to prevent the gradual proletarianization process which was beginning.
And, generated by the crises of this century, in particular the impact
of the world depression upon the export-oriented economies of the
Spanish American societies, there were formed populist alliances in
opposition to the ruling blocs, or oligarchies, of landowning aristo
crats and mercantile bourgeoisies; which, though by no means guaranteed,
harnessed the growing unrest of the peasantry for their movements at
the same time that they provided allies to the peasantry which enabled
them to effectively challenge the landowners and secure the land for
themselves.

Thus, seigneurialism was finally eliminated through land

reforms which also halted the process of proletarianization of the
peasantry from above.
Finally, the third part of the thesis of this dissertation has
been that the underdevelopment characteristic of Spanish America and,
in particular, rural Spanish America, has not been due to the
supposedly non-commercial orientation of the Spanish American land
owning classes as argued by the dualist thesis.

Nor has the partici

pation of the Spanish American societies in the world economy
- "although," to repeat the quote of Weaver:

"inter-nation transfers

of economic surplus is useful for understanding the benefits accruing
to the developed capitalist trading and investing nations" - been the
cause of Spanish America's underdevelopment, as argued by the develop
ment of underdevelopment thesis.

Andre Gunder Frank has correctly

pointed to the ahistoricity of Jacques Lambert's dualist thesis: rural
Spanish America, although admittedly with historical and regional
variation, has actively participated in the regional, national and
world economies.

However, while Frank is historically more accurate
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than Lambert with reference to the commercial orientation of the
Spanish American landowners, he has incorrectly attributed the cause
of underdevelopment to that commercial activity.

Rather, it has been

argued, the underdevelopment characteristic of the Spanish American
societies, and, in particular, rural Spanish America, has been the
historical product of the domination of the pre-capitalist ruling
classes and the persistence of pre-capitalist, predominantly seig
neurial social relations of production and domination in the country
side, which inhibited the emergence of a national bourgeoisie and
capitalist development.
The Spanish American populist alliances have tended to give way
to socio-political structures and political economies which have been
termed corporatist and, we would argue, appear to be attempts to pursue
capitalist development and industrialization and to establish capita
list hegemony in those societies.

From this perspective, there arises

an interesting hypothesis in the context of the work done by Barrington
Moore on "modernization."^

Jonathan Weiner has summarized Moore's

thesis:
Moore argues that there have been three different
types of modernization distinguished by the
changes in class structure that accompany develop
ment, and by the political costs and achievements
of each in their contribution to increasing
freedom and rationality.
The first type Moore calls "bourgeois revolu
tion," in which a violent revolution abolished
the domination of the traditional landed elite
and brought capitalist democracy to England, France
and the United States.
The second is "revolution
from above," the process in Germany and Japan by
which the traditional landed elite defeated popular

1-See Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy.
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revolution and preserved its dominant position
during industrialization, a process which cul
minated in fascism.
The third type is "peasant
revolution," which in Russia and China saw the
traditional elite abolished, not by a revolu
tionary bourgeoisie, but by a revolutionary
peasantry which cleared the way for modernization.^
That is, according to Moore, there have been three paths to the
"modern world," culminating, respectively, in: democratic capitalism,
fascism, and communism.

Thus, the hypothesis which might be formulated

is that Spanish America appears to present a fourth path to the
"modern world" = the populist path culminating in corporatism.^

Of

course, the testing of such a hypothesis requires a number of things
which are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but at the same time
it does indicate the limitations and/or inadequacies of this study and
suggests further areas of research.
A principal limitation of this study has been that it has,
perhaps, overemphasized the similarity in the historical experiences
of the Spanish American societies, for admittedly there have been, and
are, great differences between them; for example, the most obvious
differences between Bolivia and Chile.

Thus, we would suggest that

future comparative research based on class analysis focus on comparing
the Spanish American societies amongst themselves,^ which might help in
understanding why Venezuelan society has not moved towards corporatism.

^Jonathan M. Weiner, "The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its
Critics," Theory and Society, vol. 2 (1975), p. 301.
^Both Moore (Social Origins, p. 483) and Weiner, ("The Barrington
Moore Thesis," p. 325) suggest comparative studies of Latin America.
^See, for example, Weaver, "Political Disintegration and
Reconstruction in 19th Century Spanish America: The Class Basis of
Political Change."
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Such comparative study should also be expanded to Include those
Spanish and Latin American societies where populist alliances have
either failed to materialize, e.g. Colombia, or have done so - but
without mobilizing the peasantry - e.g. Argentina and Brazil.
Another area requiring further study - of both an historical and
'more contemporary' socio-political nature - which this dissertation
has approached, but perhaps inadequately, is the issue of "hegemony;"
that is, the manner in which a class maintains its rule by consent,
not force.
Historically, this refers to the hegemony of the Spanish American
landowning classes, both with respect to the dependent peasantry and
the mercantile and mining classes which so eagerly seigneurialized
themselves.

In addition to the politico-economic links and social

and family ties supporting hegemony, study should also focus on the
ideological and cultural (i.e. superstructural) aspects of Spanish
American seigneurial domination which served to legitimize it to both
subordinate elites and the peasant and semi-proletarian classes.
Within this area of research might be included the role of the Church
as the major cultural institution of those societies.
Frederick Pike has recently presented a model of Spanish American
"hegemony" in which he argues that the Spanish American societies have
consisted historically of two cultures, i.e. a dominant and a
subordinate culture, differentiated by their world views.®

He terms

^In addition to Gramsci's own writings (Prison Notebooks), see
Gwyn A. Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio
Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation," Journal of the History of Ideas,
vol. 21, no. 4 (October-December 1960), pp. 586-599.

^See Pike, Spanish America.

He does not use the term hegemony.
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the dominant culture capitalistic and paternalistic (with which we
must dissent and argue for the seigneurial thesis) and the subordinate
culture non-capitalist and dependent.^

Although we would argue, that

the Spanish American societies have, perhaps, not been so much cultu
rally dualistic as that the dominant and subordinate aspects represent
respective class orientations within the hegemony of the dominant
class; nevertheless, Pike's model does give rise to some interesting
hypotheses.

For example, does the subordinate culture present a

potential for opposing and challenging the dominant culture which
would be other than conservative, as the Spanish American societies
become increasingly capitalist?
With respect to "more contemporary" socio-political research
and Spanish America's movement towards corporatism, in fact, does it
merely represent an adaptation of the traditional culture by the
dominant classes of the Spanish American societies in their attempts
to establish their hegemony while, at the same time, carrying out
capitalist development?

And yet, if so, what will be the results and

contradictions of seeking to maintain - or better, "carry-over" - the
traditional superstructure while carrying out capitalist development
and industrialization both with respect to the proletariat and the
peasantry?
Finally, there remains the issue of the legacy of seigneurialism
in the countryside.

A significant feature of Spanish American

7lbid., pp. 9-14.
®Ibid. And Howard J. Wiarda, Politics and Social Change in Latin
America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst: The University of Massachu
setts Press, 1974).

seigneuriaiism and the agrarian structure was the differentiation and
division of the peasantry into, for example, Indian peasant villages
and estate serfs which (particularly in this case, as the differen
tiation is both socio-economic and socio-cultural)^ inhibited the
development of peasant movements.

A legacy of this intra-class dif

ferentiation and division arose during the land reform processes.

In

Bolivia, to cite one example, Antonio Garcfa has written that, in
addition to other problems of land reform: "Neither did it foresee the
conflicts which were to arise between communities and ex-colonos over
the lands of one and the same hacienda."*-®
arose in Peru and Chile.*■*■

Similar conflicts also

In fact, it might be asked, to what extent

were peasant land occupations and seizures actually pre-emptive actions
to the threat of land invasions by another peasant group?
Beyond the land reforms, what is the legacy of seigneurialism in
the countryside with respect to the development of capitalism and
industry?

Although the peasantry, through the populist alliances, has

apparently eliminated the seigneurial latifundia and prevented their
proletarianization on the estates, it is difficult to imagine that this
has opened the path to agrarian capitalism from below - nor was that
the peasants' goal!

That is, although the latifundia has been elimi

nated from the latifundla-minifunda complex, the minifundia remains

^In this vein, it must be repeated that insufficient attention
has been given to the racial/ethnic element as a dimension of class
domination.
*®Garcia, "Agrarian Reform and Social Development in Bolivia,"
p. 310.
*-*Tn Chile, the inquilinos sought to exclude the voluntarios
and afuerinos from the benefits of the reform.
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and underdevelopment continues to characterize rural Spanish America.
Thus, vhile the peasantry continues to support the populist cum
corporatist regimes, those regimes have not challenged the peasantry's
conservatism by aggressively supporting the peasantry in rural develop
ment efforts.

Rather, resources for agricultural production (not land)

are monopolized by those capitalist estates which have remained
intact.
Not least of all due to population growth and pressure on the
land, proletarianization proceeds from below - which is to be expected
from capitalist development and historically has not been a "negative"
feature in itself.

However, as we have already seen, history has pro

duced changes in the industrialization process such that industrial
development is not necessarily labor-absorptive.^

Therefore, rural

proletarianization, it appears, does not represent the transfer of
peasants to industry as an urban proletariat, but the creation of a
sub-proletariat; whose existence as a labor-reserve would seem to mean
lower wages for the proletariat, and, at the same time, they appear to
be the personification of what the economist, Joan Robinson, meant by:
"...the misery of being exploited by capitalist is nothing compared to
the misery of not being exploited at a l l . " ^

Thus, while

•^On Mexico, see Stavenhagen, "Social Aspects of Agrarian
Structure," pp. 247-257; and for Bolivia, see Burke and Malloy, "From
National Populism to National Corporatism," pp. 56-60. And in Peru
there are Peruvian-owned capitalist 'farms' which are being left
intact, see Zaldfvar, "Agrarian Reform."
13por an interesting article which presents a dissenting view on
the supposed impossibility of industrialization and capitalist develop
ment, see Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization,"
New Left Review, no. 81 (September-October 1973), pp. 3-44.
^ J o a n Robinson, Economic Philosophy (London: Penguin Books, 1964),

p. 46.
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capitalist-industrialization is pursued and a capitalist-estate sector
threatens to command the agricultural economy, the peasantry of rural
Spanish America continues to be characterized by a "pre-capitalist"
mode of production.
And yet, if development is to be more than economic growth via
industrialization - which has even been implicitly assumed herein
- then the development issue itself must be reconstructed.

That is,

the question can no longer be "is^ capitalist development possible?"
- which it is, as heretofore defined - but rather, "is there not an
alternative to capitalist development which would not entail its own
extremes of domination and exploitation?"

But here we arrive at the

point where historical social science ends and politics begin.

And,

to repeat the words of E.H. Carr:
A historically-minded generation is one which
looks back, not indeed for the solutions which
cannot be found in the past, but for those
critical insights which are necessary both to
the understanding of its existing situation and
to the realization of the values which it holds.
Keeping this in mind, the evidence and interpretation presented
in this dissertation - that seigneurialism persisted and yet was
finally overcome - affirm the proposition that 'history is a process
of becoming' and, therefore, other modes of domination and exploitation
can also be challenged.

l^Carr, The New Society, p. 18.
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